Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia – Claim and Reality

This article discusses democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and ANNAHDA in Tunesia. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principles of democratic consensus, consultation, and freedom of opinion, and an understanding that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic caliphate as a state system. Against this background, an examination of the political system proposed until 1992 by the Algerian FIS shows that this system would have resulted in a very restrictive form of Islam. An investigation of the political system of the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rached al-Ghannouchi reveals that the system he proposes may be designated as an Islamic democracy, since it takes into account separation of powers and pluralism of political parties. The head of state would be subject to the law in the same manner as the people. However, it is no liberal democracy, as he categorically rejects secularism, intends to punish apostates, and is only willing to allow political parties that are based on the religion of Islam. His state would only be a state of those citizens who follow Islam, completely neglecting secularist groups. Social conflicts and unrest are thus predetermined.

Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking

The paper discusses the phenomenon of injunctions against third parties that are innocent from the tort law perspective. One such type of injunction, website blocking, is currently appearing in the spotlight around various European jurisdictions as a consequence of the implementation of Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Website-blocking injunctions are used in this paper only as a plastic and perhaps also canonical example of the paradigmatic shift we are facing: the shift from tort-law-centric injunctions to in rem injunctions. The author of this paper maintains that the theoretical framework for the latter injunctions is not in the law of civil wrongs, but in an old Roman law concept of ‘in rem actions’ (actio in rem negatoria). Thus the term ‘in rem injunctions’ is coined to describe this paradigm of injunctions. Besides the theoretical foundations, this paper explains how a system of injunctions against innocent third parties fits into the private law regulation of negative externalities of online technology and explores the expected dangers of derailing injunctions from the tracks of tort law. The author’s PhD project – the important question of the justification of an extension of the intellectual property entitlements by the in rem paradigm, along with its limits or other solutions – is left out from the paper.