Romany Families in Romania: Intelligence and Personality of Children Cross-cultural and Specific Problems of Development

Psychogenetic research has emphasised the influence of social factors on a child's intellectual development. In her work, Ms. Dumitrascu examines two such factors; family size and order of birth. However, since these formal parameters tend to be unstable, other more informal factors should be taken into consideration. Of these, perhaps the most interesting is the "style" of parental education, which Ms. Dumitrascu regards as an expression of national traditions at the family level. This educational style is culture dependent. Only a comparative, cross-cultural study can reveal the real mechanism through which educational style influences the development of a child's intellect and personality. Ms. Dumitrascu conducted an experimental cross-cultural study aimed at examining the effects of the family environment on a child's intellectual development. Three distinct populations were involved in her investigation, each having quite a distinct status in their geographical area; Romanians, Romanies (Gypsies) from Romania, and Russians from the Republic of Moldova. She presented her research in the form of a series of articles written in English totalling 85 pages, and also on disc. A significant difference was revealed between the intelligence of a child living in a large family, and that of a child with no brothers or sisters. In the case of Romany children, the gap is remarkably large. Ms. Dumitrascu concludes that the simultaneous action of several negative factors (low socio-economic status, large family size, socio-cultural isolation of a population) may delay child development. Subjected to such a precarious environment, Romany children do not seek self-realisation, but rather struggle to survive the hardship. Most of them remain out of civilisation. Unfortunately, adult Romanies seldom express any concern regarding their children's successful social integration. The school as main socialisation tool has no value for most parents. Ms. Dumitrascu argues the need for a major effort aimed at helping Romany's social integration. She hopes this project will be of some help for psychologists, social workers, teachers, and all those who are interested in the integration into society of minority groups.

The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Marginality and Integrity: Constructing of Gender Identities in the Post-Communist Bulgaria

Ms. Kotzeva's team aimed to reveal the formation of the new gender identities in the transitional society of Bulgaria since 1989. Their main conclusions (presented in a series of manuscripts written in Bulgarian and German, and also on disc) were reached on the basis of data obtained from a field survey involving a group of 190 women, and interviews conducted with a group of Bulgarian women politicians. Although approving of gender equality and the ideology of emancipation on an abstract level, women predominantly identify themselves with mothering and caring for the family. At the same time they do not fully surrender to their family obligations and support a strategy of balancing between family and extra-family activities. Bulgarian women are highly frustrated by the new requirements of the labour market, insecurity, and lack of safety in their personal life. Ms. Kotzeva and her team observed a high degree of convergence of self-identification strategies amongst Bulgarian women from different generations and educational backgrounds. On the other hand, women from the ethnic minorities, especially Gypsy women, demonstrate radically divergent styles of orientation and behaviour. Women's marginalisation due to the altering economic and political circumstances in Bulgaria, and the decline of female participation in Parliament, have clearly shown that the end of socialist women's politics must lead to critical reflection and the development of new strategies in order to enable women to take part in the process of a new elite in Bulgaria.

National Identity in Lithuania: Processes During the Period of Changes

Under the conditions of rapid and total change in the social, political, economic and legal environment in Lithuania, a re-orientation process is going on in all groups of society. In this process, not only younger but also middle-aged and old people become adherents to what Ms. Liubiniene calls the new, "post-materialist" values, strongly reinforced by powerful agents of socialisation originating in the West, like the media, advertising agencies and lifestyle-consumption models. As a result, the national identity of Lithuania and its inhabitants is being reconstructed. Ms. Liubiniene set out to examine the details of this evolving identity by conducting a survey of 1218 university staff and students. Her conclusions are set out in a 74 page manuscript, written in Lithuanian and available on disc. Change is most noticeable among the young. Indeed, time and time again, Ms. Liubiniene was to find that the age of 36 marks a natural watershed, with, for instance, the younger group valuing individualism highly and the older, collectivism. Ms. Liubiniene ventures to suggest that traditional values are deeply rooted amongst elderly people, women and people with an education in the humanities. Young people on the other hand, and especially those with a professional orientation towards business are more open to change and ready to adapt to new values. Turning to the evaluation of national symbols, Ms. Liubinie finds that those with an education in the humanities might be considered to be the most traditional, placing greater value on the symbols of nature, ethnic culture and religion. Folk songs and the crucifix are also in their top ten. Respondents with a technical education favour symbols of statehood and nature, and respondents with a business orientation assign greater value to the symbols of nature, history, sports and statehood. Ms. Liubinie concludes that the group of respondents most active and ready to adapt to new things is composed of young males of a business orientation. Generally the national identity of the young is weaker compared to that of the old. In the future, the combination of the evolution of values and the process of inter-generational replacement allows us to predict a weakening of the sense of national identity, or at least its transformation into something radically different to what it is today.

