Software als Schutzgegenstand des Europäischen Urheberrechts

After 20 years of silence, two recent references from the Czech Republic (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, Case C-393/09) and from the English High Court (SAS Institute, Case C-406/10) touch upon several questions that are fundamental for the extent of copyright protection for software under the Computer Program Directive 91/25 (now 2009/24) and the Information Society Directive 2001/29. In Case C-393/09, the European Court of Justice held that “the object of the protection conferred by that directive is the expression in any form of a computer program which permits reproduction in different computer languages, such as the source code and the object code.” As “any form of expression of a computer program must be protected from the moment when its reproduction would engender the reproduction of the computer program itself, thus enabling the computer to perform its task,” a graphical user interface (GUI) is not protected under the Computer Program Directive, as it does “not enable the reproduction of that computer program, but merely constitutes one element of that program by means of which users make use of the features of that program.” While the definition of computer program and the exclusion of GUIs mirror earlier jurisprudence in the Member States and therefore do not come as a surprise, the main significance of Case C-393/09 lies in its interpretation of the Information Society Directive. In confirming that a GUI “can, as a work, be protected by copyright if it is its author’s own intellectual creation,” the ECJ continues the Europeanization of the definition of “work” which began in Infopaq (Case C-5/08). Moreover, the Court elaborated this concept further by excluding expressions from copyright protection which are dictated by their technical function. Even more importantly, the ECJ held that a television broadcasting of a GUI does not constitute a communication to the public, as the individuals cannot have access to the “essential element characterising the interface,” i.e., the interaction with the user. The exclusion of elements dictated by technical functions from copyright protection and the interpretation of the right of communication to the public with reference to the “essential element characterising” the work may be seen as welcome limitations of copyright protection in the interest of a free public domain which were not yet apparent in Infopaq. While Case C-393/09 has given a first definition of the computer program, the pending reference in Case C-406/10 is likely to clarify the scope of protection against nonliteral copying, namely in how far the protection extends beyond the text of the source code to the design of a computer program and where the limits of protection lie as regards the functionality of a program and mere “principles and ideas.” In light of the travaux préparatoires, it is submitted that the ECJ is also likely to grant protection for the design of a computer program, while excluding both the functionality and underlying principles and ideas from protection under the European copyright directives.

Creative Commons licences and design Are the two compatible?

This article analyses whether Creative Commons licences are applicable to and compatible with design. The first part focuses on the peculiar and complex nature of a design, which can benefit from a copyright and a design protection. This shows how it can affect the use of Creative Commons licences. The second and third parts deal with a specific case study. Some Internet platforms have recently emerged that offer users the possibility to download blueprints of design products in order to build them. Designers and creative users are invited to share their blueprints and creations under Creative Commons licences. The second part of the article assesses whether digital blueprints can be copyrightable and serve as the subject matter of Creative Commons licences, while the last part assesses whether the right to reproduce the digital blueprint, as provided by Creative Commons licences, extends to the right to build the product.

Privacy in the Post-NSA Era: Time for a Fundamental Revision?

Big Brother Watch and others have filed a complaint against the United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights about a violation of Article 8, the right to privacy. It regards the NSA affair and UK-based surveillance activities operated by secret services. The question is whether it will be declared admissible and, if so, whether the European Court of Human Rights will find a violation. This article discusses three possible challenges for these types of complaints and analyses whether the current privacy paradigm is still adequate in view of the development known as Big Data.

Oblivion, Erasure and Forgetting in the Digital Age

In light of the recent European Court of Justice ruling (ECJ C-131/12, Google Spain v Spanish Data Protection Agency),the “right to be forgotten” has once again gained worldwide media attention. Already in 2012, whenthe European Commission proposed aright to be forgotten,this proposal received broad public interest and was debated intensively. Under certain conditions, individuals should thereby be able todelete personal data concerning them. More recently – in light of the European Parliament’s approval of the LIBE Committee’samendments onMarch 14, 2014 – the concept seems tobe close to its final form.Although it remains, for the most part,unchanged from the previously circulated drafts, it has beenre-labelled as a“right of erasure”. This article argues that, despite its catchy terminology, the right to be forgotten can be understood as a generic term, bringing together existing legal provisions: the substantial right of oblivion and the rather procedural right to erasure derived from data protection. Hereinafter, the article presents an analysis of selected national legal frameworks and corresponding case law, accounting for data protection, privacy, and general tort law as well as defamation law. This comparative analysis grasps the practical challenges which the attempt to strengthen individual control and informational self-determination faces. Consequently, it is argued that narrowing the focus on the data protection law amendments neglects the elaborate balancing of conflicting interests in European legal tradition. It is shown thatthe attemptto implement oblivion, erasure and forgetting in the digital age is a complex undertaking.

A manifesto for an e-lending limitation in copyright

In the European Union, lending is an exclusive right for copyright and related rights, but Member States can transform public lending to a right of remuneration and even exempt some establishments from any payment. The making available of works online is not covered by the public lending right regime of the Rental and Lending Directive but is considered as an act of making available governed by the InfoSoc Directive. As a consequence, libraries are currently not allowed to digitally transmit works to their patrons as lending, but have entered into licenses with publishers to develop an offer of lending of e-books, also called e-lending, with the intermediation of dedicated platforms operated by commercial actors. Compared to physical lending, e-lending is not based on ownership of the book by libraries but on its provision by this intermediary. This paper discusses how the objective of enabling libraries to engage in e-lending should be achieved, and what is the proper dividing line between a market-based solution, as developing today, and a limitation to exclusive rights. The impact of an extension of the public lending right to e-lending should be assessed, but not based on a criterion of direct substitution of a book on loan at the library to a book bought at a retailer. By definition, libraries are substitutes to normal trade. Instead, the overall effect of lending to the commercialisation of books and other works should be verified. Particular conditions for a limitation in favour of lending are also addressed, and notably the modalities of lending (a limited duration, one simultaneous user per title, …), not to make e-lending through libraries easier and preferable to the normal acquisition of an e-book. This paper argues in favour of some and controlled extension of the public lending right to cover the lending of e-books and other digital content. For the role of libraries is essential in providing access to works and culture to readers who would or could not rely only on normal acquisition of books or other items on the market, to works that are not provided by the market, and to material for research. Libraries are a third sector providing access to works, aside the market and non-market exchanges between individuals. This role should not lose its relevance in the digital context, or it would culturally impoverish future generations of readers.