Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Slovak Policy, 1956-1960

The project looked at crucial political events in Slovakia between 1956 and 1960. 1956 saw the first attempt by Slovak intellectuals to reform the communist regime by increasing the degree of democracy and 1960 was the culmination of the strengthening of the political persecution that began after 1957. The period was characterised by the partial replacement of the informal-political instruments of control over society by formal measures, and the gradual weakening of the role of terror in people's daily life. Marusiak studied the gradual accommodation of the communist regime by the people, analysing the social and political history against the background of political development and of specific aspects such as the conflict of youth and intellectuals with the regime, the collectivisation of agriculture and the liquidation of the rest of the private sector in the economy, public opinion and the changes in the political system, the relations between state and churches, and ethnic problems in Czechoslovakia. He concludes that there was a continuity between the aims and methods used by the communist regime before and after 1953 (or 1956) and that the communist regime in this period remained fundamentally totalitarian.

The Position of Russian Provinical Officialdom in the Middle of the 19th Century: Law and Life

The study considered the discrepancy between the official status and real position of Russian provincial officialdom in the middle of the 19th century. The law was not entirely coherent in all aspects of the officials' life and activity, with ordinary deviations from the law being adopted in practice and accepted, albeit not openly, by the public and sometimes even by the authorities. The main law determining the rights and duties of governors was never followed to the letter and in reality governors' activities were determined by the common (unwritten) law existing in the governmental sphere. The volume and nature of the governors' rights depended on a range of factors, with specific regional features and the governor's personal qualities having a particular significance. The standard of living of government clerks was much higher than their official salary would permit and Matkhanova studied the most widespread cases of abuse, identifying those positions in the administration which offered the most opportunities for such abuses. At the start of the period and on the eve of the reforms public opinion towards the bribery of officials underwent a change. From the late 1850s onwards, there appeared among provincial officials a group of young well-educated clerks with liberal ideas and a new system of moral values which did not allow them to accept bribes or infringe the law in any way. There was also a non-official hierarchy side by side with the legally existing one. A significant role in governing the region, and one which has been underestimated by historians, was played by the head of the governor's office, but the reforms of the 1860s contributed to changing this state of affairs.

The Presidential Institution in Bulgaria, Albania and Romani: An Attempt at Comparison"

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania are all parliamentary republics with a president as head of state. Although the Albanian president is elected by Parliament, he is arguably the strongest of the three, both in terms of the powers allowed by the provisional constitution and of Mr. Berisha's political practice. The constitutional reform underway in the country will however change the status quo. In Bulgaria and Romania the presidents are elected directly by popular vote, but their powers are relatively small as compared to the democratic legitimisation implied by direct elections. Actual presidential powers should however be assessed with caution as some of them are set by law or interpretations of constitutional texts, rather than by the constitutions themselves. There is also variation in the degree to which the presidents in office have exploited their constitutional powers or taken their role as non-aligned political brokers seriously. Mr. Berisha, in particular, was in control of party politics throughout his presidency and was one of the most polarising influences on public opinion. The excessive political polarisation in all three countries has however its own logic and power. Thus Mr. Zhelev invariably supported the emergence of a political centre in Bulgaria, but this did not succeed and the policy was as damaging to his political career as the fight with would-be centrists was to Berisha's. Political practice in all three countries seems to need a presidential figure. This adds flexibility to a situation governed by hostile and mutually suspicious parties, stuck parliaments and weak or inexperienced governments. The presidents also command considerable influence on public opinion. Public opinion in Bulgaria, for example, largely supports the idea of greater power for the president, in contrast with the opinions of constitutionalists and other law-makers in the country. Under the legacy of the past, the people have a love-hate relationship with such paternalist figures. Presidents personalise politics in the public mind, but they can also become scapegoats for political failures.

Development of Socio-Economic Behaviour and Attitudes of Baltic Nationalities: Perspectives for Integration with Europe

This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.

Scientific Institutions in a Society of Transition: Strategies of Modernisation

Kristina Petkova (Group Leader), Tzocho Boyadgiev, Galin Gornev, Ivan Tcholakov (Bulgaria), Martin Bauer (Switzerland). Scientific Institutions in a Society of Transition: Strategies of Modernisation. Ms. Petkova is involved in teaching and research in the Institute of Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Science and led this project, which was carried out between July 1995 and June 1997. The aims of this project were a) to outline the main adaptive strategies of scientific institutions in a situation of social transition, and b) to analyse the opportunities for mobilising public opinion in support scientific work. The group began from the assumption that the social representation of science reflects the historical development of society as a whole. They developed a theoretical model describing the position of science in the three main types of society in the world today (modern, post-modern, totalitarian) and carried out three types of investigation: a representative survey of the public understanding of scientific institutions in Bulgaria; an in-depth cross-national investigation (Bulgarian - Great Britain); and a content analysis of how science is represented in two national newspapers, the "Rabotnichesko Delo" and the "Daily Telegraph". The results showed that Bulgarian public opinion has a more standard view of science and a more optimistic vision of scientific development than do the British, but that there is a certain insensitivity to the risks of scientific results, etc. The group conclude that in order to survive, scientific institutions in Bulgaria should change their passive attitude and adopt active strategies in both their relationships with the state, and in their contacts with private business and with the institutions of civil society.

Russian Writers and the Third Section

The Third Section was an instrument not so much of oppression as of information, propaganda and education. Under Nicholas I, the press did not represent public opinion, but rather the official point of view. It was intended to shape public opinion rather than to express it and much of the Third Section's activity focused on creating the best possible contacts with journalists and men of letters. The Third Section supervised literary activities by examining works in print and collecting information through its agents. It rewarded those authors whose work was approved by the emperor, it used writers to pursue its goals, especially in order to "direct minds", but acted as a mediator between the tsar, censors and writers, or sometimes as arbiter in conflicts between writers themselves, and it also acted as a censor. Writers, for their part, served in the Third Section, becoming its agents or consultants, delivering reports to it and writing texts commissioned by the Section. The majority of writers did not see any problems with serving or assisting the Third Section. Ideologies offering an alternative to state monarchism /in professional literature or individual liberalism/ were very weak. The only exception was a small group, mostly composed of eminent and highly educated aristocrats who possessed alternative moral and financial resources. Reitblat showed that the strong ties maintained by some journalists and writers with the Third Section were not unfortunate exceptions due to the low moral qualities of those individuals, but rather a natural phenomenon which reflected the specific nature of the Russian literary system and, more generally, of Russian society as a whole.

Resocialization of the Street Children

This project studied the phenomenon of street children through various forms of action dealing with them. The target group included 100 children who frequented the Pygmalion and Open House day centres in Bucharest. On the basis of this sample it was possible to establish the main problems of the street children: reasons for appearance, age on the street, origin, family size, attitude towards parents, reasons for street life, consumption of toxic substances, reasons for detention by the police, main health problems, needs and wishes. The work in Bucharest was supplemented by visits elsewhere in Romania and abroad which provided a breadth of understanding and knowledge of the specific profile of street children, of the complexity of their problems and of their prospects. A comparison of the causes of the phenomenon, and study of some projects and intervention programmes both from Romania and abroad provided the basis for a proposed strategy for combatting the problem. The practical activities on the project included continuing counselling and informative and education activities with the children in order to motivate them to change their life. Further mediation was aimed at changing the hostile approach of the public opinion and some people in authority towards these children. The experiments with schooling and professional resocialisation of the street children provided clear evidence of the possibility of reintroducing them into the social framework but this will require systems and mechanisms specially developed to achieve this.