The Legal Protection of Fundamental Human Values in Central and Eastern Europe and Modern Biotechnology: Towards European Harmonization

The protection of the fundamental human values (life, bodily integrity, human dignity, privacy) becomes imperative with the rapid progress in modern biotechnology, which can result in major alterations in the genetic make-up of organisms. It has become possible to insert human genes into pigs so that their internal organs coated in human proteins are more suitable for transplantation into humans (xenotransplantation), and micro-organisms that cam make insulin have been created, thus changing the genetic make-up of humans. At the end of the 1980s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries either initiated new legislation or started to amend existing laws in this area (clinical testing of drugs, experiments on man, prenatal genetic diagnosis, legal protection of the embryo/foetus, etc.). The analysis here indicates that the CEE countries have not sufficiently adjusted their regulations to the findings of modern biotechnology, either because of the relatively short period they have had to do so, or because there are no definite answers to the questions which modern biotechnology has raised (ethical aspects of xenotransplantation, or of the use of live-aborted embryonic or foetal tissue in neuro-transplantation, etc.). In order to harmonise the existing regulations in CEE countries with respect to the EU and supranational contexts, two critical issues should be taken into consideration. The first is the necessity for CEE countries to recognise the place of humans within the achievements of modern biotechnology (a broader affirmation of the principle of autonomy, an explicit ban on the violation of the genetic identity of either born or unborn life, etc.). The second concerns the definition of the status of different biotechnological procedures and their permissibility (gene therapy, therapeutic genomes, xenotransplantation, etc.). The road towards such answers may be more easily identified once all CEE countries become members of the Council of Europe and express their wish to join the EU, which in turn presupposes taking over the entire body of EU legislation.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Securities: Its Conception and Protection of Interests of its Holders

