Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Governmentality in higher education : a critical analysis of the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE)

In this dissertation, the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) serves as a nodal point through which to examine the power relations shaping the direction and practices of higher education in the twenty-first century. Theoretically, my analysis is informed by Foucault’s concept of governmentality, briefly defined as a technology of power that influences or shapes behavior from a distance. This form of governance operates through apparatuses of security, which include higher education. Foucault identified three essential characteristics of an apparatus—the market, the milieu, and the processes of normalization—through which administrative mechanisms and practices operate and govern populations. In this project, my primary focus is on the governance of faculty and administrators, as a population, at residential colleges and universities. I argue that the existing milieu of accountability is one dominated by the neoliberal assumption that all activity—including higher education—works best when governed by market forces alone, reducing higher education to a market-mediated private good. Under these conditions, what many in the academy believe is an essential purpose of higher education—to educate students broadly, to contribute knowledge for the public good, and to serve as society’s critic and social conscience (Washburn 227)—is being eroded. Although NSSE emerged as a form of resistance to commercial college rankings, it did not challenge the forces that empowered the rankings in the first place. Indeed, NSSE data are now being used to make institutions even more responsive to market forces. Furthermore, NSSE’s use has a normalizing effect that tends to homogenize classroom practices and erode the autonomy of faculty in the educational process. It also positions students as part of the system of surveillance. In the end, if aspects of higher education that are essential to maintaining a civil society are left to be defined solely in market terms, the result may be a less vibrant and, ultimately, a less just society.