Passives without actives: evidence from verbless complement clauses in Spanish

This paper proposes a constructionist analysis à la Goldberg (1995, 2003, 2006) of passive verbless configurations in Spanish lacking a felicitous active counterpart.Under the paradigmatic – rather than syntagmatic – view of passives invoked in this paper, configurations of the type in (1) above, attested with a number of verba cogitandi et dicendi, are handled as instances of the Impersonal Subjective-Transitive construction, whose general skeletal meaning is X (NP1) attributed Y (XPCOMP) by Z (NP2) in a direct, categorical way. Moreover, the analysis proposed here also provides a satisfactory account of the distribution of grammatical subjects and the XPCOMPs, while also capturing the commonalities with “regular” passives (i.e. those with a felicitous active counterpart). In addition, Spanish passive verbless complement configurations with se dice (‘is said’) are shown to illustrate a three-point continuum consisting of (i) non-grammaticalized configurations with an active counterpart, (ii) non-grammaticalized configurations without an active counterpart, and (iii) grammaticalized configurations without an active counterpart. From a synchronic point of view, the structural and semantico-pragmatic properties exhibited by the lower-level lo que se dice XPFOCUS construction, involving a focusing/emphasizer subjunct function (e.g. verdaderamente ‘really’) as well as a reformulatory connective use (e.g. o sea ‘that is’, en otras palabras ‘in other words’) appear to point to an early process of grammaticalization, exhibiting decategorialization as well as generalization of meaning in conjunction with a prominent increase in pragmatic function and subjectification (cf. Traugott 1988, 1995a, 1995b, 2003).

Imperatives in concessive clauses: compatibility between constructions

In his pioneering paper on “Performative Subordinate Clauses,” Lakoff (1984) claimed that subordinate clauses expressing a reason or concession allow imperatives conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). While this analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, the present paper shows that Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative utterances they permit. Contra Lakoff, concessive clauses with although, though and except (that) do allow imperative constructions conveying directive illocutionary forces to occur, whereas by contrast those with even though tend to disallow both types of imperatives. These findings can be explained in terms of compatibility between “component” constructions constituting a complex sentence. It is argued that the compatibility between imperatives (both directive and assertive types) and concessive adverbials (excluding even though) can be attributed to the latter’s loose integration into a matrix clause required by the former. Furthermore, it is argued that the incompatibility of even though with imperatives arises primarily from the incompatibility between the tight integration of even though and the loose integration required by imperatives, together with the associated incompatibility between the non-rectifying function of even though and the rectifying conjunction favored by imperatives.