Il razzismo della prosperità nell’Europa contemporanea - Riflessioni a margine del pensiero antirazzista di Walter Lorenz

Recent publishing on the migration phenomena in the communitarian and globalized Europe, puts in evidence a fundamental racism which is capable of making cultural processes grow and feed both chaos and social disorder. As a matter of fact we are approaching the ending debates on multicultural citizenship as well as on solidary integration and antiracism. Since the appearing of these phenomena, namely the huge post colonial migration in the nineteen-eighties, by which the colonized countries became almost “emigrant nurseries”, one could expect their stabilization. On the contrary, globalization and migration (twin subjects) everywhere still produce, at various levels, social disturbances together with some chauvinistic limitations as an ultimate kind of western prosperity defense. The peculiar European features of this new racism, less than ideological (superiority, homogeneity and civilizing mission), are confined to the concepts of patriotism, inequality and exclusion. In these terms one can understand why the new economic expansionism and the quest for new world markets makes European policies unstable, which remain undecided between conservatism, liberalism and extreme right. All this explains at least two things: the existing ambiguities of some European policies aiming to enhance particular forms of protectionism, and the difficulties in which the antiracist thought seems to be embedded. Indeed, according to what Walter Lorenz has already made clear, by using a well founded methodology, which prevents any fruitless protestations, it is impossible to contrast racism and nationalism. In such context, the educational field should try to use an operative epistemology. In other words the antiracist thought should dispose of competences and skills and, especially, personal and reflective capabilities. All this in order to avoid that which, in different historical scenes, permit the revival of the sense of moral opprobrium could not be identified with the political alibi to maintain privileges as well as advantages for the exclusive benefit of wealthy countries.

The Impact of Western Social Workers in Romania - a Fine Line between Empowerment and Disempowerment

Ideally the social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance their well-being (IFSW 2004). The social work practice, however, often proves to be different. Social workers are always in the danger to make decisions for their clients or define problems according to their own interpretation and world view. In quite a number of cases, the consequence of such a social work practice is that the clients feel disempowered rather than empowered. This dilemma is multiplying when western social workers get involved in developing countries. The potential that intervention, with the intention to empower and liberate the people, turns into disempowerment is tremendously higher because of the differences in tradition, culture and society, on the one side and the power imbalance between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ on the other side. Especially in developing countries, where the vast majority of people live in poverty, many Western social workers come with a lot of sympathy and the idea to help the poor and to change the world. An example is Romania. After the collapse of communism in 1989, Romania was an economically, politically and socially devastated country. The pictures of the orphanages shocked the western world. As a result many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), churches and individuals were bringing humanitarian goods to Romania in order to alleviate the misery of the Romanian people and especially the children. Since then, important changes in all areas of life have occurred, mostly with foreign financial aid and support. At the political level, democratic institutions were established, a liberal market economy was launched and laws were adapted to western standards regarding the accession into the European Union and the NATO. The western world has left its marks also at the grassroots level in form of NGOs or social service agencies established through western grants and individuals. Above and beyond, the presence of western goods and investment in Romania is omnipresent. This reflects a newly-gained freedom and prosperity - Romania profits certainly from these changes. But this is only one side of the medal, as the effect of westernisation contradicts with the Romanian reality and overruns many deep-rooted traditions, thus the majority of people. Moreover, only a small percentage of the population has access to this western world. Western concepts, procedures or interpretations are often highly differing from the Romanian tradition, history and culture. Nevertheless, western ideas seem to dominate the transition in many areas of daily life in Romania. A closer look reveals that many changes take place due to pressure of western governments and are conditioned to financial support. The dialectic relationship between the need for foreign aid and the implementation becomes very obvious in Romania and often leads, despite the substantial benefits, to unpredictable and rather negative side-effects, at a political, social, cultural, ecological and/or economic level. This reality is a huge dilemma for all those involved, as there is a fine line between empowering and disempowering action. It is beyond the scope of this journal to discuss the dilemma posed by Western involvement at all levels; therefore this article focuses on the impact of Western social workers in Romania. The first part consists of a short introduction to social work in Romania, followed by the discussion about the dilemma posed by the structure of project of international social work and the organisation of private social service agencies. Thirdly the experiences of Romanian staff with Western social workers are presented and then discussed with regard to turning disempowering tendencies of Western social workers into empowerment.

