The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Test on Czech Privatisation

Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.

Value Choice of Russia in the Reform Process: The Sociological Aspect

The transition in Central and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s has provided a testing ground for classic propositions. This project looked at the impact of privatisation on private consumption, using the Czech experiment of voucher privatisation to test the permanent income hypothesis. This form of privatisation moved state assets to individuals and represented an unexpected windfall gain for participants in the scheme. Whether the windfall was consumed or saved offers a clear test of the permanent income hypothesis. Of a total population of 10 million, 6 million Czechs, i.e. virtually every household, participated in the scheme,. In a January 1996 survey, 1263 individuals were interviewed , 75% of whom had taken part. The data obtained suggests that only a small quantity of transferred assets were cashed in and spent on consumption, providing support for the permanent income hypothesis. The fraction of the windfall consumed grows with age, as would be predicted from the lower life expectancy of older consumers. The most interesting deviation was for people aged 26 to 35, who apparently consumed more that they would if the windfall were annuitised. As these people are at the stage in their lives when they would otherwise be borrowing to cover consumption related to establishing a family, etc., this is however consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow money would use the windfall to avoid doing so.

Changes in Psychological Characteristics of Working Adults in Different Stages of Economic Transition in Lithuania

Global economic changes have psychological consequences and Mr. Lepeska set out to assess these changes in working adults in Lithuania between 1993 and 1997. He surveyed two groups of working adults, with a total of 200 people, randomly selected and representing different organisations and professions. In both groups around 30% of participants were managers, with the remainder working in non-managerial positions. The participants were surveyed twice, once in 1993 and the second time in 1997,using various psychodiagnostic tools to measure their psychological characteristics. The results showed that strategies for coping with stress have changed, with problem solving strategies being used more often, and avoidance behaviour or seeking social support less. Men tended to have rejected these strategy more radically than women. Attitudes towards work had become more positive, with managers' attitudes having changed more significantly than those of employees from lower levels of organisations. Younger people were more positive towards work-related changes, while situational anxiety tended to increase with age, although overall it remained low. Mr. Lepeska found that while there were some indications of an increasing individualist in relation to peers, the traditional collective orientation of Lithuanian adults had if anything increased. People have become more accepting of an unequal distribution of power, making it difficult to increase the participation of subordinates in decision making. He also noted a tendency for Lithuanians to see their organisations as traditional families, expecting them to take care of them physically and economically in return for loyalty. The strong feminine orientation with its stress on interpersonal relations and overall quality of life has also strengthened, but the ability of Lithuanians to take initiative and control their environment was relatively low. Mr. Lepeska concludes that organisations should seek to recruit people who are able to adjust more easily to changes and consider measuring dominance, individualism, and attitudes to work-related change and situational anxiety in the process of professional selection. There should also be more emphasis on team building and on training managers to maintain closer relationships with their subordinates so as to increase the latter's participation in decision making. Good interpersonal relations can be a strong work motivator, as may be special attention to the security needs of older employees.

National Identity in Lithuania: Processes During the Period of Changes

Under the conditions of rapid and total change in the social, political, economic and legal environment in Lithuania, a re-orientation process is going on in all groups of society. In this process, not only younger but also middle-aged and old people become adherents to what Ms. Liubiniene calls the new, "post-materialist" values, strongly reinforced by powerful agents of socialisation originating in the West, like the media, advertising agencies and lifestyle-consumption models. As a result, the national identity of Lithuania and its inhabitants is being reconstructed. Ms. Liubiniene set out to examine the details of this evolving identity by conducting a survey of 1218 university staff and students. Her conclusions are set out in a 74 page manuscript, written in Lithuanian and available on disc. Change is most noticeable among the young. Indeed, time and time again, Ms. Liubiniene was to find that the age of 36 marks a natural watershed, with, for instance, the younger group valuing individualism highly and the older, collectivism. Ms. Liubiniene ventures to suggest that traditional values are deeply rooted amongst elderly people, women and people with an education in the humanities. Young people on the other hand, and especially those with a professional orientation towards business are more open to change and ready to adapt to new values. Turning to the evaluation of national symbols, Ms. Liubinie finds that those with an education in the humanities might be considered to be the most traditional, placing greater value on the symbols of nature, ethnic culture and religion. Folk songs and the crucifix are also in their top ten. Respondents with a technical education favour symbols of statehood and nature, and respondents with a business orientation assign greater value to the symbols of nature, history, sports and statehood. Ms. Liubinie concludes that the group of respondents most active and ready to adapt to new things is composed of young males of a business orientation. Generally the national identity of the young is weaker compared to that of the old. In the future, the combination of the evolution of values and the process of inter-generational replacement allows us to predict a weakening of the sense of national identity, or at least its transformation into something radically different to what it is today.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Poverty in Slovenia: A Conseqence of Economic Transition

