Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the Prominence of the German Factor

With the end of the Cold War, which for central and eastern Europe in many respects meant the real political end to the Second World War, Germany regained its central position in the region. The Federal Republic quickly established itself as a major political and economic partner for both the Czech Republic and Poland. More importantly, due to its support for the idea of EU and NATO enlargement. Germany also became the most active western advocate of the Czech and Polish 'return to Europe'. The question remains, however, of whether Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic can mature into a close axis like that enjoyed between Paris and Bonn/Berlin, or whether they will continue to develop along the lines of 'strategic congruence' but 'emotional mistrust and reserve'. The research here looked at three aspects of this question. First it considered the idea of a link between perceptions of Germany and broader considerations of European integration in Poland and the Czech Republic and outlined the ways in which Germany has motivated Czech and Polish activities and policies on EU membership. The team then focused upon on-going Czech and Polish EU integration strategies and sought to identify the actual ways in which Germany's advocacy of EU enlargement in manifest in cooperation 'on the ground'. The group concluded by considering prospects for Czech/German and Polish/German cooperation in the context of the enlarged European Union.

Personality and Current Political Beliefs | Comparative Study of Polish and Belgian Samples)"

This project had a threefold aim and sought to provide answers to several different questions. Kossowska first focused on the relationship between Openness to Experience and ideological variables such as authoritarianism and conservatism. The main questions here were (1) whether there are differences between the Polish and Belgian samples studied with respect to the relationship between political ideology and Openness to Experience, and (2) whether this relationship applies to all facets of Openness to Experience. The study showed significant negative correlations between Openness and right-wing ideology in both adult samples, and that Fantasy and Actions were the most robust correlates of political ideology. A second problem examined concerned the relationship between ideology and cognitive functioning. The important questions here were about the conceptualisation and measurement of cognitive variables such as rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, or the need for closure, which determine individuals' attitudes to politics. The results confirmed the significance of the need for closure construct in both samples for understanding the process of formulating and holding political beliefs. The last aspect of the study was the differences in political beliefs between the Polish and Belgian samples in relation to the social, political and economic situation in the two countries. The most important question here was the changes in the political mentality of Poles during the period of system transition. Kossowska expected to find differences between Poles and Belgians with respect to the level of conservatism and authoritarianism, but in fact both samples showed comparable levels of right-wing political beliefs.

