Earnings Management and Measurement Error

In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.

MAS Integration and Controllership Effectiveness: Evidence of a Preparer-User Perception Gap

Recent evidence suggests that managers establish a positive link between management accounting system (MAS) integration and controllership effectiveness, which is fully mediated by the perceived consistency of financial language. Our paper extends this research by analyzing whether controllers have similar perceptions on MAS design. Testing a series of multi-group structural equation models, we find evidence for a preparer-user perception gap with respect to the mediating impact of a consistent financial language. Our results contribute to the still-ongoing controversial debate on MAS integration by indicating that the effectiveness of MAS design cannot be evaluated solely from an instrumental perspective independent from users’ perceptions.