Position, professional expertise and functions of an educator of child care homes in Lithuania

Speaking about professionals, working with children at child care homes in Lithuania, first of all we encounter a problem of terminology. This problem rises, because in various countries and languages we call these professionals differently. In Lithuania we call them ”aukletojai”. We also use the word ”aukletojas” when speaking about both professionals, working directly with children at kindergartens, and parents, as all parents are educators of their children. We suppose, that the word ”aukletojas” corresponds to the German “erzieher”, and “aukleti” to “erziehen”. Every “aukletojas” in Lithuania clearly realizes, that he is a pedagogue, because in this country every professional, involved in educational work with children – an ”aukletojas”, a teacher, a social pedagogue and a special pedagogue – is called a pedagogue. In this context it is essential to conceive that in Lithuania an ”educator” and a ”social pedagogue” are different pedagogical professions and that none of the ”aukletojas” identify himself as a social pedagogue.

A Cooperative and Adaptive Variable Neighborhood Search for the Multi Depot Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows

In this paper we propose two cooperation schemes to compose new parallel variants of the Variable Neighborhood Search (VNS). On the one hand, a coarse-grained cooperation scheme is introduced which is well suited for being enhanced with a solution warehouse to store and manage the so far best found solutions and a self-adapting mechanism for the most important search parameters. This makes an a priori parameter tuning obsolete. On the other hand, a fine-grained scheme was designed to reproduce the successful properties of the sequential VNS. In combination with the use of parallel exploration threads all of the best solutions and 11 out of 20 new best solutions for the Multi Depot Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows were found.

The Value of Negotiating Cost-Based Transfer Prices

This paper analyzes the potential of one-step transfer prices based on either variable or full costs for coordinating decentralized production and quality-improving investment decisions. Transfer prices based on variable costs fail to induce investments on the upstream stage. In contrast, transfer prices based on full costs provide strong investment incentives for the upstream divisions. However, they fail to coordinate the investment decisions. We show that negotiations prevent such coordination failure. In particular, we find that the firm benefits from a higher degree of decentralization so that total profit increases in the number of parameters being subject to negotiations.