Slovenia is considered to be one of the most successful Central and Eastern European countries undergoing the process of transition. It has a high GDP per capita (the highest in the Visegrad group) amounting to about 7200 US dollars (at the exchange rates pertaining during Ms. Stropnik's research). In 1994, a low rate of inflation, a low level of public debt and almost balanced public finances, were all positive elements. However, there is a darker side, for instance the dramatic increase in unemployment and (somewhat less dramatic) fall in production during the transition period. This analysis aimed to provide insights into what is actually happening at the household level, since households are the ultimate bearers of macroeconomic and social change. The final output totalled 166 pages in English and Slovenian, available also on disc. The income concept used by Ms. Stropnik is that of the disposable (monetary) household income, i.e. the cash income of all household members - including social security transfers and family benefits, and the net sum of taxes and social security contributions - plus the equivalent of domestic production, used in the household. Non-monetary income sources, such as household own production, benefits in kind, subsidies for goods and services, and fringe benefits, were not taken into account. The concept of relative and objective poverty was followed. Poverty means having less than others in society, it is a state of relative deprivation. Objective aspects of the situation, e.g. command over resources (i.e. the household income) and the relative position of the household in the income distribution, determine who is poor and who is not. Changes in household composition - an increase in the number of pensioners, unemployed and self-employed, concomitant with a large decrease in the number of employees - obviously played a part in the changing structure of household income sources during this period. The overall decrease in the share of wages and salaries from primary employment in 1993 is to be observed in all income deciles. On the other hand, the importance of salaries gained from secondary employment has increased in all deciles. The lower seven deciles experienced a sharp rise in the share of social benefits in the period 1988-1993, mostly because of the increase in the number of persons entitled to claim unemployment benefits. In Slovenia, income inequality has increased considerably during the 1988-1993 period. To make matters worse, the large increase in income inequality occurred in a period of falling real incomes. In 1983 the bottom decile disposed of 3.8 percent and the top decile disposed of 23.4 percent of total monetary income in Slovenia, whereas by 1993 the same statistics revealed 3.1 percent and 18.9 percent respectively. Unemployment greatly increases the risk of living in poverty. In 1993, 35 per cent of all unemployed persons in Slovenia were living in the lowest income quintile. Ms. Stropnik found certain features that were specific to Slovenia and not shared by most countries in transition. For example, the relative income position of pensioners has improved. Retirement did not increase the risk of poverty in 1993 as much as it did in 1983 and 1988. Also, it appears that children have not been particularly hard-hit by the transition upheavals. The incidence of poverty amongst children has not increased in the period 1983-1993. Children were also fairly evenly distributed across income quintiles. In 1983, 11.8 percent of households with children aged 18 or less were poor. In 1993, this figure was 8.4 per cent. On the other hand, poor households with children were, in comparison with other households of the same type, poorer in 1993 than in 1983. Ms. Stropnik also analysed the impact of social transfers. Her conclusion was that the level of social transfers prevented them from being successful in alleviating poverty. Family policy transfers (child allowances, child tax allowances, subsidised child care) did, however, contribute to the lowering of income inequality between families with and without children, and amongst families with different numbers of children. Ms. Stropnik is determined that the results of her research be used in the creation of social policy aimed at helping the poor. She quotes Piachaud approvingly: "If the term 'poverty' carries with it the implication and moral imperative that something should be done about it, then the study of poverty is only ultimately justifiable if it influences individual and social attitudes and actions."

The Hungarian Economic Elite After the Political Transition

Erzsebet Szalai (Hungary). The Hungarian Economic Elite after the Political Transition. Ms. Szalai is a research fellow in the Institute of Political Sciences in Budapest and worked on this project from July 1996 to June 1998. In the period following the political changes of 1989, the leading forces of the economic elite have gained increasing superiority over the political and cultural elites, with the clear ambition of putting the latter to their service. The power relations within the economic elite were characterised by "a war of all against all". The desire to gain precedence over others became an openly declared value. The formation of estates and the intensification of competition became embodied in a multitude of lobbies which cropped up to assert short-term interests. After the state socialist period, possession of at least two of the social, economic and cultural forms of capital is necessary to join one of the three segments of the elite: political, cultural or economic. What defines the ability of the members of the three elite groups to assert their interests is their ability to convert any of the three types of capital into another. That is to say, the basis on which they can retain and extend their position is "symbolic capital" as interpreted by Bourdieu. The concept of symbolic capital is useful for describing the power relations following the collapse of state socialist systems and societies. In the state-socialist system, the political, economic and cultural spheres are tightly interwoven, and this interpenetration slackens only slowly after the system's disintegration. A close institutional relationship between the three spheres continues to make it easier for power actors to convert social, economic and cultural capital from one type to another. Symbolic capital, or the easy transfer between the three spheres, in turn reproduces the institutional relationship, or more precisely, complicates the separation of the three spheres after the fall of state socialism.

