Interethnic Interaction Dynamics in the Russian Federation

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s also meant the end of the idea of a common soviet identity incarnated in the "soviet man" and the new "historic community of the soviet people". While this idea still lives on in the generations of the 1920s to 1940s, the younger generations tend to prefer identification with family, profession, ethnic group or religion. Ms. Alexakhina set out to investigate different interethnic interaction strategies in the multi-ethnic context of the Russian Federation, with an emphasis on analysing the role of cultural and ethno-demographic characteristics of minority ethnic groups. It aimed to identify those specific patterns of interaction dynamics that have emerged in response to the political and economic transformation at present under way. The basic supposition was that the size and growth of an ethnic population are defined not only by demographic features such as fertility, mortality and net migration, but are also dependent on processes interethnic interaction and ethnic transition. The central hypothesis of the project was that the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural composition of Russia is apparently manifesting itself in the ethnic minority groups in various forms, but particularly in the form of ethnic revival and/or assimilation. The results of these complex phenomena are manifested as changes in ethnic attachments (national re-identification and language behaviour (multi-lingualism, language transition and loss of the mother tongue). The stress of the political and economic crisis has stimulated significant changes in ethnographic, social and cultural characteristics of inter-ethnic dynamics such as the rate of national re-identification, language behaviour, migration activity and the spread of mixed marriages, among both those minorities with a long history of settlement in Russia and those that were annexed during the soviet period. Patterns of language behaviour and the spread of mixed marriages were taken as the main indicators of the directions of interethnic interaction described as assimilation, ethnic revival and cultural pluralism. The first stage of the research involved a statistical analysis of census data from 1959 to 1994 in order to analyse the changing demographic composition of the largest ethnic groups of the Russian Federation. Until 1989 interethnic interaction in soviet society was distinguished by the process of russification but the political and economic transformation has stimulated the process of ethnic revival, leading to an apparent fall in the size of the Russian population due to ethnic re-identification by members of other ethnic groups who had previously identified themselves as Russian. Cross-classification of nationalities by demographic, social and cultural indicators has shown that the most important determinants of the nature of interethnic interaction are cultural factors such as religion and language affiliation. The analysis of the dynamics of language shift through the study of bilingualism and the domains of language usage for different demographic groups revealed a strong correlation between recognition of Russian as a mother tongue among some non-Russian ethnic groups and the declining size of these groups. The main conclusion from this macro-analysis of census data was the hypothesis of the growing importance of social and political factors upon ethnic succession, that ethnic identity is no longer a stable characteristic but has become dynamic in nature. In order to verify this hypothesis Ms. Alexakhina conducted a survey in four regions showing different patterns of interethnic interaction: the Karelian Republic, Buryatiya, the Nenezkii Autonomous Region and Tatarstan. These represented the west, east, north and south of the Russian Federation. Samples for the survey were prepared on the basis of census lists so as to exclude mono-Russian families in favour of mixed and ethnic-minority families. The survey confirmed the significant growth in the importance of ethnic affiliation in the everyday lives of people in the Federation following the de-centralisation of the political and economic spheres. Language was shown to be a key symbol of the consciousness of national distinction, confirmed by the fact that the process of russification has been reversed by the active mastering of the languages of titular nationalities. The results also confirmed that individual ethnic identity has ceased to be a fixed personal characteristic of one's cultural and genetic belonging, and people's social adaptation to the current political, social and economic conditions is also demonstrated in changes in individual ethnic self-identification. In general terms, the dynamic nature of national identity means that ethnic identity is at present acquiring the special features of overall social identity, for which the frequent change of priorities is an inherent feature of a person's life cycle. These are mainly linked with a multi-ethnic environment and high individual social mobility. From her results Ms. Alexakhina concludes that the development of national languages and multi-lingualism, together with the preservation of Russian as a state language, seems to be the most promising path to peaceful coexistence and the development of the national cultures of different ethnic groups within the Russian Federation.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.