Analysis and performance of a UPC implementation of a parallel longest common subsequence algorithm

An important problem in computational biology is finding the longest common subsequence (LCS) of two nucleotide sequences. This paper examines the correctness and performance of a recently proposed parallel LCS algorithm that uses successor tables and pruning rules to construct a list of sets from which an LCS can be easily reconstructed. Counterexamples are given for two pruning rules that were given with the original algorithm. Because of these errors, performance measurements originally reported cannot be validated. The work presented here shows that speedup can be reliably achieved by an implementation in Unified Parallel C that runs on an Infiniband cluster. This performance is partly facilitated by exploiting the software cache of the MuPC runtime system. In addition, this implementation achieved speedup without bulk memory copy operations and the associated programming complexity of message passing.

Plackett and Burman analysis to select effective compiler optimizations

Compiler optimizations help to make code run faster at runtime. When the compilation is done before the program is run, compilation time is less of an issue, but how do on-the-fly compilation and optimization impact the overall runtime? If the compiler must compete with the running application for resources, the running application will take more time to complete. This paper investigates the impact of specific compiler optimizations on the overall runtime of an application. A foldover Plackett and Burman design is used to choose compiler optimizations that appear to contribute to shorter overall runtimes. These selected optimizations are compared with the default optimization levels in the Jikes RVM. This method selects optimizations that result in a shorter overall runtime than the default O0, O1, and O2 levels. This shows that careful selection of compiler optimizations can have a significant, positive impact on overall runtime.

A FIREWALL MODEL OF FILE SYSTEM SECURITY

File system security is fundamental to the security of UNIX and Linux systems since in these systems almost everything is in the form of a file. To protect the system files and other sensitive user files from unauthorized accesses, certain security schemes are chosen and used by different organizations in their computer systems. A file system security model provides a formal description of a protection system. Each security model is associated with specified security policies which focus on one or more of the security principles: confidentiality, integrity and availability. The security policy is not only about “who” can access an object, but also about “how” a subject can access an object. To enforce the security policies, each access request is checked against the specified policies to decide whether it is allowed or rejected. The current protection schemes in UNIX/Linux systems focus on the access control. Besides the basic access control scheme of the system itself, which includes permission bits, setuid and seteuid mechanism and the root, there are other protection models, such as Capabilities, Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), supported and used in certain organizations. These models protect the confidentiality of the data directly. The integrity of the data is protected indirectly by only allowing trusted users to operate on the objects. The access control decisions of these models depend on either the identity of the user or the attributes of the process the user can execute, and the attributes of the objects. Adoption of these sophisticated models has been slow; this is likely due to the enormous complexity of specifying controls over a large file system and the need for system administrators to learn a new paradigm for file protection. We propose a new security model: file system firewall. It is an adoption of the familiar network firewall protection model, used to control the data that flows between networked computers, toward file system protection. This model can support decisions of access control based on any system generated attributes about the access requests, e.g., time of day. The access control decisions are not on one entity, such as the account in traditional discretionary access control or the domain name in DTE. In file system firewall, the access decisions are made upon situations on multiple entities. A situation is programmable with predicates on the attributes of subject, object and the system. File system firewall specifies the appropriate actions on these situations. We implemented the prototype of file system firewall on SUSE Linux. Preliminary results of performance tests on the prototype indicate that the runtime overhead is acceptable. We compared file system firewall with TE in SELinux to show that firewall model can accommodate many other access control models. Finally, we show the ease of use of firewall model. When firewall system is restricted to specified part of the system, all the other resources are not affected. This enables a relatively smooth adoption. This fact and that it is a familiar model to system administrators will facilitate adoption and correct use. The user study we conducted on traditional UNIX access control, SELinux and file system firewall confirmed that. The beginner users found it easier to use and faster to learn then traditional UNIX access control scheme and SELinux.