Questions of Life and Death

The research started with a definition of the general ethical background to be applied in bioethical discussions, particularly regarding aspects of morality that have to be enforced by the community. Only those moral beliefs that can be accepted by consensus in a free discussion can be enforced. It follows that the basic principle of a well ordered society is the equality (and possible upwards extension) of the basic liberties. Therefore, whenever it is possible to respect the principle of autonomy in matters of bioethics (here including questions of abortion, assisted procreation, genetics, organ transplantation and euthanasia) this must be done. On the other hand, there are some common values that can be defended in a free dialogue, values that are needed in order to guarantee stable cooperation in a political society. These values include the respect for human life, which implies the respect for human life in all its forms. This leads to the conclusion that people who are able to be part of the system of cooperation in a political society have rights which are dominant in moral considerations. In all cases where there is no conflict between these rights and the value of life as manifested in human individuals who are not able participate in social cooperation, considerations of the value of the life of the latter must be an important moral consideration. This implies that embryo experimentation should be permitted in order to develop scientific advances needed to save human life, but embryos must not be used for trivial reasons or for the cosmetic industry.

Trust and Social Networks in a Changing Europe.

This project set out to investigate the effects of the recent massive social transitions in Eastern Europe on the everyday social lives of the inhabitants of three very different nations: Georgia, Russia and Hungary. It focused in particular on the availability and nature of the support networks available to three different segments of each of the societies (manual workers, students and entrepreneurs) and the impact of network participation on psychological and physical well-being. The group set four specific questions to investigate: the part played by individual psychological beliefs in the formation and maintenance of social networks and the consequent formation of trusting relations; the implication of the size and quality of these networks for mental health; the nature of the social groups inhabited by the respondents and the implication of their work schedule and daily routines on the maintenance of a social and family life; and an analysis of how cultures vary in their social networks and intimacy. Three different methods were used to examine social support and its implications: structured questionnaires, semi-structured short interviews and a media analysis of newspaper materials. The questionnaires were administered to 150 participants in each country, equally divided between students studying full time, manual workers employed in factories, and business people (small kiosk owners, whose work and life style differs considerably from that of the manual workers). The questionnaires investigated various predictors of social support including the locus of control, relationship beliefs, individualism-collectivism and egalitarianism, demographic variables (age, gender and occupation), social support, both in general and in relation to significant events that have occurred since the transition from communism. Those with an internal locus of control were more likely to report a higher level of social support, as were collectivists, while age too was a significant predictor, with younger respondents enjoying higher levels of support, regardless of the measures of support employed. Respondents across the cultures referred to a decline of social support and the group also found a direct correlation between social support and mental health outcomes. All 450 respondents were interviewed on their general responses to changes in their lives since the fall of communism and the effects of their work lives on their social lives and the home environment. The interviews revealed considerable variations in the way in which work-life offered opportunities for a broader social life and also provided a hindrance to the development of fulfilling relationships. Many of the work experiences discussed were culture specific, with work having a particularly negative impact on the social life of Russian entrepreneurs but being seen much more positively in Georgia. This may reflect the nature of support offered in a society as overall support levels were lowest in Russia, meaning that social support may be of particular importance there. The way in cultural values and norms about personal relationships are transmitted in a culture is a critical issue for social psychologists and the group examined newspaper articles in those newspapers read by the respondents in each of the three countries. These revealed a number of different themes. The concept of a divided society and its implications for personal relationships was clearest in Russian and Hungary, where widely-read newspapers dwelt on the contrast between "new Russians/Hungarians" and the older, poorer ones and extended considerable sympathy to those suffering from neglect in institutions. Magyar Nemzet, a paper widely read by Hungarian students reflects the generally more pessimistic tone about personal relationships in Russia and Hungary and gave a particularly detailed analysis of the implications this holds for human relations in a modern society. In Georgia, however, the tone of the newspapers is more positive, stressing greater social cohesion. Part of this cohesion is framed in the context of religion, with the church appealing to a broader egalitarianism, whereas in less egalitarian Hungary appeals by the Church are centred more on the nuclear family and its need for expansion in both size and influence. The division between the sexes was another prominent issue in Hungary and Russia, while the theme of generational conflict also emerged in Hungarian and Georgian papers, although with some understanding of "young people today". The team's original expectation that the different newspapers read by the different groups of respondents would present differing images of personal relationships was not fulfilled, as despite variations in style, they found little clear "ideological targeting" of any particular readership. They conclude that the vast majority of respondents recognised that the social transition from communism has had a significant impact on the well-being of social relationships and that this is a pertinent issue for all segments of society. While the group see the data collected as a source to be worked on for some time in the future, their initial impressions include the following. Social support is clearly an important concern across all three countries. All respondents (including the students) lament the time taken up by their heavy work schedules and value their social networks and family ties in particular. The level of social support differs across the countries investigated, with Georgian apparently enjoying significantly higher levels of social support. The analysis produced an image of a relatively cohesive and egalitarian society in which even the group most often seen as distant from the general population, business people, is supported by a strong social network. In contrast, the support networks available to the Russian respondents seem particularly weak and reflect a general sense of division and alienation within the culture as a whole. The implications of low levels of social support may vary across countries. While Russians reported the lowest level of mental health problems, the link between social support and mental health may be strongest in that country. In contrast, in Hungary it is the link between fatalism and mental health problems which is particularly strong, while in Georgia the strongest correlation was between mental health and marital quality, emphasising the significance of the marital relationship in that country.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.