Earnings Management and Measurement Error

In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.

The Road to Negative Behavior: Discriminatory Intentions in the German Population

This study analyzes discriminatory intentions shared by members of the German majority against several outgroups in Germany. Patterns of discriminatory intentions against various minority groups were investigated for several indicators, including gender, age, and political orientation, by means of a representative survey (N = 1,778). The relationship between prejudices and discriminatory intentions against different target groups was also analyzed. Prejudice and discriminatory intentions show moderate but consistently positive correlations in relation to one and the same target group. Moreover, it was found that discriminatory intentions against one outgroup are related to hostile attitudes towards other outgroups, too. The results support the hypothesis of a syndrome of group-focused enmity.