Poverty in Israel

The paper deals with poverty within Israel. Against the background of the history of pre-state Israel and the developments after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the historical roots of Israeli poverty are analyzed. Thus the ‘socialist’-Zionist project, ethnic exclusion, religious and intra-Jewish ethnic lines of conflict as well as the Bedouins, Druzes and Israeli Arabs as ‘specific’ Israeli citizen are discussed. Despite the economic growth in Israel since 2003 ‘the majority of Israeli wage earners (over 60percent) earned less than $1,450 a month last year’ (Goldstein 2007, p. 1). In 2004 1.3 million Israelis lived below the poverty line, a number which in 2005 increased to more than 1.5 million Israelis. In spite of growing economic prosperity the proportion of families belonging to the working-poor, i.e. families with at least one family member in paid employment, increased from 11.4 percent in 2004 to 12.2 percent in 2005. The percentage of poor families in the working population increased from 40.6 percent to 43.1 percent. Nearly 60 percent of the ‘working-poor’ were working fulltime (Sinai 2006a, Shaoul 2006). 42 percent of Israeli Arab families are living below the poverty line. The average wages are less than half the wages of Ashkenazi Jews. Every second Israeli Arab child lives in poverty. When in 1996 to 2001 the unemployment rate of the Jewish Israelis increased by about 53 percent, the unemployment rate of the Arab Israelis increased by 126 percent (cf. Shaoul 2006). 80 percent of Israelis regard themselves as poor. 23 percent of the pensioners are living below the poverty line. Poverty among children increased in 1988 to 2005 by about 50 percent. Approximately one fifth of all under-age children (714.000) in Israel are suffering from hunger (cf. Shaoul 2006). 75 percent of the poor families cannot afford medicine and 70 percent are dependant on food donations (cf. Sinai 2005b). Nearly one third of the Holocaust survivors are living in poverty. Some of the Holocaust survivors get $ 600,- per month from the German government, whilst other Holocaust survivors receive only $ 350,- per month from the Israeli Ministry of Finance and the Holocaust survivors that immigrated to Israel after 1953 (who amount to 70 percent of the Holocaust survivors in Israel) only receive the general national pension. Nearly 20 percent of the Holocaust survivors are at the present time 86 years and older, 70 percent are older than 76 years. (cf. Medina 2007, p. 1) They are not entitled to a supplementary payment or to compensation. But the problematic economic situation of the Holocaust survivors is neither new information nor an unknown fact. As a result of the precarious situation several are in need of the help of welfare organizations, because they cannot afford to some degree their necessary medicine.

Italia: La chiusura della Casa dell’Emigrante come spunto riflessione sui rientri degli emigrati italiani

