Immigrants in the Czech Republic (With Special Reference to Ukrainian Workers and "Western" Firms Operating in Prague)

International migration has increased rapidly in the Czech Republic, with more than 150,000 legally registered foreign residents at the end of 1996. A large proportion of these are in Prague - 35% of the total in December 1996. The aim of this project was to enrich the fund of information concerning the "environment", reasons and "mechanisms" behind immigration to the Czech Republic. Mr. Drbohlav looked first at the empirical situation and on this basis set out to test certain well-known migration theories. He focused on four main areas: 1) a detailed description and explanation of the stock of foreign citizens legally settled in Czech territory, concentrating particularly on "economic" migrants; 2) a questionnaire survey targeting a total of 192 Ukrainian workers (98 in the fall 1995 and 94 in the fall 1996) working in Prague or its vicinity; 3) a second questionnaire survey of 40 "western" firms (20 in 1996 and 20 in 1997) operating out of Prague; 4) an opinion poll on how the Czech population reacts to foreign workers in the CR. Over 80% of economic immigrants at the end of 1996 were from European countries, 16% from Asia and under 2% from North America. The largest single nationalities were Ukrainians, Slovaks, Vietnamese and Poles. There has been a huge increase in the Ukrainian immigrant community over both space (by region) and time (a ten-fold increase since 1993), and at 40,000 persons this represents one third of all legal immigrants. Indications are that many more live and work there illegally. Young males with low educational/skills levels predominate, in contrast with the more heterogeneous immigration from the "West". The primary reason for this migration is the higher wages in the Czech Republic. In 1994 the relative figures of GDP adjusted for parity of purchasing power were US$ 8,095 for the Czech Republic versus US$ 3,330 for the Ukraine as a whole and US$ 1,600 for the Zakarpatye region from which 49% of the respondents in the survey came. On an individual level, the average Czech wage is about US$ 330 per month, while 50% of the Ukrainian respondents put their last monthly wage before leaving for the Czech Republic at under US$ 27. The very low level of unemployment in the latter country (fluctuating around 4%) was also mentioned as an important factor. Migration was seen as a way of diversifying the family's source of income and 49% of the respondents had made their plans together with partners or close relatives, while 45% regularly send remittances to Ukraine (94% do so through friends or relatives). Looking at Ukrainian migration from the point of view of the dual market theory, these migrants' type and conditions of work, work load and earnings were all significantly worse than in the primary sector, which employs well educated people and offers them good earnings, job security and benefits. 53% of respondents were working and/or staying in the Czech Republic illegally at the time of the research, 73% worked as unqualified, unskilled workers or auxiliary workers, 62% worked more than 12 hours a day, and 40% evaluated their working conditions as hard. 51% had no days off, earnings were low in relation to the number of hours worked. and 85% said that their earnings did not increase over time. Nearly half the workers were recruited in Ukraine and only 4% expressed a desire to stay in the Czech Republic. Network theories were also borne out to some extent as 33% of immigrants came together with friends from the same village, town or region in Ukraine. The number who have relatives working in the Czech Republic is rising, and many wish to invite relatives or children to visit them. The presence of organisations which organised cross-border migration, including some which resort to organising illegal documents, also gives some support for the institutional theory. Mr. Drbohlav found that all the migration theories considered offered some insights on the situation, but that none was sufficient to explain it all. He also points out parallels with many other regions of the world, including Central America, South and North America, Melanesia, Indonesia, East Africa, India, the Middle East and Russia. For the survey of foreign and international firms, those chosen were largely from countries represented by more than one company and were mainly active in market services such as financial and trade services, marketing and consulting. While 48% of the firms had more than 10,000 employees spread through many countries, more than two thirds had fewer than 50 employees in the Czech Republic. Czechs formed 80% plus of general staff in these firms although not more than 50% of senior management, and very few other "easterners" were employed. All companies absolutely denied employing people illegally. The average monthly wage of Czech staff was US$ 850, with that of top managers from the firm's "mother country" being US$ 6,350 and that of other western managers US$ 3,410. The foreign staff were generally highly mobile and were rarely accompanied by their families. Most saw their time in the Czech Republic as positive for their careers but very few had any intention of remaining there. Factors in the local situation which were evaluated positively included market opportunities, the economic and political environment, the quality of technical and managerial staff, and cheap labour and low production costs. In contrast, the level of appropriate business ethics and conduct, the attitude of local and regional authorities, environmental production conditions, the legal environment and financial markets and fiscal policy were rated very low. In the final section of his work Mr. Drbohlav looked at the opinions expressed by the local Czech population in a poll carried out at the beginning of 1997. This confirmed that international labour migration has become visible in this country, with 43% of respondents knowing at least one foreigner employed by a Czech firm in this country. Perception differ according to the region from which the workers come and those from "the West" are preferred to those coming from further east. 49% saw their attitude towards the former as friendly but only 20% felt thus towards the latter. Overall, attitudes towards migrant workers is neutral, although 38% said that such workers should not have the same rights as Czech citizens. Sympathy towards foreign workers tends to increase with education and the standard of living, and the relatively positive attitudes towards foreigners in the South Bohemia region contradicted the frequent belief that a lack of experience of international migration lowers positive perceptions of it.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Slovak Policy, 1956-1960

