Democratic Transition and Political Patronage

Mr. Korosenyi begins by analysing the particular relationship holding between politics and administration in different countries. Within Europe three major patterns have emerged in the 20th century. Firstly there is the politically neutral British Civil Service, secondly the German and French state bureaucracies, which traditionally are supposed to embody the "common good", and thirdly there is the patronage system of the so-called consociate democracies, e.g. Austria. In general Mr. Korosenyi believes that, though politics do not penetrate into the Hungarian administration to the extent they do in Belgium and Austria, nevertheless, there is a stronger fusion than there is in the traditional British pattern. He is particularly interested in this relationship with regard to its effect on democratic institution building and the stabilisation of the new regime in Hungary, now the old "nomenklatura" system has been abolished. The structure of the Hungarian government was a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990. Analysing this period, it becomes clear that for all the political actors who initiated and supported the democratic transition to democracy, the underlying assumption was a radical depoliticisation of the administration in order to maintain its stability. The political leadership of the executive is a cabinet government. The government is structured along ministries, each headed by a politician, i.e. the minister, who is a member of the cabinet. The minister's political secretary is not a cabinet member, but he or she is a politician, usually a member of the parliament. The head of the administration of the ministry is the administrative state secretary, who is a civil servant. He or she usually has four deputies, also civil servants. Naturally it is assumed that there should be a clear separation between politicians and civil servants. However in practice, the borders can be blurred, giving rise to a hybrid known as the "political civil servant". Mr. Korosenyi analyses the different faces of these hybrids. They are civil servants for the following reasons. They need special educational qualifications, working experience, a civil service exam etc., they are not allowed to do anything which is incompatible with their impartial role, and they cannot occupy political office nor may they appear in the name of any political party. On the other hand, the accepted political dimension to their function is revealed by the following facts. The state secretary (a civil servant) may participate in cabinet meetings instead of the minister. The state secretary is employed by the minister. A state secretary or any of their deputies can be dismissed at any time by the minister or the prime minister. In practice then, ministers appoint to these senior administrative positions civil servants whose personal and political loyaties are strong. To the second level of political patronage in ministries belong the ministerial cabinet, press office and public relation office. The ministerial cabinet includes the private advisors and members of the personal staff of the minister. The press office and the PR office, if they exist, are not adjusted to the administrative hierarchy of the ministry, but under the direct control of the minister. In the beginning of the 1990s, such offices were exceptions; in the second half of the 90s they are accepted and to be found in most ministries. Mr. Korosenyi's work, a 92-page manuscript of a book in Hungarian, marks the first piece of literature within the field of political science which analyses the structure of the Hungarian government in the 1990s and the relationship between the political leadership and the public administration.

From Elitism through Corporatism to Pluralism? The Role of Elites in the Political Transition of Ukraine

The group set out to analyse the dynamics of elite groups in Ukraine today, both internal and inter-group, and their ideas on major socio-economic, political and foreign policies, in order to identify the degree of competitiveness between groups, methods of elite recruitment and the degree of elite response, which influence both the political agenda and the results of political activity. Having observed the contemporary debate and identified the pre-eminence of various elite groups in the decision-making process at the regional and state levels, they also sought to determine the type and degree of elite consensus which might be achieved in contemporary Ukraine. They also considered the extent of concealed power, in terms of covert interaction more characteristic of corporate societies, which might allow for the abuse of authority within a technically democratic system. The group then went on to consider the stages of counter-elite transformation and the continuing importance of the communist elite, as well as the issue of rivalry versus consensus. They see their findings as relevant not only to the Central and Eastern European context but also to the situation in Latin America today.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

Scientific Institutions in a Society of Transition: Strategies of Modernisation

Kristina Petkova (Group Leader), Tzocho Boyadgiev, Galin Gornev, Ivan Tcholakov (Bulgaria), Martin Bauer (Switzerland). Scientific Institutions in a Society of Transition: Strategies of Modernisation. Ms. Petkova is involved in teaching and research in the Institute of Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Science and led this project, which was carried out between July 1995 and June 1997. The aims of this project were a) to outline the main adaptive strategies of scientific institutions in a situation of social transition, and b) to analyse the opportunities for mobilising public opinion in support scientific work. The group began from the assumption that the social representation of science reflects the historical development of society as a whole. They developed a theoretical model describing the position of science in the three main types of society in the world today (modern, post-modern, totalitarian) and carried out three types of investigation: a representative survey of the public understanding of scientific institutions in Bulgaria; an in-depth cross-national investigation (Bulgarian - Great Britain); and a content analysis of how science is represented in two national newspapers, the "Rabotnichesko Delo" and the "Daily Telegraph". The results showed that Bulgarian public opinion has a more standard view of science and a more optimistic vision of scientific development than do the British, but that there is a certain insensitivity to the risks of scientific results, etc. The group conclude that in order to survive, scientific institutions in Bulgaria should change their passive attitude and adopt active strategies in both their relationships with the state, and in their contacts with private business and with the institutions of civil society.