A Simple Accounting-based Valuation Model for the Debt Tax Shield

This paper describes a simple way to integrate the debt tax shield into an accounting-based valuation model. The market value of equity is determined by forecasting residual operating income, which is calculated by charging operating income for the operating assets at a required return that accounts for the tax benefit that comes from borrowing to raise cash for the operations. The model assumes that the firm maintains a deterministic financial leverage ratio, which tends to converge quickly to typical steady-state levels over time. From a practical point of view, this characteristic is of particular help, because it allows a continuing value calculation at the end of a short forecast period.

Integrating Pricing and Inventory Control: Is it Worth the Effort?

In this paper we first show that the gains achievable by integrating pricing and inventory control are usually small for classical demand functions. We then introduce reference price models and demonstrate that for this class of demand functions the benefits of integration with inventory control are substantially increased due to the price dynamics. We also provide some analytical results for this more complex model. We thus conclude that integrated pricing/inventory models could repeat the success of revenue management in practice if reference price effects are included in the demand model and the properties of this new model are better understood.

Thin Capitalization Rules and Entrepreneurial Capital Structure Decisions

Tax planners often choose debt over equity financing. As this has led to increased corporate debt financing, many countries have introduced thin capitalization rules to secure their tax revenues. In a general capital structure model we analyze if thin capitalization rules affect dividend and financing decisions, and whether they can partially explain why corporations receive both debt and equity capital. We model the Belgian, German and Italian rules as examples. We find that the so-called Miller equilibrium and definite financing effects depend significantly on the underlying tax system. Further, our results are useful for the treasury to decide what thin capitalization type to implement.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.