Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.

Is VHB-JOURQUAL2 a Good Measure of Scientific Quality? Assessing the Validity of the Major Business Journal Ranking in German-Speaking Countries

This study examines the question of whether the journal ranking VHB-JOURQUAL 2 can be considered as a good measure for the construct “scientific quality”. Various rankings in business research provide the database for the analysis. The correlations between theses rankings are used to assess the validity of VHB-JOURQUAL 2 along various validity criteria. The correlations with rankings that measure the same construct based on different methods show that VHB-JOURQUAL 2 has acceptable, but moderate convergent validity. The validity varies considerably across disciplines, showing that the heterogeneity of business administration is not sufficiently represented by this overall ranking. The variability is related to the variation in members per discipline represented by the German Association for Business Research. Furthermore, the measure shows a weak correlation with acceptance rates as an indicator of nomological validity in some disciplines.