Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.

OCTAVIS: Optimization Techniques for Multi-GPU Multi-View Rendering

We present a high performance-yet low cost-system for multi-view rendering in virtual reality (VR) applications. In contrast to complex CAVE installations, which are typically driven by one render client per view, we arrange eight displays in an octagon around the viewer to provide a full 360° projection, and we drive these eight displays by a single PC equipped with multiple graphics units (GPUs). In this paper we describe the hardware and software setup, as well as the necessary low-level and high-level optimizations to optimally exploit the parallelism of this multi-GPU multi-view VR system.