A Transformation of the Philosophical Thought of West European Liberalism in the Multi-National Central and South-Eastern European Milieu

This work was devoted to individual child development. Psychogenetic research has emphasised the importance of social factors in children's intellectual development and two social factors are looked at here, family size and birth order. The effect of the formal parameters is, however, very unstable and they should therefore be considered together with certain informal factors. Of these, parental educational style, which is an expression of national traditions at the family level, is of particular interest. Educational style is culture-dependent and only a comparative cross-cultural study can reveal the real mechanisms through which educational style influences children's intellectual and personality development. Dumitrascu carried out an experimental cross-cultural study dedicated to the effects of family environment on child intellectual development. This involved three distinct populations, each of which has a distinct status in their geographical area, namely Romanians, Romanies from Romania, and Russians from the Republic of Moldova. It showed a significant difference between child intelligence in those from large families and in only children, with a huge gap in the case of Romany children. This suggests that the simultaneous action of several negative factors (low socio-economic status, large family size, socio-cultural isolation of the population) may delay a child's development. Subjected to such a precarious environment, Romany children do not seek self-realisation but rather struggle to overcome hardship and the majority remain outside civilisation. Unfortunately, adult Romanies rarely show concern about their children's successful social integration, placing no value on the school as a major socialising tool. This leads to the conclusion that a major effort is needed to help Romanies' social integration.

Cultural and Educational Society of Muslims "Narodna Uzdanica" /"National Hope"/ 1923-1941

Ibrahim Kemura. The Muslim Cultural-Educational Society Narodna uzdanica from 1923/4 to 1941 One of the features of the cultural history of the Bosniacs between the two world wars (1918-1941) was a cultural and educational society named Narodna uzdanica, which was a significant institutional and cultural-intellectual centre of the Bosniac people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Narodna uzdanica expressed the aspirations and needs of the Bosniac citizens who were its main support and axis and was aimed at fulfilling their interests. This was reflected in an ideological-cultural orientation towards the West and the adoption of positive western achievements while at the same time stressing its Slavic origins and individuality, the education of young people and the formation of a European-type civic intelligentsia, adaptation to life in capitalist society, the development of modern trade and crafts, the emancipation of women, and cultural education based on European values. Thus conceived, the programme enjoyed the support of a wider circle of members, the reading public and the cultural consumers of those particular elements such as education and economic prosperity which it sought to achieve. The political involvement of Narodna uzdanica and its use as a platform for the leading Bosniac political party Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija (JMO - Yugoslav Muslim Organisation) which had founded the society, played a significant role in the socio-political life and development of Bosniacs. The opposition to the ruling regime, often expressed through close cooperation with similar Croat organisations and through the pro-Croat attitude of some of the society's leading figures, offered both the regime and Narodna uzdanica's political adversaries grounds for describing it as separatist and Croat and served as a pretext for repressive measures to hinder its normal operations. This research proved these accusations to be groundless, showing that the pro-Croat orientation was primarily political and cultural and that throughout its existence Narodna uzdanica was active in the cultural and educational renaissance of Bosniacs, helping to strengthen their national identity.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

National Identity in Lithuania: Processes During the Period of Changes

Under the conditions of rapid and total change in the social, political, economic and legal environment in Lithuania, a re-orientation process is going on in all groups of society. In this process, not only younger but also middle-aged and old people become adherents to what Ms. Liubiniene calls the new, "post-materialist" values, strongly reinforced by powerful agents of socialisation originating in the West, like the media, advertising agencies and lifestyle-consumption models. As a result, the national identity of Lithuania and its inhabitants is being reconstructed. Ms. Liubiniene set out to examine the details of this evolving identity by conducting a survey of 1218 university staff and students. Her conclusions are set out in a 74 page manuscript, written in Lithuanian and available on disc. Change is most noticeable among the young. Indeed, time and time again, Ms. Liubiniene was to find that the age of 36 marks a natural watershed, with, for instance, the younger group valuing individualism highly and the older, collectivism. Ms. Liubiniene ventures to suggest that traditional values are deeply rooted amongst elderly people, women and people with an education in the humanities. Young people on the other hand, and especially those with a professional orientation towards business are more open to change and ready to adapt to new values. Turning to the evaluation of national symbols, Ms. Liubinie finds that those with an education in the humanities might be considered to be the most traditional, placing greater value on the symbols of nature, ethnic culture and religion. Folk songs and the crucifix are also in their top ten. Respondents with a technical education favour symbols of statehood and nature, and respondents with a business orientation assign greater value to the symbols of nature, history, sports and statehood. Ms. Liubinie concludes that the group of respondents most active and ready to adapt to new things is composed of young males of a business orientation. Generally the national identity of the young is weaker compared to that of the old. In the future, the combination of the evolution of values and the process of inter-generational replacement allows us to predict a weakening of the sense of national identity, or at least its transformation into something radically different to what it is today.