Russian Writers and the Third Section

The Third Section was an instrument not so much of oppression as of information, propaganda and education. Under Nicholas I, the press did not represent public opinion, but rather the official point of view. It was intended to shape public opinion rather than to express it and much of the Third Section's activity focused on creating the best possible contacts with journalists and men of letters. The Third Section supervised literary activities by examining works in print and collecting information through its agents. It rewarded those authors whose work was approved by the emperor, it used writers to pursue its goals, especially in order to "direct minds", but acted as a mediator between the tsar, censors and writers, or sometimes as arbiter in conflicts between writers themselves, and it also acted as a censor. Writers, for their part, served in the Third Section, becoming its agents or consultants, delivering reports to it and writing texts commissioned by the Section. The majority of writers did not see any problems with serving or assisting the Third Section. Ideologies offering an alternative to state monarchism /in professional literature or individual liberalism/ were very weak. The only exception was a small group, mostly composed of eminent and highly educated aristocrats who possessed alternative moral and financial resources. Reitblat showed that the strong ties maintained by some journalists and writers with the Third Section were not unfortunate exceptions due to the low moral qualities of those individuals, but rather a natural phenomenon which reflected the specific nature of the Russian literary system and, more generally, of Russian society as a whole.

The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Test on Czech Privatisation

Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.

Aggressive Behaviour of Different Social and Demographic Groups in Post-Totalitarian Society

The project looked at aggressiveness in different age and social groups of modern post-totalitarian society, beginning with the hypotheses that the greatest risk groups are teenagers and the unemployed, and that there is a link between aggression and the level of meaningfulness of life. The groups studied comprised about 200 persons from urban areas of eastern Ukraine, including schoolchildren, students, white collar workers, self-employed persons, the unemployed and pensioners. Workers in industry were not included as this group has virtually disappeared in Ukraine at present since most enterprises have ceased to work and most workers have moved into the groups of the unemployed or self-employed. Participants were divided into age groups of 13-14, 16-17, 18-22, 24-45, 46-60 and over 60, with each group including approximately equal number of men and women. Research methods included Buss-Darky techniques, the "hand test" (E. Wagner), the "non-existent animal" technique, a Rozenzweig picture frustration study, purpose-in-life tests and an interview. The Buss-Darky test showed that schoolchildren have the highest level of aggression, followed by students. These groups have high indexes in virtually all types of aggression, including its open form. The self-employed have relatively lower indexes, although they are more likely to manifest it openly, while such open manifestations are less likely among white-collar workers, pensioners and the unemployed. The least aggressive were the unemployed and pensioners, although the latter had a relatively high level of hostility. In terms of age, aggression was shown to decrease with age, which Ms. Ivanova attributes to the still imperfect control mechanisms of teenagers and their less mature personalities. Among the younger groups girls showed a slightly higher level of aggression, although this situation was reversed among older people. The risk groups inclined to manifest open forms of aggressiveness can therefore be seen to be teenagers and students. Other tests used show aggressiveness as a feature of the current state, rather than as an inherent feature and the results obtained were somewhat different. In the interviews, all adults referred to the increased aggressiveness in society and most stated that they themselves had become more aggressive and bad-tempered. The ability of individuals to adapt to their social environment was also investigated and schoolchildren turned out to have the lowest adaptation index and the unemployed the highest. MS. Ivanova attributes that latter, rather surprising, result to the fact that the constant frustrations facing the unemployed force them to actively seek ways and means of adapting in order to survive. The final aspect considered was the possible connection between human aggressiveness and the meaningfulness of life. Here the groups with the most meaningful lives were the self-employed and pensioners. The latter result, again rather surprising, was attributed to the desire of people who have already lived the greater part of their lives to place more weight on what they have already done, in order to prove to themselves that they have not lived in vain. The hypothesis that aggressiveness is conversely related to the meaningfulness of life was only partially confirmed. In the two extreme cases (schoolchildren and pensioners) this was indeed the case, but the remaining groups did not show any such connection. From the data obtained, Ms. Ivanova concluded that life in modern post-totalitarian society does indeed foster a rise in people's aggressiveness, and this was supported by the fact that indexes of aggressiveness proved to be higher than the norm. Her original hypothesis as to the groups in society most at risk from open aggression confirmed in the case of teenagers but not of the unemployed, who had relatively low aggressiveness indexes and the highest degree of adaptation.

Development of Socio-Economic Behaviour and Attitudes of Baltic Nationalities: Perspectives for Integration with Europe

This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.