Differentiation in Male and Female Speech Styles

From the moment of their birth, a person's life is determined by their sex. Ms. Goroshko wants to know why this difference is so striking, why society is so concerned to sustain it, and how it is able to persist even when certain national or behavioural stereotypes are erased between people. She is convinced of the existence of not only social, but biological differences between men and women, and set herself the task, in a manuscript totalling 126 pages, written in Ukrainian and including extensive illustrations, of analysing these distinctions as they are manifested in language. She points out that, even before 1900, certain stylistic differences between the ways that men and women speak had been noted. Since then it has become possible, for instance in the case of Japanese, to point to examples of male and female sub-languages. In general, one can single out the following characteristics. Males tend to write with less fluency, to refer to events in a verb-phrase, to be time-oriented, to involve themselves more in their references to events, to locate events in their personal sphere of activity, and to refer less to others. Therefore, concludes Ms Goroshko, the male is shown to be more active, more ego-involved in what he does, and less concerned about others. Women, in contrast, were more fluent, referred to events in a noun-phrase, were less time-oriented, tended to be less involved in their event-references, locate events within their interactive community and refer more to others. They spent much more time discussing personal and domestic subjects, relationship problems, family, health and reproductive matters, weight, food and clothing, men, and other women. As regards discourse strategies, Ms Goroshko notes the following. Men more often begin a conversation, they make more utterances, these utterances are longer, they make more assertions, speak less carefully, generally determine the topic of conversation, speak more impersonally, use more vulgar expressions, and use fewer diminutives and more imperatives. Women's speech strategies, apart from being the opposite of those enumerated above, also contain more euphemisms, polite forms, apologies, laughter and crying. All of the above leads Ms. Goroshko to conclude that the differences between male and female speech forms are more striking than the similarities. Furthermore she is convinced that the biological divergence between the sexes is what generates the verbal divergence, and that social factors can only intensify or diminish the differentiation in verbal behaviour established by the sex of a person. Bearing all this in mind, Ms Goroshko set out to construct a grammar of male and female styles of speaking within Russian. One of her most important research tools was a certain type of free association test. She took a list comprising twelve stimuli (to love, to have, to speak, to fuck, a man, a woman, a child, the sky, a prayer, green, beautiful) and gave it to a group of participants specially selected, according to a preliminary psychological testing, for the high levels of masculinity or femininity they displayed. Preliminary responses revealed that the female reactions were more diverse than the male ones, there were more sentences and word combinations in the female reactions, men gave more negative responses to the stimulus and sometimes didn't want to react at all, women reacted more to adjectives and men to nouns, and that, surprisingly, women coloured more negatively their reactions to the words man, to love and a child (Ms. Goroshko is inclined to attribute this to the present economic situation in Russia). Another test performed by Ms. Goroshko was the so-called "defective text" developed by A.A. Brudny. All participants were distributed with packets of complete sentences, which had been taken from a text and then mixed at random. The task was to reconstruct the original text. There were three types of test, the first descriptive, the second narrative, and the third logical. Ms. Goroshko created computer programmes to analyse the results. She found that none of the reconstructed texts was coincident with the original, differing both from the original text and amongst themselves and that there were many more disparities in the male than the female texts. In the descriptive and logical texts the differences manifested themselves more clearly in the male texts, and in the narrative texts in the female texts. The widest dispersal of values was observed at the outset, while the female text ending was practically coincident with the original (in contrast to the male ending). The greatest differences in text reconstruction for both males and females were registered in the middle of the texts. Women, Ms. Goroshko claims, were more sensitive to the semantic structure of the texts, since they assembled the narrative text much more accurately than the other two, while the men assembled more accurately the logical text. Texts written by women were assembled more accurately by women and texts by men by men. On the basis of computer analysis, Ms. Goroshko found that female speech was substantially more emotional. It was expressed by various means, hyperbole, metaphor, comparisons, epithets, ways of enumeration, and with the aid of interjections, rhetorical questions, exclamations. The level of literacy was higher for female speech, and there were fewer mistakes in grammar and spelling in female texts. The last stage of Ms Goroshko's research concerned the social stereotypes of beliefs about men and women in Russian society today. A large number of respondents were asked questions such as "What merits must a woman possess?", "What are male vices and virtues?", etc. After statistical manipulation, an image of modern man and woman, as it exists in the minds of modern Russian men and women, emerged. Ms. Goroshko believes that her findings are significant not only within the field of linguistics. She has already successfully worked on anonymous texts and been able to decide on the sex of the author and consequently believes that in the future her research may even be of benefit to forensic science.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.