The Institutional Framework around Successful Art Forms in Communist Czechoslovakia

Mr. Michl posed the question of how the institutional framework that the former communist regime set up around art production contributed to the success of Czech applied arts. In his theoretical review of the question he discussed the reasons for the lack of success of socialist industrial design as opposed to what he terms pre-industrial arts (such as art glass), and also for the current lack of interest into art institutions of the past regime. His findings in the second, historical section of his work were based largely on interviews with artists and other insiders, as an initial attempt to use questionnaires was unsuccessful. His original assumption that the institutional framework was imposed on artists against their will in fact proved mistaken, as it turned out to have been proposed by the artists themselves. The basic blueprint for communist art institutions was the Memorandum document published on behalf of Czechoslovak visual artists in March 1947, i.e. before the communist coup of February 1948. Thus, while the communist state provided a beneficial institutional framework for artists' work, it was the artists themselves who designed this framework. Mr. Michl concludes that the text of the memorandum appealed to the general left-wing and anti-market sentiments of the immediate post-war period and by this and by later working through the administrative channels of the new state, the artists succeeded in gaining all of their demands over the next 15 years. The one exception was artistic freedom, although this they came to enjoy, if only by default and for a short time, during the ideological thaw of the 1960s. Mr. Michl also examined the art-related legislative framework in detail and looked at the main features of key art institutions in the field, such as the Czech Fund for Visual Arts and the 1960s art export enterprise Art Centrum, which opened the doors into foreign markets for artists.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.