DEVELOPMENT OF ION EXCHANGE MODELS FOR WATER TREATMENT AND APPLICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION WATER PROCESSOR

The International Space Station (ISS) requires a substantial amount of potable water for use by the crew. The economic and logistic limitations of transporting the vast amount of water required onboard the ISS necessitate onboard recovery and reuse of the aqueous waste streams. Various treatment technologies are employed within the ISS water processor to render the waste water potable, including filtration, ion exchange, adsorption, and catalytic wet oxidation. The ion exchange resins and adsorption media are combined in multifiltration beds for removal of ionic and organic compounds. A mathematical model (MFBMODEL™) designed to predict the performance of a multifiltration (MF) bed was developed. MFBMODEL consists of ion exchange models for describing the behavior of the different resin types in a MF bed (e.g., mixed bed, strong acid cation, strong base anion, and weak base anion exchange resins) and an adsorption model capable of predicting the performance of the adsorbents in a MF bed. Multicomponent ion exchange ii equilibrium models that incorporate the water formation reaction, electroneutrality condition, and degree of ionization of weak acids and bases for mixed bed, strong acid cation, strong base anion, and weak base anion exchange resins were developed and verified. The equilibrium models developed use a tanks-inseries approach that allows for consideration of variable influent concentrations. The adsorption modeling approach was developed in related studies and application within the MFBMODEL framework was demonstrated in the Appendix to this study. MFBMODEL consists of a graphical user interface programmed in Visual Basic and Fortran computational routines. This dissertation shows MF bed modeling results in which the model is verified for a surrogate of the ISS waste shower and handwash stream. In addition, a multicomponent ion exchange model that incorporates mass transfer effects was developed, which is capable of describing the performance of strong acid cation (SAC) and strong base anion (SBA) exchange resins, but not including reaction effects. This dissertation presents results showing the mass transfer model's capability to predict the performance of binary and multicomponent column data for SAC and SBA exchange resins. The ion exchange equilibrium and mass transfer models developed in this study are also applicable to terrestrial water treatment systems. They could be applied for removal of cations and anions from groundwater (e.g., hardness, nitrate, perchlorate) and from industrial process waters (e.g. boiler water, ultrapure water in the semiconductor industry).

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.