Integrating Pricing and Inventory Control: Is it Worth the Effort?

In this paper we first show that the gains achievable by integrating pricing and inventory control are usually small for classical demand functions. We then introduce reference price models and demonstrate that for this class of demand functions the benefits of integration with inventory control are substantially increased due to the price dynamics. We also provide some analytical results for this more complex model. We thus conclude that integrated pricing/inventory models could repeat the success of revenue management in practice if reference price effects are included in the demand model and the properties of this new model are better understood.

Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.