Post-War Writers' Memoirs in Romania and France: A Study of Mentalities

Ms. Net wanted to find out if there was what she terms a "collective identity of the intelligentsia" of Romania and France between 1945 and 1989. She conducted her research on a corpus of memoirs from both cultures, and in the process, uncovered some fundamental differences, which she presented in the form of a 178 page manuscript in English, and also on disc. One of the most basic appears to be that French memorialists rarely deal with social, historical and political changes and events. Ms. Net regards these writers as shutting their eyes to reality, and attempting to preserve the past. They are interested in their personal history, and in the genesis of their own works. According to Ms. Net, this tendency is so marked that she doubts whether 20th century French writers share the dominant mentalities of their times. In her opinion all this points to the fact that the French intelligentsia are "trying hard to preserve their cultural hegemony" a task which she maintains has always been an essential aspect of the identity of the French intellectual. In Romania, of course, the situation was very different. To take an example: many Romanian memoirs speak about the campaigns to improve the lot of women, while at the same time recognising and analysing the way that this was simply a "cover" for promoting the most incompetent people, men and women alike. They also express frustration at the way access to information was blocked due to the media being government controlled. Ms. Net concludes, eventually, that, in general, intellectuals, more than any other group in society, ensure the continuity of the dominant mentalities in a given cultural space. Consequently, she feels, we must revise the idea - or myth as she calls it - that intellectuals represent the avant-garde in a given society. Specifically, she concludes that petty bourgeois, patriarchal and elitist mentalities are still prevalent in France. The truth is, she reflects, that intellectuals are always true to their nature, no mater when and where they are living.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Poverty in Slovenia: A Conseqence of Economic Transition

Slovenia is considered to be one of the most successful Central and Eastern European countries undergoing the process of transition. It has a high GDP per capita (the highest in the Visegrad group) amounting to about 7200 US dollars (at the exchange rates pertaining during Ms. Stropnik's research). In 1994, a low rate of inflation, a low level of public debt and almost balanced public finances, were all positive elements. However, there is a darker side, for instance the dramatic increase in unemployment and (somewhat less dramatic) fall in production during the transition period. This analysis aimed to provide insights into what is actually happening at the household level, since households are the ultimate bearers of macroeconomic and social change. The final output totalled 166 pages in English and Slovenian, available also on disc. The income concept used by Ms. Stropnik is that of the disposable (monetary) household income, i.e. the cash income of all household members - including social security transfers and family benefits, and the net sum of taxes and social security contributions - plus the equivalent of domestic production, used in the household. Non-monetary income sources, such as household own production, benefits in kind, subsidies for goods and services, and fringe benefits, were not taken into account. The concept of relative and objective poverty was followed. Poverty means having less than others in society, it is a state of relative deprivation. Objective aspects of the situation, e.g. command over resources (i.e. the household income) and the relative position of the household in the income distribution, determine who is poor and who is not. Changes in household composition - an increase in the number of pensioners, unemployed and self-employed, concomitant with a large decrease in the number of employees - obviously played a part in the changing structure of household income sources during this period. The overall decrease in the share of wages and salaries from primary employment in 1993 is to be observed in all income deciles. On the other hand, the importance of salaries gained from secondary employment has increased in all deciles. The lower seven deciles experienced a sharp rise in the share of social benefits in the period 1988-1993, mostly because of the increase in the number of persons entitled to claim unemployment benefits. In Slovenia, income inequality has increased considerably during the 1988-1993 period. To make matters worse, the large increase in income inequality occurred in a period of falling real incomes. In 1983 the bottom decile disposed of 3.8 percent and the top decile disposed of 23.4 percent of total monetary income in Slovenia, whereas by 1993 the same statistics revealed 3.1 percent and 18.9 percent respectively. Unemployment greatly increases the risk of living in poverty. In 1993, 35 per cent of all unemployed persons in Slovenia were living in the lowest income quintile. Ms. Stropnik found certain features that were specific to Slovenia and not shared by most countries in transition. For example, the relative income position of pensioners has improved. Retirement did not increase the risk of poverty in 1993 as much as it did in 1983 and 1988. Also, it appears that children have not been particularly hard-hit by the transition upheavals. The incidence of poverty amongst children has not increased in the period 1983-1993. Children were also fairly evenly distributed across income quintiles. In 1983, 11.8 percent of households with children aged 18 or less were poor. In 1993, this figure was 8.4 per cent. On the other hand, poor households with children were, in comparison with other households of the same type, poorer in 1993 than in 1983. Ms. Stropnik also analysed the impact of social transfers. Her conclusion was that the level of social transfers prevented them from being successful in alleviating poverty. Family policy transfers (child allowances, child tax allowances, subsidised child care) did, however, contribute to the lowering of income inequality between families with and without children, and amongst families with different numbers of children. Ms. Stropnik is determined that the results of her research be used in the creation of social policy aimed at helping the poor. She quotes Piachaud approvingly: "If the term 'poverty' carries with it the implication and moral imperative that something should be done about it, then the study of poverty is only ultimately justifiable if it influences individual and social attitudes and actions."