Soziale Dienste, Schule und zivilgesellschaftliches Klima

In an international perspective cooperation between social services and school has a long tradition. In the German speaking countries we can recognize a historical distance or gap between school and “social pedagogy”, but despite this tradition new forms of cooperation are arising since the last few years. This tendency is part of the development of European societies into “knowledge-based societies” where knowledge and cultural capital are becoming ever stricter criteria for participation in society. This puts particular pressure on those adolescents who threaten to fail in the positional competition for educational qualifications. And it tends to the reproduction and reinforcing of social inequalities due to inequalities in education. For that reason in the article the development of school related social services in different European countries is investigated and it is shown that the increasing pressure to qualification and selection in school creates various problems of integration. Social dimensions of education are pointed out delivering starting points for the cooperation of social services in school and opening opportunities for productive forms of coping with differences between family background, informal social environment and educational milieu in school. Particular attention is paid to differences in socio cultural habits, in socio economical opportunities and in collective practices of interaction. A central focus in the contribution is the orientation towards a participative civil society climate relevant for the interaction between teachers and pupils and between professionals and addressees of social services as well. It is a task of future research in school related social services to analyse their institutional structure and their practices of professional interaction and to find out by European and international comparison in which way social services can contribute to the establishing of a participative civil society climate in school.

The Integration of Formal and Non-formal Education: The Dutch “brede school”

The Dutch “brede school” (BS) development originates in the 1990s and has spread unevenly since: quicker in the primary than secondary educational sector. In 2007, there were about 1000 primary and 350 secondary BS schools and it is the intention of the government as well as the individual municipalities to extend that number and make the BS the dominant school form of the near future. In the primary sector, a BS cooperates with crèche and preschool facilities, besides possible other neighborhood partners. The main targets are, first, to enhance educational opportunities, particularly for children with little (western-) cultural capital, and secondly to increase women’s labor market participation by providing extra familial care for babies and small children. All primary schools are now obliged to provide such care. In the secondary sector, a BS is less neighborhood-orientated than a primary BS because those schools are bigger and more often located in different buildings. As in the primary sector, there are broad and more narrow BS, the first profile cooperating with many non-formal and other partners and facilities and the second with few. On the whole, there is a wide variety of BS schools, with different profiles and objectives, dependent on the needs and wishes of the initiators and the neighborhood. A BS is always the result of initiatives of the respective school and its partners: parents, other neighborhood associations, municipality etc. BS schools are not enforced by the government although the general trend will be that existing school organizations transform into BS. The integration of formal and non-formal education and learning is more advanced in primary than secondary schools. In secondary education, vocational as well as general, there is a clear dominance of formal education; the non-formal curriculum serves mainly two lines and objectives: first, provide attractive leisure activities and second provide compensatory courses and support for under-achievers who are often students with migrant background. In both sectors, primary and secondary, it is the formal school organization with its professionals which determines the character of a BS; there is no full integration of formal and non-formal education resulting in one non-disruptive learning trajectory, nor is there the intention to go in that direction. Non-formal pedagogues are partly professionals, like youth- and social workers, partly volunteers, like parents, partly non-educational partners, like school-police, psycho-medical help or commercial leisure providers. Besides that, the BS is regarded by government educational and social policy as a potential partner and anchor for community development. It is too early to make reliable statements about the effects of the BS movement in the Netherlands concerning the educational opportunities for disadvantaged children and their families, especially those with migrant background, and combat further segregation. Evaluation studies made so far are moderately positive but also point to problems of overly bureaucratized structures and layers, lack of sufficient financial resources and, again, are uncertain about long-term effects.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.