The Effects of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Poland and East Germany

The main goal of this project was to propose appropriate methods of analysing the effects of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, methods which were then tested on a limited sample of 16 Polish and 8 German enterprises privatised in 1992. A considerable amount of information was collected relating to the six-year period 1989-1994 relating to most aspects of the companies' activities. The effects of privatisation were taken to be those changes within the enterprises which were the result of privatisation, in such areas as production, the productivity of labour and fixed assets, investments and innovations, employment and wages, economic incentives (especially for top managers), financing (internal and external sources), bad debts and economic effects (financial analysis). A second important goal was to identify the main factors which represent methodological obstacles in surveys of the effects of privatisation during a period of fundamental transformation of the entire economic system. The list of enterprises for the research was compiled in such a way as to allow for the differentiation of ownership structures of privatised firms and to permit (at least to a certain extent) the empirical verification of some hypotheses regarding the privatisation process. The enterprises selected were divided into the following three groups representing (as far as possible) various types of ownership structures or types of control: (1) enterprises control by strategic investors (domestic or foreign), (2) enterprises controlled by employees (employee-owned companies), (3) enterprises controlled by managers. Formal methods such as econometric models with varying parameters were used to separate pure privatisation effects from other factors which influence various aspects of an enterprise's working, including policies on the productivity of labour and capital, average wages, the remuneration of top managers, etc. While the group admits that their findings and conclusions cannot be treated as representative of all privatised enterprises in Poland and Germany, they found considerable convergence with their findings and those of other surveys conducted on a wider scale. The main hypotheses that were confirmed included that privatisation (especially in companies controlled by large investors and managers) leads to a significant increase in the effectiveness of these production process, growing pay differentials between different employee groups (e.g. between executives and rank-and-file employees) and between different jobs and positions within particular professional groups. They also confirmed the growing importance in incentives to top executives of incentives linked with the company's economic effects (particularly profit-related incentives), long-term incentives and the capital market.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.