Value Choice of Russia in the Reform Process: The Sociological Aspect

The transition in Central and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s has provided a testing ground for classic propositions. This project looked at the impact of privatisation on private consumption, using the Czech experiment of voucher privatisation to test the permanent income hypothesis. This form of privatisation moved state assets to individuals and represented an unexpected windfall gain for participants in the scheme. Whether the windfall was consumed or saved offers a clear test of the permanent income hypothesis. Of a total population of 10 million, 6 million Czechs, i.e. virtually every household, participated in the scheme,. In a January 1996 survey, 1263 individuals were interviewed , 75% of whom had taken part. The data obtained suggests that only a small quantity of transferred assets were cashed in and spent on consumption, providing support for the permanent income hypothesis. The fraction of the windfall consumed grows with age, as would be predicted from the lower life expectancy of older consumers. The most interesting deviation was for people aged 26 to 35, who apparently consumed more that they would if the windfall were annuitised. As these people are at the stage in their lives when they would otherwise be borrowing to cover consumption related to establishing a family, etc., this is however consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow money would use the windfall to avoid doing so.

Democratic Transition and Political Patronage

Mr. Korosenyi begins by analysing the particular relationship holding between politics and administration in different countries. Within Europe three major patterns have emerged in the 20th century. Firstly there is the politically neutral British Civil Service, secondly the German and French state bureaucracies, which traditionally are supposed to embody the "common good", and thirdly there is the patronage system of the so-called consociate democracies, e.g. Austria. In general Mr. Korosenyi believes that, though politics do not penetrate into the Hungarian administration to the extent they do in Belgium and Austria, nevertheless, there is a stronger fusion than there is in the traditional British pattern. He is particularly interested in this relationship with regard to its effect on democratic institution building and the stabilisation of the new regime in Hungary, now the old "nomenklatura" system has been abolished. The structure of the Hungarian government was a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990. Analysing this period, it becomes clear that for all the political actors who initiated and supported the democratic transition to democracy, the underlying assumption was a radical depoliticisation of the administration in order to maintain its stability. The political leadership of the executive is a cabinet government. The government is structured along ministries, each headed by a politician, i.e. the minister, who is a member of the cabinet. The minister's political secretary is not a cabinet member, but he or she is a politician, usually a member of the parliament. The head of the administration of the ministry is the administrative state secretary, who is a civil servant. He or she usually has four deputies, also civil servants. Naturally it is assumed that there should be a clear separation between politicians and civil servants. However in practice, the borders can be blurred, giving rise to a hybrid known as the "political civil servant". Mr. Korosenyi analyses the different faces of these hybrids. They are civil servants for the following reasons. They need special educational qualifications, working experience, a civil service exam etc., they are not allowed to do anything which is incompatible with their impartial role, and they cannot occupy political office nor may they appear in the name of any political party. On the other hand, the accepted political dimension to their function is revealed by the following facts. The state secretary (a civil servant) may participate in cabinet meetings instead of the minister. The state secretary is employed by the minister. A state secretary or any of their deputies can be dismissed at any time by the minister or the prime minister. In practice then, ministers appoint to these senior administrative positions civil servants whose personal and political loyaties are strong. To the second level of political patronage in ministries belong the ministerial cabinet, press office and public relation office. The ministerial cabinet includes the private advisors and members of the personal staff of the minister. The press office and the PR office, if they exist, are not adjusted to the administrative hierarchy of the ministry, but under the direct control of the minister. In the beginning of the 1990s, such offices were exceptions; in the second half of the 90s they are accepted and to be found in most ministries. Mr. Korosenyi's work, a 92-page manuscript of a book in Hungarian, marks the first piece of literature within the field of political science which analyses the structure of the Hungarian government in the 1990s and the relationship between the political leadership and the public administration.

The Presidential Institution in Bulgaria, Albania and Romani: An Attempt at Comparison"

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania are all parliamentary republics with a president as head of state. Although the Albanian president is elected by Parliament, he is arguably the strongest of the three, both in terms of the powers allowed by the provisional constitution and of Mr. Berisha's political practice. The constitutional reform underway in the country will however change the status quo. In Bulgaria and Romania the presidents are elected directly by popular vote, but their powers are relatively small as compared to the democratic legitimisation implied by direct elections. Actual presidential powers should however be assessed with caution as some of them are set by law or interpretations of constitutional texts, rather than by the constitutions themselves. There is also variation in the degree to which the presidents in office have exploited their constitutional powers or taken their role as non-aligned political brokers seriously. Mr. Berisha, in particular, was in control of party politics throughout his presidency and was one of the most polarising influences on public opinion. The excessive political polarisation in all three countries has however its own logic and power. Thus Mr. Zhelev invariably supported the emergence of a political centre in Bulgaria, but this did not succeed and the policy was as damaging to his political career as the fight with would-be centrists was to Berisha's. Political practice in all three countries seems to need a presidential figure. This adds flexibility to a situation governed by hostile and mutually suspicious parties, stuck parliaments and weak or inexperienced governments. The presidents also command considerable influence on public opinion. Public opinion in Bulgaria, for example, largely supports the idea of greater power for the president, in contrast with the opinions of constitutionalists and other law-makers in the country. Under the legacy of the past, the people have a love-hate relationship with such paternalist figures. Presidents personalise politics in the public mind, but they can also become scapegoats for political failures.