Theoretical studies of the problems of the securities markets in the Russian Federation incline to one or other of the two traditional approaches. The first consists of comparing the definition of "valuable paper" set forth in the current legislation of the Russian Federation, with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" elaborated by German scholars more than 90 years ago. The problem with this approach is, in Mr. Pentsov's opinion, that any new features of the definition of "security" that do not coincide with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" (such as valuable papers existing in non-material, electronic form) are claimed to be incorrect and removed from the current legislation of the Russian Federation. The second approach works on the basis of the differentiation between the Common Law concept of "security" and the Civil Law concept of "valuable paper". Mr. Pentsov's research, presented in an article written in English, uses both methodological tools and involves, firstly, a historical study of the origin and development of certain legal phenomena (securities) as they evolved in different countries, and secondly, a comparative, synchronic study of equivalent legal phenomena as they exist in different countries today. Employing the first method, Mr. Pentsov divided the historical development of the conception of "valuable paper" in Russia into five major stages. He found that, despite the existence of a relatively wide circulation of valuable papers, especially in the second half of the 19th century, Russian legislation before 1917 (the first stage) did not have a unified definition of valuable paper. The term was used, in both theoretical studies and legislation, but it covered a broad range of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, government bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, etc. During the second stage, also, the legislation of the USSR did not have a unified definition of "valuable paper". After the end of the "new economic policy" (1922 - 1930) the stock exchanges and the securities markets in the USSR, with a very few exceptions, were abolished. And thus during the third stage (up to 1985), the use of valuable papers in practice was reduced to foreign economic relations (bills of exchange, stocks in enterprises outside the USSR) and to state bonds. Not surprisingly, there was still no unified definition of "valuable paper". After the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika, a securities market began to re-appear in the USSR. However, the successful development of securities markets in the USSR was retarded by the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. The first effort to improve the situation was the adoption of the Regulations on Valuable Papers, approved by resolution No. 590 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated June 19, 1990. Section 1 of the Regulation contained the first statutory definition of "valuable paper" in the history of Russia. At the very beginning of the period of transition to a market economy, a number of acts contained different definitions of "valuable paper". This diversity clearly undermined the stability of the Russian securities market and did not achieve the goal of protecting the investor. The lack of unified criteria for the consideration of such non-standard financial instruments as "valuable papers" significantly contributed to the appearance of numerous fraudulent "pyramid" schemes that were outside of the regulatory scheme of Russia legislation. The situation was substantially improved by the adoption of the new Civil Code of the Russian Federation. According to Section 1 of Article 142 of the Civil Code, a valuable paper is a document that confirms, in compliance with an established form and mandatory requisites, certain material rights whose realisation or transfer are possible only in the process of its presentation. Finally, the recent Federal law No. 39 - FZ "On the Valuable Papers Market", dated April 22 1996, has also introduced the term "emission valuable papers". According to Article 2 of this Law, an "emission valuable paper" is any valuable paper, including non-documentary, that simultaneously has the following features: it fixes the composition of material and non-material rights that are subject to confirmation, cession and unconditional realisation in compliance with the form and procedure established by this federal law; it is placed by issues; and it has equal amount and time of realisation of rights within the same issue regardless of when the valuable paper was purchased. Thus the introduction of the conception of "emission valuable paper" became the starting point in the Russian federation's legislation for the differentiation between the legal regimes of "commercial papers" and "investment papers" similar to the Common Law approach. Moving now to the synchronic, comparative method of research, Mr. Pentsov notes that there are currently three major conceptions of "security" and, correspondingly, three approaches to its legal definition: the Common Law concept, the continental law concept, and the concept employed by Japanese Law. Mr. Pentsov proceeds to analyse the differences and similarities of all three, concluding that though the concept of "security" in the Common Law system substantially differs from that of "valuable paper" in the Continental Law system, nevertheless the two concepts are developing in similar directions. He predicts that in the foreseeable future the existing differences between these two concepts will become less and less significant. On the basis of his research, Mr. Pentsov arrived at the conclusion that the concept of "security" (and its equivalents) is not a static one. On the contrary, it is in the process of permanent evolution that reflects the introduction of new financial instruments onto the capital markets. He believes that the scope of the statutory definition of "security" plays an extremely important role in the protection of investors. While passing the Securities Act of 1933, the United States Congress determined that the best way to achieve the goal of protecting investors was to define the term "security" in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within the definition the many types of instruments that in the commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of "security' and to cover the countless and various devices used by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits. On the other hand, the very limited scope of the current definition of "emission valuable paper" in the Federal Law of the Russian Federation entitled "On the Valuable Papers Market" does not allow the anti-fraud provisions of this law to be implemented in an efficient way. Consequently, there is no basis for the protection of investors. Mr. Pentsov proposes amendments which he believes would enable the Russian markets to become more efficient and attractive for both foreign and domestic investors.

Intersection of Tradition and Need of Change in Romanian Child Protection System

The reconstruction of the child protection system in the post-communist period so as to meet professional standards while responding to the needs of children is an enormous task. In order to understand the features of the current stage of the development of the Romanian child protection system and to evaluate its trends towards change, Roth-Szamoskozi analysed data from scientific literature and collected statistics to document the evolution of the child-protection structure. Empirical data collection using qualitative methods (content analysis of documents and interviews with staff) were designed to reflect the degree to which child welfare laws correspond to internationally accepted regulations and to analyse the attitudes of those working in the field at different decision-making levels. An experiment with a group of 12 students showed that there have been basic changes in the legal framework of Romanian child welfare. Students could see that the required principles exist in the new Romanian child protection law, but also identified areas which are still inadequately represented. 61 staff members working in child welfare agencies (both state and non-governmental) were also interviewed, using a systematic, circular interview. Using the criteria of competence and the existence of specific social goals, professionalism in solving social problems and respect for social-work values, the 30 non-governmental organisations were divided into three categories. The first (7 organisations) are active in the area, know the law and are fairly professional, the second (5) are motivated in their work with specific problems, but with no great competence. The 18 organisations in the third group have no competence in the social field and in issues concerning children and do only charitable work. The state agencies are still dominated by routine, but there were many staff members who were developing reform and strategic roles and were actively directing the system towards change. Many staff members in both governmental and non-governmental organisations were directing the system towards a stress on intervention in the interests of the child in the context of its family. Roth-Szamoskozi found that staff members felt the need of a more accurate evaluation system which would enable them to show their results more clearly.