Interethnic Interaction Dynamics in the Russian Federation

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s also meant the end of the idea of a common soviet identity incarnated in the "soviet man" and the new "historic community of the soviet people". While this idea still lives on in the generations of the 1920s to 1940s, the younger generations tend to prefer identification with family, profession, ethnic group or religion. Ms. Alexakhina set out to investigate different interethnic interaction strategies in the multi-ethnic context of the Russian Federation, with an emphasis on analysing the role of cultural and ethno-demographic characteristics of minority ethnic groups. It aimed to identify those specific patterns of interaction dynamics that have emerged in response to the political and economic transformation at present under way. The basic supposition was that the size and growth of an ethnic population are defined not only by demographic features such as fertility, mortality and net migration, but are also dependent on processes interethnic interaction and ethnic transition. The central hypothesis of the project was that the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural composition of Russia is apparently manifesting itself in the ethnic minority groups in various forms, but particularly in the form of ethnic revival and/or assimilation. The results of these complex phenomena are manifested as changes in ethnic attachments (national re-identification and language behaviour (multi-lingualism, language transition and loss of the mother tongue). The stress of the political and economic crisis has stimulated significant changes in ethnographic, social and cultural characteristics of inter-ethnic dynamics such as the rate of national re-identification, language behaviour, migration activity and the spread of mixed marriages, among both those minorities with a long history of settlement in Russia and those that were annexed during the soviet period. Patterns of language behaviour and the spread of mixed marriages were taken as the main indicators of the directions of interethnic interaction described as assimilation, ethnic revival and cultural pluralism. The first stage of the research involved a statistical analysis of census data from 1959 to 1994 in order to analyse the changing demographic composition of the largest ethnic groups of the Russian Federation. Until 1989 interethnic interaction in soviet society was distinguished by the process of russification but the political and economic transformation has stimulated the process of ethnic revival, leading to an apparent fall in the size of the Russian population due to ethnic re-identification by members of other ethnic groups who had previously identified themselves as Russian. Cross-classification of nationalities by demographic, social and cultural indicators has shown that the most important determinants of the nature of interethnic interaction are cultural factors such as religion and language affiliation. The analysis of the dynamics of language shift through the study of bilingualism and the domains of language usage for different demographic groups revealed a strong correlation between recognition of Russian as a mother tongue among some non-Russian ethnic groups and the declining size of these groups. The main conclusion from this macro-analysis of census data was the hypothesis of the growing importance of social and political factors upon ethnic succession, that ethnic identity is no longer a stable characteristic but has become dynamic in nature. In order to verify this hypothesis Ms. Alexakhina conducted a survey in four regions showing different patterns of interethnic interaction: the Karelian Republic, Buryatiya, the Nenezkii Autonomous Region and Tatarstan. These represented the west, east, north and south of the Russian Federation. Samples for the survey were prepared on the basis of census lists so as to exclude mono-Russian families in favour of mixed and ethnic-minority families. The survey confirmed the significant growth in the importance of ethnic affiliation in the everyday lives of people in the Federation following the de-centralisation of the political and economic spheres. Language was shown to be a key symbol of the consciousness of national distinction, confirmed by the fact that the process of russification has been reversed by the active mastering of the languages of titular nationalities. The results also confirmed that individual ethnic identity has ceased to be a fixed personal characteristic of one's cultural and genetic belonging, and people's social adaptation to the current political, social and economic conditions is also demonstrated in changes in individual ethnic self-identification. In general terms, the dynamic nature of national identity means that ethnic identity is at present acquiring the special features of overall social identity, for which the frequent change of priorities is an inherent feature of a person's life cycle. These are mainly linked with a multi-ethnic environment and high individual social mobility. From her results Ms. Alexakhina concludes that the development of national languages and multi-lingualism, together with the preservation of Russian as a state language, seems to be the most promising path to peaceful coexistence and the development of the national cultures of different ethnic groups within the Russian Federation.

The Ingrian Question as a Historical and Political Phenomenon

The project dealt with the political history of the Finnish-speaking minorities of the Russian northwest, mainly in the 20th century. The first part looks at the development of the national movement of the Ingrian Finns and other related ethnic groups (Izhoras, Votes) from the turn of the century to 1920, when Estonia and Finland signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia and the national rights of the Finnish minority in Russia were to some extent guaranteed. In the second section, on the history of the Ingrians during Soviet and post-Soviet times, areas covered include Ingrian national-cultural autonomy in the 1920s, the activities of Ingrian "ingri" organizations in Finland during the inter-war period, social and national repression and the end of autonomy in the 1930s, the dispersal of the Ingrians during the second world war, their first attempts to return home in the immediate post-war period, trends in the development of the social and cultural life of Ingrians during the last 40 years, and the prospects for their existence as an ethnic unity in the future. The research is based on documentary sources from 15 Russian archives, many of which have not previously been used.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.