Access for All? The promise and problems of universalism.

In what follows, I explore why the question of ‘access for all’ is both important and difficult. Beginning by treating it as a contested claim, I will consider some of its political, institutional and professional implications. What do I mean by saying that access for all is a contested claim? First of all, it is a claim – a demand that access for all needs to be created. It is a claim about change. To demand ‘access for all’ is to speak about, and speak against, social conditions that are unjust, unequal or excluding. At its simplest, then, to claim ‘access for all’ is to address social arrangements in which all people do not have access. Secondly, it is a claim made by – or on behalf of – specific social groups against their experience of exclusion, marginalization or subordination. I have added these other terms because I think that ‘exclusion’ is too simple, and too problematic, a term to capture all the aspects of unjust social arrangements that produce claims for ‘access’.1 Access is a demand to be treated equitably in relation to a range of valued social resources, conditions and relationships. It is a claim to be a member: of the society, the polity or the nation. It is a claim to be a citizen: to possess rights and the capacity to make legitimate demands on the state. It is a claim on the apparatuses and agencies that sustain social citizenship: citizenship brings with it access to benefits, services and rights of ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair treatment’. As this last point suggests, it is a claim about equality: the expectation that all citizens will be dealt with by public agencies in ways that are not discriminatory or oppressive.

Imperatives in concessive clauses: compatibility between constructions

In his pioneering paper on “Performative Subordinate Clauses,” Lakoff (1984) claimed that subordinate clauses expressing a reason or concession allow imperatives conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). While this analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, the present paper shows that Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative utterances they permit. Contra Lakoff, concessive clauses with although, though and except (that) do allow imperative constructions conveying directive illocutionary forces to occur, whereas by contrast those with even though tend to disallow both types of imperatives. These findings can be explained in terms of compatibility between “component” constructions constituting a complex sentence. It is argued that the compatibility between imperatives (both directive and assertive types) and concessive adverbials (excluding even though) can be attributed to the latter’s loose integration into a matrix clause required by the former. Furthermore, it is argued that the incompatibility of even though with imperatives arises primarily from the incompatibility between the tight integration of even though and the loose integration required by imperatives, together with the associated incompatibility between the non-rectifying function of even though and the rectifying conjunction favored by imperatives.