Changes in the Social Status of Women in Societies in Transition: Russia and Armenia

The project studied the way the post-communist transition has affected the position of women in society and two post-Soviet states, Armenia and Russia, were chosen for a comparative study. Although in many respects the two countries show rather similar tendencies, there are important differences. The most dramatic of these lie in the field of the women's movement and state support, in family lifestyles and public thinking, and in the perception of female roles in society by both women and men in both countries. Whereas in Russia, at least in large cities, it is possible to speak of a movement concerned with equality and women's rights, in Armenia there are few women's organisations and those that exist are most focused on support for children and poor families. In Russia, many post-Soviet changes can be described as a shift towards 'Western' rather than 'Eastern' values, while in Armenia this tendency is much weaker and exists alongside a relapse into traditional attitudes. Iskandarian suggests possible explanations for this, both intrinsic (tradition. motivation) and external (influences, neighbouring countries, involvement in wars, the economic situation, migrations, political regimes). Nevertheless, for both societies it is possible to speak of a growing awareness of women's needs and of the birth of a new tradition in family and public life brought by the post-Soviet winds of change.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Tolerance and Critical Thinking

Post-soviet countries are in the process of transformation from a totalitarian order to a democratic one, a transformation which is impossible without a profound shift in people's way of thinking. The group set themselves the task of determining the essence of this shift. Using a multidisciplinary approach, they looked at concrete ways of overcoming the totalitarian mentality and forming that necessary for an open democratic society. They studied the contemporary conceptions of tolerance and critical thinking and looked for new foundations of criticism, especially in hermeneutics. They then sought to substantiate the complementary relation between tolerance and criticism in the democratic way of thinking and to prepare a a syllabus for teaching on the subject in Ukrainian higher education. In a philosophical exploration of tolerance they began with relgious tolerance as its first and most important form. Political and social interests often lay at the foundations of religious intolerance and this implicitly comprised the transition to religious tolerance when conditions changed. Early polytheism was more or less indifferent to dogmatic deviations but monotheism is intolerant of heresies. The damage wrought by the religious wars of the Reformations transformed tolerance into a value. They did not create religious tolerance but forced its recognition as a positive phenomenon. With the weakening of religious institutions in the modern era, the purely political nature of many conflicts became evident and this stimulated the extrapolation of tolerance into secular life. Each historical era has certain acts and operations which may be interpreted as tolerant and these can be classified as to whether or not they are based on the conscious following of the principle of tolerance. This criterion requires the separation of the phenomenon of tolerance from its concept and from tolerance as a value. Only the conjunction of a concept of tolerance with a recognition of its value can transform it into a principle dictating a norm of conscious behaviour. The analysis of the contemporary conception of tolerance focused on the diversity of the concept and concluded that the notions used cannot be combined in the framework of a single more or less simple classification, as the distinctions between them are stimulated by the complexity of the realty considered and the variety of its manifestations. Notions considered in relation to tolerance included pluralism, respect and particular-universal. The rationale of tolerance was also investigated and the group felt that any substantiation of the principle of tolerance must take into account human beings' desire for knowledge. Before respecting or being tolerant of another person different from myself, I should first know where the difference lies, so knowledge is a necessary condition of tolerance.The traditional division of truth into scientific (objective and unique) and religious, moral, political (subjective and so multiple) intensifies the problem of the relationship between truth and tolerance. Science was long seen as a field of "natural" intolerance whereas the validity of tolerance was accepted in other intellectual fields. As tolerance eemrges when there is difference and opposition, it is essentially linked with rivaly and there is a a growing recognition today that unlimited rivalry is neither able to direct the process of development nor to act as creative matter. Social and economic reality has led to rivalry being regulated by the state and a natural requirement of this is to associate tolerance with a special "purified" form of rivalry, an acceptance of the actiivity of different subjects and a specification of the norms of their competition. Tolerance and rivalry should therefore be subordinate to a degree of discipline and the group point out that discipline, including self-discipline, is a regulator of the balance between them. Two problematic aspects of tolerance were identified: why something traditionally supposed to have no positive content has become a human activity today, and whether tolerance has full-scale cultural significance. The resolution of these questions requires a revision of the phenomenon and conception of tolerance to clarify its immanent positive content. This involved an investigation of the contemporary concept of tolerance and of the epistemological foundations of a negative solution of tolerance in Greek thought. An original soution to the problem of the extrapolation of tolerance to scientific knowledge was proposed based on the Duhem-Quine theses and conceptiion of background knowledge. In this way tolerance as a principle of mutual relations between different scientific positions gains an essential epistemological rationale and so an important argument for its own universal status. The group then went on to consider the ontological foundations for a positive solution of this problem, beginning with the work of Poincare and Reichenbach. The next aspect considered was the conceptual foundations of critical thinking, looking at the ideas of Karl Popper and St. Augustine and at the problem of the demarcation line between reasonable criticism and apologetic reasoning. Dogmatic and critical thinking in a political context were also considered, before an investigation of critical thinking's foundations. As logic is essential to critical thinking, the state of this discipline in Ukrainian and Russian higher education was assessed, together with the limits of formal-logical grounds for criticism, the role of informal logical as a basis for critical thinking today, dialectical logic as a foundation for critical thinking and the universality of the contemporary demand for criticism. The search for new foundations of critical thinking covered deconstructivism and critical hermeneutics, including the problem of the author. The relationship between tolerance and criticism was traced from the ancient world, both eastern and Greek, through the transitional community of the Renaissance to the industrial community (Locke and Mill) and the evolution of this relationship today when these are viewed not as moral virtues but as ordinary norms. Tolerance and criticism were discussed as complementary manifestations of human freedom. If the completeness of freedom were accepted it would be impossible to avoid recognition of the natural and legal nature of these manifestations and the group argue that critical tolerance is able to avoid dismissing such negative phenomena as the degradation of taste and manner, pornography, etc. On the basis of their work, the group drew up the syllabus of a course in "Logic with Elements of Critical Thinking, and of a special course on the "Problem of Tolerance".

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.