The project looked at crucial political events in Slovakia between 1956 and 1960. 1956 saw the first attempt by Slovak intellectuals to reform the communist regime by increasing the degree of democracy and 1960 was the culmination of the strengthening of the political persecution that began after 1957. The period was characterised by the partial replacement of the informal-political instruments of control over society by formal measures, and the gradual weakening of the role of terror in people's daily life. Marusiak studied the gradual accommodation of the communist regime by the people, analysing the social and political history against the background of political development and of specific aspects such as the conflict of youth and intellectuals with the regime, the collectivisation of agriculture and the liquidation of the rest of the private sector in the economy, public opinion and the changes in the political system, the relations between state and churches, and ethnic problems in Czechoslovakia. He concludes that there was a continuity between the aims and methods used by the communist regime before and after 1953 (or 1956) and that the communist regime in this period remained fundamentally totalitarian.

Family Anomie and Juvenile Deliquency in Post-Communist Romania

The sensitivity of crime rates to social, economic and political influences has long aroused the interest of sociologists who have attempted to explain what kind of relationships might be associated with variations in crime rates between different social groups at different times. The earliest views were put forward by Emil Durkheim, and while later writers have developed (R.K. Merton, L. Srole, A, K. Cohen, etc.) have developed some aspects of his ideas further, his basic ideas of the divorce of the individual from normative standards and the lack of social integration are still valid. Ms. Voicu-Minea looked at the theoretical background in detail but then limited it to a specific social group, the family, asking first why certain individual within vulnerable families and/or negative social influences commit offences while others do not. In modern times the family has undergone massive structural and functional changes. Its former economic function, which once endowed it with a great capacity for social inclusion, has generally vanished, while its formerly crucial role in children's education has been massively reduced. These changes, which are still not complete, can lead to dysfunction and in certain social contexts such as that in post-communist Romanian society, this risk of dysfunction is still greater as unfavourably social circumstances more easily affect such families. The number of cases of juvenile delinquency in Romania has increased sharply ever since the end of the communist system and in 1996 reached the level of 18,317 cases. The sample examined included 1012 juvenile delinquents aged between 14 and 18, taken from all areas of Bucharest. Over 80% of charges related to theft, with more serious offences being relatively rare. The children underwent a series of psychological tests, accompanied by a questionnaire relating to family situation. The results showed that juvenile delinquency in Romania is overwhelmingly male, with 91.8% of offences being committed by boys. Two thirds of the research group were under the age of 16 and only just over one third attended school, with over half having left school before the legal age. While the majority of subjects had a lower than average level of education, they did not always recognise this, with two thirds seeing their level of education as being as good as or better than average. Nearly half the children (43%) did not live with both natural parents and majority came from families with three or more children. This applied both to their original families and to the families in which they were living at the time of the survey. The overwhelming majority of families were living in or around Bucharest, but under one third originated from there. Almost 25% of parents were under-schooled and around one third were unqualified workers. At least 30% of families lived in inadequate accommodation and family incomes were generally low. Ms. Voicu-Minea does however point out that over half the minors from the sample saw their family income as satisfactory or even more than satisfactory. When factors such as bad relationships between parents, corporal punishment, alcohol consumption and criminal records of family members were taken into account, the picture was bleak, making it understandable why over 36% of subjects had run away from home at least once, and in many cases repeatedly and for longer periods. The overwhelming majority of offences (80.8%) were committed in groups of between 2 and 11 persons, usually "friends" but in about 10% of cases member's of the family. IQ tests put about 75% of the sample at slightly under average, the difference being too slight to account for the behaviour problems of the majority. Personality tests, however, showed a different picture. Over 70% of those tested manifested an acute need of tenderness and a similar number a high level of potential aggressiveness. Almost half of the minors expressed such feelings as intolerance or a desire for revenge, and Ms. Voicu-Minea found a clear weakness of the Self. Around half the sample expressed sentiments of abandonment, renunciation and solitude.

