Igbo Nationalism and Biafra

When I was living in Igboland in 1993 and from 1994 to 1996, there was not much talk about Biafra, the secessionist republic that had been defeated by the Nigerian army in 1970. Not one Igbo politician suggested that his or her people in the southeast of Nigeria should secede again and proclaim a second Biafra. Since 1984, Nigeria had been ruled by the military, and political hopes focused on a return to democracy. Democracy did come in 1999, but it proved a big disappointment. It did not end the marginalisation of the Igbo but led to an increase in the number of ethnic and religious clashes, with Igbo 'migrants' in northern Nigeria as the main victims. It was Nigeria's fourth transition to democracy, and the Igbo lost out again. When I returned to Igboland for brief visits between 2000 and 2007, the option of a new Biafra was widely discussed. Many of my former colleagues at the University of Nsukka seemed to be in favour of the secession project. I talked to supporters of the main separatist organisation, Movement for the Actualisation of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and I discussed the project with members of Ohanaeze, a loose association of Igbo politicians, most of whom had distanced themselves from radical secessionism. In order to learn more about the resurgence of Igbo nationalism, I collected Igbo periodicals. A few of them, such as the New Republic, resembled newspapers; others, like News Round, Eastern Sunset or Weekly Hammer (with eight pages in A4 size), looked more like political pamphlets. Street vendors used back issues as wrapping paper, so they were easy to get. Most of them had been edited not in Igboland, but in Lagos, Nigeria's commercial centre and former capital which is home to a huge Igbo diaspora. Though written in English, these publications are addressed exclusively to an Igbo readership, discussing global and domestic affairs from a nationalist point of view. Articles printed here, no matter their topic, are nationalist in the sense that they assess things from the standpoint of Igbo interests. The same is true of many articles on Igbo websites and of some books and brochures written for an Igbo audience. Another source of information on Igbo nationalism are statements by Igbo governors, ministers, members of parliament and other professional politicians who are quoted in newspapers, such as Vanguard or Guardian, and in weekly magazines such as Newswatch, Tell or The News – all with a Nigeria-wide circulation and a multi-ethnic readership. Nigeria's papers and magazines are among the best in Africa. They try to be balanced in their coverage of ethnic conflicts, and they give reliable information. The same cannot be said of periodicals produced by Igbo nationalists. They provide space for Igbo all over the world to voice their opinions, and they tolerate much controversy, but they are not accurate when reporting facts.

Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia – Claim and Reality

This article discusses democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and ANNAHDA in Tunesia. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principles of democratic consensus, consultation, and freedom of opinion, and an understanding that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic caliphate as a state system. Against this background, an examination of the political system proposed until 1992 by the Algerian FIS shows that this system would have resulted in a very restrictive form of Islam. An investigation of the political system of the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rached al-Ghannouchi reveals that the system he proposes may be designated as an Islamic democracy, since it takes into account separation of powers and pluralism of political parties. The head of state would be subject to the law in the same manner as the people. However, it is no liberal democracy, as he categorically rejects secularism, intends to punish apostates, and is only willing to allow political parties that are based on the religion of Islam. His state would only be a state of those citizens who follow Islam, completely neglecting secularist groups. Social conflicts and unrest are thus predetermined.

Education and Ideologies of the Knowledge Economy: Europe and the Politics of Emulation

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously proposed a style of philosophy that was directed against certain pictures [bild] that tacitly direct our language and forms of life. His aim was to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle and to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1953, 115). In this context Wittgenstein is talking of philosophical pictures, deep metaphors that have structured our language but he does also use the term picture in other contexts (see Owen 2003, 83). I want to appeal to Wittgenstein in my use of the term ideology to refer to the way in which powerful underlying metaphors in neoclassical economics have a strong rhetorical and constitutive force at the level of public policy. Indeed, I am specifically speaking of the notion of ‘the performative’ in Wittgenstein and Austin. The notion of the knowledge economy has a prehistory in Hayek (1937; 1945) who founded the economics of knowledge in the 1930s, in Machlup (1962; 1970), who mapped the emerging employment shift to the US service economy in the early 1960s, and to sociologists Bell (1973) and Touraine (1974) who began to tease out the consequences of these changes for social structure in the post-industrial society in the early 1970s. The term has been taken up since by economists, sociologists, futurists and policy experts recently to explain the transition to the so-called ‘new economy’. It is not just a matter of noting these discursive strands in the genealogy of the ‘knowledge economy’ and related or cognate terms. We can also make a number of observations on the basis of this brief analysis. First, there has been a succession of terms like ‘postindustrial economy’, ‘information economy’, ‘knowledge economy’, ‘learning economy’, each with a set of related concepts emphasising its social, political, management or educational aspects. Often these literatures are not cross-threading and tend to focus on only one aspect of phenomena leading to classic dichotomies such as that between economy and society, knowledge and information. Second, these terms and their family concepts are discursive, historical and ideological products in the sense that they create their own meanings and often lead to constitutive effects at the level of policy. Third, while there is some empirical evidence to support claims concerning these terms, at the level of public policy these claims are empirically underdetermined and contain an integrating, visionary or futures component, which necessarily remains untested and is, perhaps, in principle untestable.

Structural Problems in the Development of Social Work in Central Europe under Transformation. The Case of Poland

Socio-economic transformation the countries of Central Europe are undergoing since 1989 has brought new developments in social welfare systems of this region. Social work, which was in the countries of the region during its communist past either non-existent or superficial activity, has become treated as an instrument of social welfare systems there. The collapse of authoritarian regimes in the region clearly inducted political leaderships there to opt for transition to Western style civil society. Hence an adoption of social work seemed to be natural choice for the countries in the region.