In the literature on migration, as well as in social policies regarding this phenomenon, the situation of returning emigrants receives scant attention. This essay establishes an intricate connection between attitudes and policies that prevail in a country regarding emigration and those concerning immigration. The case of Italy provides a prime example for this as it once was a classical country of emigration, only to turn, in recent decades, into a country that appears highly attractive (and relatively accessible) to immigrants. The essay traces the pervasive ambiguity that characterizes this country’s attitudes towards emigration from the beginning of mass emigration shortly after the unification of Italy in 1868 to the emigration policies of the fascist regime of Mussolini and the post-World War II waves of emigration right through to the corresponding ambiguity concerning the status of immigrants in contemporary society, including the indifferent treatment of returning Italian emigrants who constitute a considerable numerical phenomenon. These reflections take their origin from the impending closure of a reception centre in Lazio, the Casa dell’Emigrante near Sant’Elia Fiumerapido, Province of Frosinone, ostensibly for financial reasons. This centre had been the only one of its kind in the whole of Italy dealing officially with the needs of repatriated Italians. It had assisted returning emigrants both with practical matters, such as negotiating the labyrinth of Italian bureaucracy , and with psychological implications of a return, which are often considerable given the time lag of experiences with current social realities and the frequently unrealistic expectations associated with the return. Questions of identity become highly acute in those circumstances. The threatened closure of the centre illustrates the unwillingness of the state to face up to the factual prevalence of migratory experiences in the country as a whole and as a core element of national history, experiences of migration in both directions. The statistics speak for themselves: of the 4.660.427 persons who left Italy between 1880 and 1950, 2.322.451 have returned, almost exactly 50%. To those have to be added 3.628.430 returnees of the 5.109.860 emigrants who left Italy between the end of World War II and 1976 for Europe alone. Attitudes towards people leaving changed ostensibly over time. In the first two decades after Unification parliament on the one hand wanted to show some concern over the fate of its citizens, not wanting to abandon those newly created citizens entirely to their own destiny, while on the other portraying their decisions to emigrate as expressions of individual liberty and responsibility and not necessitated by want and poverty. Emigrants had to prove, paradoxically that they had the requisite means to emigrate when in fact poverty was largely driving them to emigrate. To admit that publicly would have amounted to admission of economic and political failure made evident through emigration. In contrast to that Mussolini’s emigration policies not only enforced large population movements within the territory of Italy to balance unemployment between regions and particularly between North and South, but also declared it citizen’s duty to be ready to move also to the colonies, thereby ‘turning emigration as a sign of social crisis into a sign of national strength and the success of the country’s political agenda’ (Gaspari 2001, p. 34). The duplicity continued even after World War II when secret deals were done with the USA to allow a continuous flow of Italian immigrants and EU membership obviously further facilitated the departure of unemployed, impoverished Italians. With the growing prosperity of Italy the reversal of the direction of migration became more obvious. On the basis of empirical research conducted by one of the author on returning emigrants four types of motives for returning can be distinguished: 1. Return as a result of failure – particularly the emigrants who left during the 1950-1970 period usually had no linguistic preparation, and in any case the gap between the spoken and the written language is enormous with the latter often being insurmountable. This gives rise to nostalgic sentiments which motivates a return into an environment where language is familiar 2. Return as a means of preserving an identity – the life of emigrants often takes place within ghetto-like conditions where familiarity is being reproduced but under restricted conditions and hence not entirely authentic. The necessity for saving money permits only a partial entry into the host society and at the same time any accumulating savings add to the desire to return home where life can be lived fully again – or so it seems. 3. Return of investment – the impossibility to become fully part of another society often motivates migrants to accumulate not so much material wealth but new experiences and competences which they then aim to reinvest in their home country. 4. Return to retire – for many emigrants returning home becomes acute once they leave a productive occupation and feelings of estrangement build up, in conjunction with the efforts of having invested in building a house back home. All those motives are associated with a variety of difficulties on the actual return home because, above all, time in relation to the country of origin has been suspended for the emigrant and the encounter with the reality of that country reveals constant discrepancies and requires constant readjustment. This is where the need for assistance to returning emigrants arises. The fact that such an important centre of assistance has been closed is further confirmation of the still prevailing politics of ambiguity which nominally demand integration from nationals and non-nationals alike but deny the means of achieving this. Citizenship is not a natural result of nationality but requires the means for active participation in society. Furthermore, the experiences of returning immigrants provide important cues for the double ambivalence in which immigrants to Italy live between the demands made on them to integrate, the simultaneous threats of repatriation and the alienation from the immigrants’ home country which grows inexorably during the absence. The state can only regain its credibility by putting an end to this ambiguity and provide to returning emigrants, and immigrants alike, the means of reconstructing strong communal identities.