Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking

The paper discusses the phenomenon of injunctions against third parties that are innocent from the tort law perspective. One such type of injunction, website blocking, is currently appearing in the spotlight around various European jurisdictions as a consequence of the implementation of Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Website-blocking injunctions are used in this paper only as a plastic and perhaps also canonical example of the paradigmatic shift we are facing: the shift from tort-law-centric injunctions to in rem injunctions. The author of this paper maintains that the theoretical framework for the latter injunctions is not in the law of civil wrongs, but in an old Roman law concept of ‘in rem actions’ (actio in rem negatoria). Thus the term ‘in rem injunctions’ is coined to describe this paradigm of injunctions. Besides the theoretical foundations, this paper explains how a system of injunctions against innocent third parties fits into the private law regulation of negative externalities of online technology and explores the expected dangers of derailing injunctions from the tracks of tort law. The author’s PhD project – the important question of the justification of an extension of the intellectual property entitlements by the in rem paradigm, along with its limits or other solutions – is left out from the paper.

Information as Property

Information is widely regarded as one of the key concepts of modern society. The production, distribution and use of information are some of the key aspects of modern economies. Driven by technological progress information has become a good in its own right. This established an information economy and challenged the law to provide an apt framework suitable to promote the production of information, enable its distribution and efficient allocation, and deal with the risks inherent in information technology. Property rights are a major component of such a framework. However, information as an object of property rights is not limited to intellectual property but may also occur as personality aspects or even tangible property. Accordingly, information as property can be found in the area of intellectual property, personality protection and other property rights. This essay attempts to categorize three different types of information that can be understood as a good in the economic sense and an object in the legal sense: semantic information, syntactic information and structural information. It shows how legal ownership of such information is established by different subjective rights. In addition the widespread debate regarding the justification of intellectual property rights is demonstrated from the wider perspective of informational property in general. Finally, in light of current debates, this essay explores whether “data producers” shall have a new kind of property right in data.

The Law Applicable to Online Copyright Infringements int ALI and CLIP Proposals: A Rebalance of Interest Needed?

The article discusses the problems of applicable law to copyright infringements online. It firstly identifies the main problems related to the well established territoriality principle and the lex loci protectionis rules. Then; the discussion focuses on the "ubiquitous infringement" rule recently proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the European Max Planck Group for Conflicts of Law and Intellectual Propoperty (CLIP). The author strongly welcomes a compromise between the territoriality and universality approaches suggested in respect of ubiquitous infringement cases. At the same time; the paper draws the attention that the interests of "good faith" online service providers (such as legal certainty and foreseeability) have been until now underestimated and invites to take these interests into account when merging the projects into a common international proposal.

Spanish Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Google Search Engine... and a Flexible Reading of Copyright Statutes?

On 3 April 2012, the Spanish Supreme Court issued a major ruling in favour of the Google search engine, including its ‘cache copy’ service: Sentencia n.172/2012, of 3 April 2012, Supreme Court, Civil Chamber.* The importance of this ruling lies not so much in the circumstances of the case (the Supreme Court was clearly disgusted by the claimant’s ‘maximalist’ petitum to shut down the whole operation of the search engine), but rather on the court going beyond the text of the Copyright Act into the general principles of the law and case law, and especially on the reading of the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) in a positive sense so as to include all these principles. After accepting that none of the limitations listed in the Spanish Copyright statute (TRLPI) exempted the unauthorized use of fragments of the contents of a personal website through the Google search engine and cache copy service, the Supreme Court concluded against infringement, based on the grounds that the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) is to be read not only in a negative manner but also in a positive sense so as to take into account that intellectual property – as any other kind of property – is limited in nature and must endure any ius usus inocui (harmless uses by third parties) and must abide to the general principles of the law, such as good faith and prohibition of an abusive exercise of rights (Art. 7 Spanish Civil Code).The ruling is a major success in favour of a flexible interpretation and application of the copyright statutes, especially in the scenarios raised by new technologies and market agents, and in favour of using the three-step test as a key tool to allow for it.