The Representation of Motherhood in Polish Cinema

The project aimed to analyse representations of motherhood in Polish cinema as a special case of a more general system within the representation of women. It concentrated on the image of the Polish Mother created during the 19th century in Polish culture under the influence of specific political, social and religious factors. Ms. Ostrowska's initial hypothesis was that this symbolic image became one of the most stable elements in Polish cinema and as her research revealed, it was valuable for the preservation of national identity but nevertheless a fiercely constraining model for Polish femininity. In order to fully understand the nature of this persistent image it was initially necessary to related it to broader contexts and issues in representation. These included the image of the Polish Mother within general mythological structures (using the notion of myth in the Barthesian sense). Following her initial research Ms. Ostrowska felt that it was most appropriate to view the myth of the Polish Mother as a dominant ideological structure in the discourse of motherhood within Polish culture. An analysis of the myth of the Polish Mother can provide an insight into how Polish society sees itself at different periods in time and how a national identity was constructed in relation to particular ideological demands stemming from concrete historical and political situations. The analysis of the film version of this myth also revealed some aspects of the national character of Polish cinema. There the image of woman has become enshrined as the "eternal feminine", with virtues which are inevitably derived directly from Catholicism, particularly in relation to the networks of meanings around the central figure of Mary, Mother of God. In 19th century Poland these were linked with patriotic values and images of woman became part of the defence of the very idea of Poland and Polishness. After World War Two, this religious-political image system was adapted to the demands of the new communist ideology. The possibility of manipulating the ideological dimensions of the myth of the Polish Mother is due to the very nature of the image, which as a symbol of civil religion had been able to function independently of any particular state or church institution. Although in communist ideology the stress was on the patriotic aspect of the myth, its pronounced religious aspect was also transmitted, consciously or not, in the denotation process, this being of great significance in the viewer's response to the female character. This appropriation of elements derived from the national patriotic tradition into the discourse of communist ideology was a very efficient strategy to establish the illusion of continuity in national existence, which was supposed to convince society of the rightness of the new political situation. The analysis of films made in the post-war period showed the persistence of this discourse on motherhood in a range of cinematic texts regardless of the changing political situation. Ms. Ostrowska claims that the stability of this discursive formation is to a certain extent the result of the mythological aspect of the mother figure. This mythological structure also belongs to the ideology of Romanticism which in general continues to prevail in Polish cultural discourse as a meta-language of national community. The analysis of the films confirmed the hypothesis of the Polish Mother as a myth-sign whose signifier is stable whereas the signified depends on the specific historical conditions in which it is set. Therefore in the famous propaganda documentary Kobiety naszych dni (Women of Our Days, 1951) by Jan Zelnik, and in other films made after the October 1956 "thaw" it functions as an "empty sign. She concludes that it would be difficult to deny that the myth of the Polish Mother has offered Polish women a special role in national life, granting them a high moral position in the social, hierarchy. However the processes of idealisation involved have resulted in a deprivation of her subjectivity and the right to decide about her own life. This idealisation also served to strengthen traditional patriarchal structures through this set of female obligations to the mother land. In Polish ideology it is not a man who demands sacrifice from a woman but the motherland, which, deprived of the institutions of male power for nearly 150 years, had functioned as a feminine structure. That is why oppressive aspects of the myth have been obscured for so long. While Polish women were doubtless able to accept the constrictions because of their sense of national duty and any misgivings were overridden by the argument of the cause, it is important to recognise that the strength of these constructions, compounded by the ways in which they spoke of and continue to speak of a certain perfection, make them persist into contemporary Poland. Poland is however no longer embattled and the signs that made these meanings are potentially empty. This space for meaning will be and is already being contested and increasingly colonised by current western models of femininity. Ms. Ostrowska's final question is whether this will help to prevent a possible resentful victimisation of the silent and noble Polish Mother.

The Semantics and Typology of Yes/No Particles (A Cross-Linguistic Study)

Taking the three basic systems of Yes/No particles the group looked at the relative deep and surface structures, and asked what types of systems are present in the Georgian, Polish and Armenian languages. The choice of languages was of particular interest as the Caucasian and Indo-European languages usually have different question-answering systems, but Georgian (Caucasian) and Polish (Indo-European) in fact share the same system. The Armenian language is Indo-European, but the country is situated in the southern Caucasus, on Georgia's southern border, making it worth analysing Armenian in comparison with Georgian (from the point of view of language interference) and with Polish (as two relative languages). The group identified two different deep structures, tracing the occurrence of these in different languages, and showed that one is more natural in the majority of languages. They found no correspondence between relative languages and their question-answer systems and demonstrated that languages in the same typological class may show different systems, as with Georgian and the North Caucasian languages. It became clear that Georgian, Armenian and Polish all have an agree/disagree question-answering system defined by the same deep structure. From this they conclude that the lingual mentalities of Georgians, Armenians and Poles are more oriented to the communicative act. At the same time the Yes/No system, in which a positive particle stands for a positive answer and a negative particle for a negative answer, also functions in these languages, indicating that the second deep structure identified also functions alongside the first.

The Role of Gender in Ethnic Perception

A group of 406 Polish university students (210 women and 196 men) were asked to describe typical representatives of selected ethnic groups and their typical female and male members. The descriptions were based on a list of 24 traits and a list of 18 values, accompanied by scales for measuring trait-typicality and value-importance. The participants' level of confidence about the accuracy of the descriptions, their ethnic attitudes and their perception of the relative social status of men and women in ethnic groups were also measured. The results indicate an effect of masculinisation of ethnic images for both traits and values. Descriptions of typical representatives of ethnic groups resemble the images of typical men significantly more than those of typical women of these nationalities, even for the most modern nations. Differences registered between images of typical representatives of ethnic groups and their male and female members concerned primarily the traits and values basic to gender stereotypes. The images of women were significantly more favourable than those of men. The bias in ethnic perception towards the gender of the stereotype-holder was also indicated. Several differences were found between women's and men's perception of typical representatives of ethnic groups and especially of ethnic gender subgroups, without however the predicted effect of gender in-group favouritism. There was also a degree of ethnic in-group favouritism of Poles related to the gender both of participants and of the ethnic target groups.

