Open Source und Kartellrecht

„Open source and European antitrust laws: An analysis of copyleft and the prohibition of software license fees on the basis of art. 101 TFEU and the block exemptions“ Open source software and open source licenses (like the GNU GPL) are not only relevant for computer nerds or activists – they are already business. They are for example the fundament of LINUX, the only real rival of MICROSOFT’s WINDOWS-line in the field of operating systems for IBM PC compatibles. Art. 101 TFEU (like the identical predecessor art. 81 TEC) as part of the EU antitrust laws prohibits contract terms like price fixing and some forms of technology control. Are copyleft – the „viral effect“, the „cancer“ – and the interdiction of software license fees in the cross hairs of this legal rule? On the other side the European Union has since 2004 a new Technology Transfer Block Exemption with software license agreements for the first time in its scope: a safe harbour and a dry place under a umbrella for open source software? After the introduction (A) with a description of open source software the following text analyses the system of the European Unions competition law respectivley antitrust law and the requirements of the block exemptions (B). Starting point of antitrust analysis are undertakings – but who are the untertakings (C) in the field of widespread, independent developers as part of the „bazar organization“? To see how much open source has to fear from the law of the European Union, at the end the anti competitive and pro competitive effects of open source are totalized within the legal framework (D). The conclusion (E) shows: not nothing, but not much.

Tax-Optimal Step-Up and Imperfect Loss Offset

In the field of mergers and acquisitions, German and international tax law allow for several opportunities to step up a firm's assets, i.e., to revaluate the assets at fair market values. When a step-up is performed the taxpayer recognizes a taxable gain, but also obtains tax benefits in the form of higher future depreciation allowances associated with stepping up the tax base of the assets. This tax-planning problem is well known in taxation literature and can also be applied to firm valuation in the presence of taxation. However, the known models usually assume a perfect loss offset. If this assumption is abandoned, the depreciation allowances may lose value as they become tax effective at a later point in time, or even never if there are not enough cash flows to be offset against. This aspect is especiallyrelevant if future cash flows are assumed to be uncertain. This paper shows that a step-up may be disadvantageous or a firm overvalued if these aspects are not integrated into the basic calculus. Compared to the standard approach, assets should be stepped up only in a few cases and - under specific conditions - at a later point in time. Firm values may be considerably lower under imperfect loss offset.