Towards a Variety of Family Models: Economic Contributions of Spouses and Family Power

In Western societies the increase in female employment (especially among married women) is seen as having brought about the crisis of the traditional model of the family, reinforcing the position of the "modern" model - the egalitarian family with two working spouses and a "dual-career" family. In contrast, the transitional situation in the post-communist countries during the 1990s is producing a crisis of the family with two working spouses (the basic type of the communist period) and leading to new power relations within the family. While the growth of dual-earner households in this century has implied modification of family models towards greater symmetry of responsibility for breadwinning and homemaking, there is considerable evidence that women's increased employment does not necessarily lead to a more egalitarian approach to gender roles within the family. The group set out to investigate the economic situation of families and economic power within the fame as a crucial factor in the transformation of families with two working spouses in order to reveal the specific patterns of gender contracts and power relations within the family that are emerging in response to the current political and economic transformation. They opted for a comparative approach, selecting the Czech Republic as a country where the very similar tendencies of a few years ago (almost 100% of women employed and the family as a realm of considerable private freedom where both women's and men's gender identities and the traditional distribution of family responsibilities were largely preserved) are combined with a very different experience in terms of economic inequalities during the 1990s to that of Russia. In the first stage of the study they surveyed 300 married couples (150 in each country) on the question of breadwinning. They then carried out in-depth interviews with 10 couples from each country (selected from among the educated layers of the population), focusing on the process of the social construction of gender, using breadwinning and homemaking as gender boundaries which distinguish men from women. By analysing changes in social position and the type of interpersonal interaction of spouses they distinguished two main types of family contracts: the neo-traditional "communal sharing" (with male breadwinner, traditional distribution of family chores and negotiated family power) and the modern one based on negotiated agreement. The most important pre-conditions of husband-wife agreement about breadwinning seemed to imply their overall gender ideology rather than the economic and/or family circumstances. In general, wives were more likely to express egalitarian views, supporting the blurring or even elimination of many gender boundaries. Husbands, on the other hand, more often gave responses calling for the continued maintenance of gender boundaries. The analysis showed that breadwinning is still an important gender boundary in these cultures, one that is assumed unless it is explicitly questioned and that is seen as part of what makes a man a "real man". The majority of respondents seemed to be committed to egalitarian ideology on gender roles and the distribution of family tasks, including decision making, but this is contradicted by the persistent idea of the husband as the breadwinner. This contradiction is more characteristic of the Russian situation than of the Czech. The quantitative study showed a difference in prevailing family models between the two countries, with a clearer shift towards the traditional family contract in the Russian case. The Czechs were more likely to consider their partnerships as based on negotiated agreement, while the Russians saw theirs as based on egalitarian contract, in both cases seeing this as the norm. The majority of couples said they felt satisfied with their marriage, although in both countries wives seemed to be less satisfied. There was however a difference in the issues that aroused dissatisfaction, with Czech women being more sensitive to issues such as self-realisation, personal independence, understanding and recognition in the family, and Russians to issues of love, understanding and recognition. The most disputed area for the majority of families was chores in the home, presumably because in many families both husband and wife were working hard outside the home and because a number of partners had differing views as to the ideal distribution of chores within the family. The distribution of power in the family seems to be linked to the level of well being. The analysis showed that in the dominant democratic model there is still an inverse connection between family leadership and well being: the more prominent the wife's position as head of the family is, the lower the level of family income. This may reflect both the husband's refusal to play the leading role in the family and even his rejection of any involvement in family issues in such a family. The qualitative research revealed that both men and women see the breadwinning role to be an essential part of masculine identity, a role which the female partner would take on temporarily to assist the male but not permanently since this would threaten the gender boundaries and the man's identity. At the same time, few breadwinners expressed a sense of job satisfaction and all considered their choice as imposed on them by the circumstances (i.e. having a family in difficult times). The group feel that family orientation and some loss of personal involvement in their profession is partly reflected in the fact that many of the men felt more comfortable and self-confident at home than at work. Women's work, on the other hand, was largely seen as a source of personal and self-realisation and social life. Eight out of ten of the Russian women interviewed were employed, although only two on a full-time basis, but none saw their jobs as adding substantially to the family budget. Both partners see the most important factor as the wife's wish to work or stay at home, and do not think it wise for the wife to work at the expense of her part of the "family contract", although husbands from the "egalitarian" relationships expressed more willingness to compromise. The analysis showed clearly that wives and husbands did not construct gender boundaries in isolation, with the interviews providing clear evidence of negotiation. At the same time, husbands' interpretations of their wives' employment were less susceptible to the influence of negotiation than were their gender attitudes and norms about breadwinning. One of the most interesting aspects of the spouses' negotiations was the extent to which they disagreed about what they seemed to have agreed upon. Most disagreements about the breadwinning boundaries, however, were over norms and were settled by changes in norms rather than in behavioural interpretation. Changes in norms were often a form of peace offering or were in response in changes in circumstances. The study did show, however, that many of the efforts at cooperation and compensation were more symbolic than real and the group found the plasticity of expressed gender ideology to be one of the most striking findings of their work. They conclude that the shift towards more traditional gednder distributions of incomes and domestic chores does not automatically mean the reestablishment of a patriarchal model of family power. On the contrary, it seems to be a compromise formation, relatively unstable, temporary and containing self-defeating forces as the split between the personal and professional value of work and its social value expressed in a money equivalent cannot be maintained for generations.