Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation

The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.

Economic Loan Loss Provision and Expected Loss

The intention of a loan loss provision is the anticipation of the loan's expected losses by adjusting the book value of the loan. Furthermore, this loan loss provision has to be compared to the expected loss according to Basel II and, in the case of a difference, liable equity has to be adjusted. This however assumes that the loan loss provision and the expected loss are based on a similar economic rationale, which is only valid conditionally in current loan loss provisioning methods according to IFRS. Therefore, differences between loan loss provisions and expected losses should only result from different approaches regarding the parameter estimation within each model and not due to different assumptions regarding the outcome of the model. The provisioning and accounting model developed in this paper overcomes the before-mentioned shortcomings and is consistent with an economic rationale of expected losses. Additionally, this model is based on a close-to-market valuation of the loan that is in favor of the basic idea of IFRS. Suggestions for changes in current accounting and capital requirement rules are provided.