'Balance of Terror' -- Rival Militias and Vigilantes in Nigeria

Militias and vigilantes that assume public authority by fighting crime reject the laws of the state, yet they have no other set of rules to regulate their activities. Many of them claim to be accountable to their ethnic or religious community on whose behalf they operate. But their communities have found no means to institutionalise control over them. Moreover, there are no institutions to settle conflicts between different militias and vigilantes. On a local level, rival groups have reached informal arrangements. However, these compromises are unstable, as they reflect fragile alliances and shifting balances of power. Leaders of militias and other 'self-determination groups' have suggested organising a conference of all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria in order to design a new constitution that would give militias and vigilantes a legal role and define their authority. But the groups compared in this article – Oodua People's Congress, Sharia Vigilantes, Bakassi Boys, MASSOB, and Niger Delta militias – pursue very divergent interests, and they are far from reaching a consensus on how to contain violence between them.

The Magnetism of Power in Helping Relationships. Professional Attitude and Asymmetry

What makes helping relationships - or social interventions in general - so sensitive to abuse? These problems are directly related to the nature of the helping relationship. The core of this relationship is the inequality, the asymmetry, between the helper and the person being helped, and the dependence of the latter. Asymmetry is the driving force behind every social intervention and at the same time its weakest point. Handling asymmetry in an appropriate manner constitutes a major part of the work of the intervening party. This asymmetry makes heavy demands on the professional attitude of the intervening party i.e. the helper. Is s/he capable of dealing with dependence in an acceptable way? Is s/he well-versed in her/his profession? This article contains a comprehensive sketch of many of the possible dangers and pitfalls which beset asymmetric intervention relations. At the end it will be argued that, for a better understanding, the proximity of helping and power has to be taken into account.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.

Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory

A limited but accumulating body of research and theoretical commentary offers support for core claims of the “institutional-anomie theory” of crime (IAT) and points to areas needing further development. In this paper, which focuses on violent crime, we clarify the concept of social institutions, elaborate the cultural component of IAT, derive implications for individual behavior, summarize empirical applications, and propose directions for future research. Drawing on Talcott Parsons, we distinguish the “subjective” and “objective” dimensions of institutional dynamics and discuss their interrelationship. We elaborate on the theory’s cultural component with reference to Durkheim’s distinction between “moral” and “egoistic” individualism and propose that a version of the egoistic type characterizes societies in which the economy dominates the institutional structure, anomie is rampant, and levels of violent crime are high. We also offer a heuristic model of IAT that integrates macro- and individual levels of analysis. Finally, we discuss briefly issues for the further theoretical elaboration of this macro-social perspective on violent crime. Specifically, we call attention to the important tasks of explaining the emergence of economic dominance in the institutional balance of power and of formulating an institutional account for distinctive punishment practices, such as the advent of mass incarceration in the United States.