Transformations in French Anti-Semitism?

The increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts since the start of the Second Intifada has sparked off a broad debate on the return of anti-Semitism in France. This article focuses on the question whether this anti-Semitism is still based on the alleged superiority of the Aryan race as in the time of Nazism, or if it represents the birth of a “new Judeophobia” that is more based on anti-Zionism and the polemical mixing of “Jews,” “Israelis,” and “Zionists.” One supposed effect of this transformation is that anti-Semitism is in the process of changing camps and migrating from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political arena, to the “altermondialistes,” the communists, and the “neo-Trotskyists.” The article provides answers to the following questions: Are anti-Jewish views on the increase in France today? Do these opinions correlate with negative opinions of other minorities, notably Maghrebians and Muslims? Do they tend to develop among voters and sympathizers with the extreme right or on the extreme left of the political spectrum? And how are they related to opinions concerning Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? My evaluation of the transformations in French anti-Semitism relies on two types of data. The first is police and gendarmerie statistics published by the National Consultative Committee on Human Rights (CNCDH), which is charged with presenting the prime minister with an annual report on the struggle against racism and xenophobia in France. The other is data from surveys, notably surveys commissioned by CNCDH for its annual report and surveys conducted at the Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) at Sciences Po (Paris Institute for Political Research). The data show that anti-Semitic opinions follow a different logic from acts, that the social, cultural, and political profile of anti-Semites remains very close to that of other types of racists, and that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism do not overlap exactly.

Guest Editorial: Racial and Ethnic Conflict and Violence

Racial and ethnic violence takes many forms. Genocides, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, civil wars, and violent separatist movements are the most obvious and extreme expressions, but less organized violence such as rioting, and hate crimes by individuals or small groups are products of racial and ethnic conflict as well. Also, the distribution of criminal violence within societies, which may or may not be aimed at members of another group, is in some places a by-product of ongoing conflicts between superior and subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Although estimates of the number of deaths attributable to ethnic violence vary widely, range of eleven to twenty million given for the period between 1945 and the early 1990s show the gravity of this type of conflict (Williams 1994, 50). So it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid increasing attention to such conflicts over the last decades.

Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of “Naxalite” Activity in the Districts of India

This paper asks: is it a fact that there is more violence in districts affected by Naxalite (Maoist) activity compared to those which are free of Naxalite activity? And can the existence of Naxalite activity in some districts of India, but not in others, be explained by differences in economic and social conditions? This study identifies districts in India in which there was significant Naxalite activity and correlating the findings with district-level economic, social, and crime indicators. The econometric results show that, after controlling for other variables, Naxalite activity in a district had, if anything, a dampening effect on its level of violent crime and crimes against women. Furthermore, even after controlling for other variables, the probability of a district being Naxalite-affected rose with an increase in its poverty rate and fell with a rise in its literacy rate. So, one prong in an anti-Naxalite strategy would be to address the twin issues of poverty and illiteracy in India.

