What Price Social and Health Care? Commodities, Competition and Consumers

In this paper we explore some important disputes and problems surrounding the legal status and social purpose of Health

Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation

The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.

Tariff-Specific Preferences and Their Influence on Price Sensitivity

For many services, consumers can choose among a range of optional tariffs that differ in their access and usage prices. Recent studies indicate that tariff-specific preferences may lead consumers to choose a tariff that does not minimize their expected billing rate. This study analyzes how tariff-specific preferences influence the responsiveness of consumers’ usage and tariff choice to changes in price. We show that consumer heterogeneity in tariff-specific preferences leads to heterogeneity in their sensitivity to price changes. Specifically, consumers with tariff-specific preferences are less sensitive to price increases of their preferred tariff than other consumers. Our results provide an additional reason why firms should offer multiple tariffs rather than a uniform nonlinear pricing plan to extract maximum consumer surplus.

Visual Fixation for 3D Video Stabilization

Visual fixation is employed by humans and some animals to keep a specific 3D location at the center of the visual gaze. Inspired by this phenomenon in nature, this paper explores the idea to transfer this mechanism to the context of video stabilization for a handheld video camera. A novel approach is presented that stabilizes a video by fixating on automatically extracted 3D target points. This approach is different from existing automatic solutions that stabilize the video by smoothing. To determine the 3D target points, the recorded scene is analyzed with a stateof- the-art structure-from-motion algorithm, which estimates camera motion and reconstructs a 3D point cloud of the static scene objects. Special algorithms are presented that search either virtual or real 3D target points, which back-project close to the center of the image for as long a period of time as possible. The stabilization algorithm then transforms the original images of the sequence so that these 3D target points are kept exactly in the center of the image, which, in case of real 3D target points, produces a perfectly stable result at the image center. Furthermore, different methods of additional user interaction are investigated. It is shown that the stabilization process can easily be controlled and that it can be combined with state-of-theart tracking techniques in order to obtain a powerful image stabilization tool. The approach is evaluated on a variety of videos taken with a hand-held camera in natural scenes.

Target Price Accuracy

This study analyzes the accuracy of forecasted target prices within analysts’ reports. We compute a measure for target price forecast accuracy that evaluates the ability of analysts to exactly forecast the ex-ante (unknown) 12-month stock price. Furthermore, we determine factors that explain this accuracy. Target price accuracy is negatively related to analyst-specific optimism and stock-specific risk (measured by volatility and price-to-book ratio). However, target price accuracy is positively related to the level of detail of each report, company size and the reputation of the investment bank. The potential conflicts of interests between an analyst and a covered company do not bias forecast accuracy.