Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Characterization Of Porous Media In Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell Based on Percolation Studies

Water management in the porous media of proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells, catalyst layer and porous transport layers (PTL) is confronted by two issues, flooding and dry out, both of which result in improper functioning of the fuel cell and lead to poor performance and degradation. The data that has been reported about water percolation and wettability within a fuel cell catalyst layer is limited to porosimetry. A new method and apparatus for measuring the percolation pressure in the catalyst layer has been developed. The experimental setup is similar to a Hele-Shaw experiment where samples are compressed and a fluid is injected into the sample. Pressure-Wetted Volume plots as well as Permeability plots for the catalyst layers were generated from the percolation testing. PTL samples were also characterizes using a Hele-Shaw method. Characterization for the PTLs was completed for the three states: new, conditioned and aged. This is represented in a Ce-t* plots, which show a large offset between new and aged samples.