Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Test on Czech Privatisation

Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.