Why Freeter and NEET are Misunderstood: Recognizing the New Precarious Conditions of Japanese Youth

In developed countries, the transition from school to work has radically changed over the past two decades. It has become prolonged, complicated and individualized (Bynner et al., 1997; Walther et al., 2004). Young people used to transition directly from school to stable employment, or with a very short unemployed period. In many European countries, this situation has been changing since the eighties: overall youth unemployment has increased, and many young people experience long periods of unemployment, government training schemes and part-time or temporary jobs. In Japan, this change has taken a decade later to appear, becoming prevalent by the late nineties (Inui, 2003). The transiting process has become not only precarious for young people, but also difficult for society to precisely understand the risks and problems. Traditionally, we have been able to recognize young people's situation by a simple category: in education, employed, in training or unemployed. However, these categories no longer accurately represent young people's state. In Japan, most young people used to move from school directly to full-time employment through the new graduate recruitment system (Inui, 1993). Therefore, in official statistics such as the School Basic Survey, 'employed' includes only those who are in regular employment, while those who are in part-time or temporary work are covered by the categories 'jobless' and 'others'. However, with the increase in non-full-time jobs in the nineties, these categories have become less useful for describing the actual employment conditions of young people. Indeed, this is why, in the late of nineties, the Japanese Ministry of Education changed the category name from 'jobless' to 'others'.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.