Poverty in Israel

The paper deals with poverty within Israel. Against the background of the history of pre-state Israel and the developments after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the historical roots of Israeli poverty are analyzed. Thus the ‘socialist’-Zionist project, ethnic exclusion, religious and intra-Jewish ethnic lines of conflict as well as the Bedouins, Druzes and Israeli Arabs as ‘specific’ Israeli citizen are discussed. Despite the economic growth in Israel since 2003 ‘the majority of Israeli wage earners (over 60percent) earned less than $1,450 a month last year’ (Goldstein 2007, p. 1). In 2004 1.3 million Israelis lived below the poverty line, a number which in 2005 increased to more than 1.5 million Israelis. In spite of growing economic prosperity the proportion of families belonging to the working-poor, i.e. families with at least one family member in paid employment, increased from 11.4 percent in 2004 to 12.2 percent in 2005. The percentage of poor families in the working population increased from 40.6 percent to 43.1 percent. Nearly 60 percent of the ‘working-poor’ were working fulltime (Sinai 2006a, Shaoul 2006). 42 percent of Israeli Arab families are living below the poverty line. The average wages are less than half the wages of Ashkenazi Jews. Every second Israeli Arab child lives in poverty. When in 1996 to 2001 the unemployment rate of the Jewish Israelis increased by about 53 percent, the unemployment rate of the Arab Israelis increased by 126 percent (cf. Shaoul 2006). 80 percent of Israelis regard themselves as poor. 23 percent of the pensioners are living below the poverty line. Poverty among children increased in 1988 to 2005 by about 50 percent. Approximately one fifth of all under-age children (714.000) in Israel are suffering from hunger (cf. Shaoul 2006). 75 percent of the poor families cannot afford medicine and 70 percent are dependant on food donations (cf. Sinai 2005b). Nearly one third of the Holocaust survivors are living in poverty. Some of the Holocaust survivors get $ 600,- per month from the German government, whilst other Holocaust survivors receive only $ 350,- per month from the Israeli Ministry of Finance and the Holocaust survivors that immigrated to Israel after 1953 (who amount to 70 percent of the Holocaust survivors in Israel) only receive the general national pension. Nearly 20 percent of the Holocaust survivors are at the present time 86 years and older, 70 percent are older than 76 years. (cf. Medina 2007, p. 1) They are not entitled to a supplementary payment or to compensation. But the problematic economic situation of the Holocaust survivors is neither new information nor an unknown fact. As a result of the precarious situation several are in need of the help of welfare organizations, because they cannot afford to some degree their necessary medicine.

Suicide Bombers in Israel: Their Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity in Terrorist Organizations

This paper examines the characteristics of suicide bombers as reflected in the Israeli press during the Second Intifada in Israel. The analysis aims to determine whether there were significant differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those with nationalist motives. The findings reveal that gender, education level, and organizational affiliation correlated significantly with motives for carrying out suicide attacks. Most of the suicide bombers with religious motives were men with elementary education. In addition, the results show that most of the suicide bombers who were affiliated with the Hamas organization acted out of religious motives. No significant differences were found between suicide bombers with religious and those with nationalist motives with regard to age, marital status, and prior activity in terrorist organizations.

Youth criminality and urban social conflict in the city of Rosario, Argentina. Analysis and proposals for conflict transformation

The present article describes and analyses youth criminality in the city of Rosario, Argentina between the years 2003-2006. Key actors’ understandings of and responses to the conflict were investigated by means of semi-structured interviews, observations, discourse analysis of policy documents, analysis of secondary data, and draw heavily on the experience of the author, a citizen and youth worker of Rosario. The actors examined were the police, the local government, young delinquents and youth organisations. Youth criminality is analysed from a conflict transformation approach using conflict analysis tools. Whereas, the provincial police understand the issue as a delinquency problem, other actors perceive it as an expression of a wider urban social conflict between those that are “included” and those that are “excluded” and as one of the negative effects of globalisation processes. The results suggest that police responses addressing only direct violence are ineffective, even contributing to increased tensions and polarisation, whereas strategies addressing cultural and structural violence are more suitable for this type of social urban conflict. Finally, recommendations for local youth policy are proposed to facilitate participation and inclusion of youth and as a tool for peaceful conflict transformation.

Clausewitz’s “Wondrous Trinity” as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict

Rather than discarding Clausewitz’s theory of war in response to the revolutionary changes in modern warfare, this article articulates a broader theory of war based on his concept of the “wondrous trinity,” identifying it as his true legacy. The author shows that the concept of trinitarian war attributed to Clausewitz by his critics, which seems to be applicable only to wars between states, is a caricature of Clausewitz’s theory. He goes on to develop Clausewitz’s theory that war is composed of the three tendencies of violence/force, fighting, and the affiliation of the combatants to a warring community. Each war can be analyzed as being composed of these three tendencies and their opposites.