Towards a Variety of Family Models: Economic Contributions of Spouses and Family Power

In Western societies the increase in female employment (especially among married women) is seen as having brought about the crisis of the traditional model of the family, reinforcing the position of the "modern" model - the egalitarian family with two working spouses and a "dual-career" family. In contrast, the transitional situation in the post-communist countries during the 1990s is producing a crisis of the family with two working spouses (the basic type of the communist period) and leading to new power relations within the family. While the growth of dual-earner households in this century has implied modification of family models towards greater symmetry of responsibility for breadwinning and homemaking, there is considerable evidence that women's increased employment does not necessarily lead to a more egalitarian approach to gender roles within the family. The group set out to investigate the economic situation of families and economic power within the fame as a crucial factor in the transformation of families with two working spouses in order to reveal the specific patterns of gender contracts and power relations within the family that are emerging in response to the current political and economic transformation. They opted for a comparative approach, selecting the Czech Republic as a country where the very similar tendencies of a few years ago (almost 100% of women employed and the family as a realm of considerable private freedom where both women's and men's gender identities and the traditional distribution of family responsibilities were largely preserved) are combined with a very different experience in terms of economic inequalities during the 1990s to that of Russia. In the first stage of the study they surveyed 300 married couples (150 in each country) on the question of breadwinning. They then carried out in-depth interviews with 10 couples from each country (selected from among the educated layers of the population), focusing on the process of the social construction of gender, using breadwinning and homemaking as gender boundaries which distinguish men from women. By analysing changes in social position and the type of interpersonal interaction of spouses they distinguished two main types of family contracts: the neo-traditional "communal sharing" (with male breadwinner, traditional distribution of family chores and negotiated family power) and the modern one based on negotiated agreement. The most important pre-conditions of husband-wife agreement about breadwinning seemed to imply their overall gender ideology rather than the economic and/or family circumstances. In general, wives were more likely to express egalitarian views, supporting the blurring or even elimination of many gender boundaries. Husbands, on the other hand, more often gave responses calling for the continued maintenance of gender boundaries. The analysis showed that breadwinning is still an important gender boundary in these cultures, one that is assumed unless it is explicitly questioned and that is seen as part of what makes a man a "real man". The majority of respondents seemed to be committed to egalitarian ideology on gender roles and the distribution of family tasks, including decision making, but this is contradicted by the persistent idea of the husband as the breadwinner. This contradiction is more characteristic of the Russian situation than of the Czech. The quantitative study showed a difference in prevailing family models between the two countries, with a clearer shift towards the traditional family contract in the Russian case. The Czechs were more likely to consider their partnerships as based on negotiated agreement, while the Russians saw theirs as based on egalitarian contract, in both cases seeing this as the norm. The majority of couples said they felt satisfied with their marriage, although in both countries wives seemed to be less satisfied. There was however a difference in the issues that aroused dissatisfaction, with Czech women being more sensitive to issues such as self-realisation, personal independence, understanding and recognition in the family, and Russians to issues of love, understanding and recognition. The most disputed area for the majority of families was chores in the home, presumably because in many families both husband and wife were working hard outside the home and because a number of partners had differing views as to the ideal distribution of chores within the family. The distribution of power in the family seems to be linked to the level of well being. The analysis showed that in the dominant democratic model there is still an inverse connection between family leadership and well being: the more prominent the wife's position as head of the family is, the lower the level of family income. This may reflect both the husband's refusal to play the leading role in the family and even his rejection of any involvement in family issues in such a family. The qualitative research revealed that both men and women see the breadwinning role to be an essential part of masculine identity, a role which the female partner would take on temporarily to assist the male but not permanently since this would threaten the gender boundaries and the man's identity. At the same time, few breadwinners expressed a sense of job satisfaction and all considered their choice as imposed on them by the circumstances (i.e. having a family in difficult times). The group feel that family orientation and some loss of personal involvement in their profession is partly reflected in the fact that many of the men felt more comfortable and self-confident at home than at work. Women's work, on the other hand, was largely seen as a source of personal and self-realisation and social life. Eight out of ten of the Russian women interviewed were employed, although only two on a full-time basis, but none saw their jobs as adding substantially to the family budget. Both partners see the most important factor as the wife's wish to work or stay at home, and do not think it wise for the wife to work at the expense of her part of the "family contract", although husbands from the "egalitarian" relationships expressed more willingness to compromise. The analysis showed clearly that wives and husbands did not construct gender boundaries in isolation, with the interviews providing clear evidence of negotiation. At the same time, husbands' interpretations of their wives' employment were less susceptible to the influence of negotiation than were their gender attitudes and norms about breadwinning. One of the most interesting aspects of the spouses' negotiations was the extent to which they disagreed about what they seemed to have agreed upon. Most disagreements about the breadwinning boundaries, however, were over norms and were settled by changes in norms rather than in behavioural interpretation. Changes in norms were often a form of peace offering or were in response in changes in circumstances. The study did show, however, that many of the efforts at cooperation and compensation were more symbolic than real and the group found the plasticity of expressed gender ideology to be one of the most striking findings of their work. They conclude that the shift towards more traditional gednder distributions of incomes and domestic chores does not automatically mean the reestablishment of a patriarchal model of family power. On the contrary, it seems to be a compromise formation, relatively unstable, temporary and containing self-defeating forces as the split between the personal and professional value of work and its social value expressed in a money equivalent cannot be maintained for generations.