The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Birth, Survival and Growth of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Poland: 1990-1994

This research is based on a unique and extensive database which tracks the employment, payroll and sales of individual Polish firms for the period 1990 to 1995. This allowed the authors to calculate the birth, survival and growth rates for different categories of enterprises (state-owned, cooperative, private, foreign-owned and privatised after 1990) and regions. These data match data collected in the United States, making it possible to compare the Polish situation with that of the state of Michigan. Analysis of the data and lessons from the Poland-Michigan comparisons provide a solid basis for the formulation of new policy recommendations for Poland. Allowing for certain important differences, Poland would still seem to need a higher rate of births of new companies. New small private companies and companies with foreign capital can be seen as the main source of job creation and economic revitalisation. To strengthen positive trends in the economy, Poland should create a model of institutional support for both potential entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

The Effects of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Poland and East Germany

The main goal of this project was to propose appropriate methods of analysing the effects of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, methods which were then tested on a limited sample of 16 Polish and 8 German enterprises privatised in 1992. A considerable amount of information was collected relating to the six-year period 1989-1994 relating to most aspects of the companies' activities. The effects of privatisation were taken to be those changes within the enterprises which were the result of privatisation, in such areas as production, the productivity of labour and fixed assets, investments and innovations, employment and wages, economic incentives (especially for top managers), financing (internal and external sources), bad debts and economic effects (financial analysis). A second important goal was to identify the main factors which represent methodological obstacles in surveys of the effects of privatisation during a period of fundamental transformation of the entire economic system. The list of enterprises for the research was compiled in such a way as to allow for the differentiation of ownership structures of privatised firms and to permit (at least to a certain extent) the empirical verification of some hypotheses regarding the privatisation process. The enterprises selected were divided into the following three groups representing (as far as possible) various types of ownership structures or types of control: (1) enterprises control by strategic investors (domestic or foreign), (2) enterprises controlled by employees (employee-owned companies), (3) enterprises controlled by managers. Formal methods such as econometric models with varying parameters were used to separate pure privatisation effects from other factors which influence various aspects of an enterprise's working, including policies on the productivity of labour and capital, average wages, the remuneration of top managers, etc. While the group admits that their findings and conclusions cannot be treated as representative of all privatised enterprises in Poland and Germany, they found considerable convergence with their findings and those of other surveys conducted on a wider scale. The main hypotheses that were confirmed included that privatisation (especially in companies controlled by large investors and managers) leads to a significant increase in the effectiveness of these production process, growing pay differentials between different employee groups (e.g. between executives and rank-and-file employees) and between different jobs and positions within particular professional groups. They also confirmed the growing importance in incentives to top executives of incentives linked with the company's economic effects (particularly profit-related incentives), long-term incentives and the capital market.

Franciszek Maczynski: a Monograph

Franciszek Maczynski was one of the best Polish architects of the early 20th century and Solewski used a wide range of materials to complete a bibliography of Maczynski's architectural, artistic and theoretical works, and a biography of the architect. From his analysis of the material collected, he concluded that Maczynski was a romantic architect, influenced by a vision to seek the essential Truth in historical patterns or artistic creativity. This determined his search for the ideal form and style in architecture, connecting 'national' and historical inspiration, the vernacular 'Zakopane Style', Gesamtkunstwek and modernistic severity. However, Maczynski worked closely with Tadeusz Stryjenski, his most important patron, who also used the 'beginner's' artistic talents, while he, as the 'boss', decided on commissions and profits. This experience led to Maczynski's involvement in the Spojnia partnership, creating simple engineering architecture and successfully locating wealthy investors. It was the liberal idea of establishing a building firm to make profits that turned Maczynski into a regular builder and entrepreneur, abandoning the romantic idea of 'artistic' or 'national' architecture. The transformation from artist to entrepreneur indeed reflected the opposition of romantic-liberal.