Comparison of performance measurement-systems used for order-picking

In consequence of rapidly changing market demands companies are permanently encouraged to review their own processes and structures and to modify them. Being one of these developments, order-picking is involved as part of an intra-logistics system. But to take appropriate actions, system performance and system costs have to be measured permanently. Concerning this the use of performance measurement-systems as further development of traditional systems of key figures is suitable. In this paper various performance measurement-systems are compared and their suitability for an implementation in order-picking systems is estimated. On the basis of the result of the evaluation a first concept of a performance measurement-system for order-picking will be developed by using typical key figures that are mentioned in academic literature. Finally, hints for a necessary detailed implementation and evaluation in practice will be given.

Vergleich von Performance Measurement-Systemen zum Einsatz für die Kommissionierung

Aufgrund sich schnell verändernder Anforderungen des Marktes sind Unternehmen ständig dazu aufgefordert, ihre eigenen Prozesse und Strukturen zu überdenken und ggf. anzupassen. Von diesen Entwicklungen ist auch die Kommissionierung als Teil eines Intralogistiksystems betroffen. Um allerdings geeignete Maßnahmen ergreifen zu können, müssen Systemleistungen und –kosten permanent gemessen werden. Hierzu eignet sich der Einsatz von Performance Measurement-Systemen als Weiterentwicklung traditioneller Kennzahlensysteme. In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene Performance Measurement-Systeme gegenüber gestellt und hinsichtlich ihrer Eignung für den Einsatz in Kommissioniersystemen bewertet. Auf Basis der Ergebnisse der Bewertung erfolgt eine erste Konzeption eines Performance Measurement-Systems für die Kommissionierung unter Verwendung typischer Kennzahlen, die in der Literatur genannt werden. Abschließend werden Hinweise zur noch notwendigen detaillierten Umsetzung und Evaluation in der Praxis gegeben.

Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.

Effects of Ownership on Hospital Efficiency in Germany

The objective of our study was to evaluate the efficiency of public, private for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals in Germany. First, bootstrapped data envelopment analysis (DEA) was used to evaluate the efficiency of a panel (n = 1,046) of public, private for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals between 2002 and 2006. This was followed by a second-step truncated linear regression model with bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores as dependent variable. The results show that public hospitals performed significantly better than their private for-profit and non-profit counterparts. In addition, we found a significant positive association between hospital size and efficiency, and that competitive pressure had a significant negative impact on hospital efficiency.

Earnings Management and Measurement Error

In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.