The Benefits of Multilingualism for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa

Taking the South African experience as an example, this article considers the interpretive benefits to be reaped from having access to bi- and multilingual versions of a statutory text. The discussion takes place against the backdrop of a history of statutory bi- and multilingualism in the said jurisdiction as well as, at present, constitutional guarantees of language rights and the “parity of esteem” of eleven official languages. It is argued that, if invoked with due discretion and in a non-rigid way, statutory multilingualism can be a boon to statutory and constitutional interpretation. The South African courts – whose traditional approach to statutory inter-pretation has tended to be literalist, formalistic and formulaic – are, generally speaking, to be commended for their supple use of bilingualism as an aid to interpretation over the years. The advent of constitutional multilingualism and the (potential) availability of statutory texts (and the Constitution) in more than two languages, have moreover created conditions conducive to the further development and refinement of reliance on multilingualism in statutory and constitutional interpretation – certain challenges notwithstanding.

Understanding the Other’s “Understanding” of Violence: Legitimacy, Recognition, and the Challenge of Dealing with the Past in Divided Societies

Post-conflict societies which have achieved a cessation of violence and embarked on a political conflict transformation process cannot in the long-term avoid a process of dealing with the past. Case studies of South Africa and Northern Ireland confirm this normative claim, showing that within the post-war society as a whole a social consensus on how to “understand” and “recognize” the use of violence that occurred during the conflict is necessary: understanding the other’s “understanding” of violence. A mutual understanding must be reached that both sides fought a campaign that was just and legitimate from their own perspective. The morality of the “other’s violence” has to be recognized.