The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Social Policy Facing the Problems of Youth Employment

Rumiana Stoilova (Bulgaria). Social Policy Facing the Problems of Youth Employment. Ms. Stoilova is a researcher in the Institute of Sociology in Sofia and worked on this project from October 1996 to September 1998. This project involved collecting both statistical and empirical data on the state of youth employment in Bulgaria, which was then compared with similar data from other European countries. One significant aspect was the parallel investigation of employment and unemployment, which took as a premise the continuity of professional experience where unemployment is just a temporary condition caused by external and internal factors. These need to be studied and changed on a systematic basis so as to create a more favourable market situation and to improve individuals' resources for improving their market opportunities. A second important aspect of the project was an analysis of the various entities active on the labour market, including government and private institutions, associations of unemployed persons, of employers or of trade unions, all with their specific legal powers and interests, and of the problems in communication between these. The major trends in youth unemployment during the period studied include a high proportion of the registered unemployed who are not eligible for social assistance, a lengthening of the average period of unemployment, an increase in the percentage of people who are unemployed for the first time and an increasing percentage of these who are not eligible for assistance, particularly among newly registered young people. At the same time the percentage of those for who work has been found is rising and during the last three years an increasing number of the unemployed have started some independent economic activity. Regional differences are also considerable and in the case of the Haskovo region represent a danger of losing the youngest generation, with resulting negative demographic effects. One major weakness of the existing institutional structure is the large scale of the black labour market, with clear negative implications for the young people drawn into it. The role of non-governmental organisations in providing support and information for the unemployed is growing and the government has recently introduced special preferences for organisations offering jobs to unemployed persons. Social policy in the labour market has however been largely restricted to passive measures, mostly because of the risk that poverty poses to people continuously excluded from the labour market. Among the active measures taken, well over half are concerned with providing jobs for the unemployed and there are very limited programmes for providing or improving qualifications. The nature of youth employment in Bulgaria can be seen in the influence of sustained structures (generation) and institutions (family and school). Ms. Stoilova studied the situation of the modern generation through a series of profiles, mostly those of continuously unemployed and self-employed persons, but also distinguishing between students and the unemployed, and between high school and university students. The different categories of young people were studied in separate mini-studies and the survey was carried out in five town in order to gather objective and subjective information on the state of the labour market in the different regions. She conducted interviews with several hundred young people covering questions of family background, career plans, attitudes to the labour situation and government measures to deal with it, and such questions as independence, mobility, attitude to work, etc. The interviews with young people unemployed for a long period of time show the risk involved in starting work and its link with dynamics of economic development. Their approval of structural reforms, of the financial restrictions connected with the introduction of a currency board and the inevitability of unemployment was largely declarative. The findings indicate that the continuously unemployed need practical knowledge and skills to "translate" the macroeconomic realities in concrete alternatives of individual work and initiative. The unemployed experience their exclusion from the labour market not only as a professional problem but also as an existential threat, of poverty, forced mobility and dependence on their parents' generation. The exclusion from the market of goods and services means more than just exercising restraint in their consumption, as it places restrictions on their personal development. Ms. Stoilova suggests that more efficient ways of providing financial aid and mobilisation are needed to counteract the social disintegration and marginalisation of the continuously unemployed. In measuring the speed of reform, university students took both employment opportunities and the implementation of the meritocratic principle in employment into account. When offered a hypothetical choice between a well-paid job and work in one's own profession, 62% would prefer opt for the well-paid job and for working for a company that offered career opportunities rather than employment in a family or own company. While most see the information gained during their studies as useful and interesting, relatively few see their education as competitive on a wider level and many were pessimistic about employment opportunities based on their qualifications. Very similar attitudes were found among high school students, with differences being due rather to family and personal situations. The unemployed, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis on possibilities of gaining or improving qualifications on a job and for the opportunities it would offer for personal contacts. High school students tend to attribute more significance to opportunities for personal accomplishment. A significant difference that five times fewer high school students were willing to work for state-owned companies, and many fewer expected to find permanent employment or to find a job in the area where they lived, Within the family situation, actual support for children seems to be higher than the feelings of confidence expressed in interviews. The attitudes of the families towards past experience seems to be linked with their ability to cope with the difficulties of the present, with those families which show an optimistic and active attitude towards the future having a greater respect for parents experience and tolerance in communication between parents and children.