Talents in Migration Processes in the Conditions of the Czech Republic of the Nineties

The transformation of the 1990s has had a bearing on the academic and scientific world, as is becoming increasingly obvious with the changing numbers of foreign students wishing to study in the Czech Republic and of Czech students wishing to study abroad, the virtual collapse of doctoral studies, and the rapidly increasing age of Czech academics (placed at 48 by official sources and at rather more by this research). At the same time there is an apparent lack of interest in analysing and understanding these trends, which Mr. Cermak terms an ostrich policy, although his research showed that academics are in fact both aware and concerned about them. The mid-1990s migration of talent to and from R+D in the Czech Republic is also reflected in the number of talented Czech students studying abroad, who represent the largest and most interesting group of actual and potential migrants. Mr. Cermak's study took the form of a Delphi enquiry participated in by 44 specialists, including experts in the problems of higher education and science policy from the Presidium of the Higher Education Council (n = 23), members of the Council's Science and Research Commission (n = 14), former and current managers of higher education authorities (n = 4) and selected participants of the longitudinal talent research (n = 3). Questions considered included the influence of continuing talent migration from domestic R+D on the efficiency of domestic higher education, the diversification of forms of the brain drain and their impact on other processes in society, the possibility of positive influence on the brain drain processes to minimise the risks it presents, and the use of the knowledge obtained about the brain drain. The study revealed a clear drop of interest in brain drain problems in higher education in the mid-1990s, which is probably related to the collapsed of Czech R+D in the field of talent education. The effects on this segment of the labour market appeared earlier, with a major migration wave in 1991-1993 which significantly "cleared" the area of scientific talent. In addition, prospective talents from the ranks of younger students have not been integrated into domestic R+D, leading to the increasing average age of those working in this field. "Talent scouting" tended to be oriented towards much younger individuals, even in some cases towards undergraduate students. The R+D institutions deprived of human resources considered as basic in a functional R+D system have lost much of their dynamism and so no longer attract not only domestic talent but also talent from other regions. As a result the public, including the mass media and political structures, have stopped regarding the support of domestic science as a priority. This is clear both among the young people who are important for the future development of R+D (support for the education of talented children has dropped), from the drop in the prestige of this area as a profession among university students, and from the lack of explicit support for R+D by any of the political parties. On the basis of his findings Mr. Cermak concludes that there is no basis for the belief that the brain drain will represent a positive force in stimulating the development of the open society. Migration data shows that the outflow of talent from the Czech Republic far exceeds the inflow, and that the latter is largely short-term. Not only has the number of returning Czech professors dropped to half of its level at the beginning of the 1990s, but they also tend to take up only short-term contracts and retain their foreign positions. Recruitment of scientific talent from other countries, including the Slovak Republic, is limited. Furthermore internal contacts between those already involved in R+D have been badly hit by economic pressures and institutional co-operation has dropped to a minimum. There have been few moves to counteract this situation, the only notable one being the Program 250, launched in 1996 with government support to try and attract younger (i.e. under 40) talent into R+D. Its resources are however limited and its effects have not so far been evaluated. The deficit of academic and scientific talent in the Czech Republic is increasing and two major directions of academic work are emerging. Classic higher education science based on the teaching process is declining, largely due to economic factors, while there is an increasing emphasis on special; ad hoc projects which cannot be related directly to teaching but are often interesting to specialists outside the Czech Republic. This is shown clearly by the increase in publishing and in participation in domestic and foreign grant projects, which often serve to supplement the otherwise low salaries in the higher education sector. This tend was also accelerated by the collapse of applied R+D in individual sectors of the national economy and by substantial cutbacks in the Czech Academy of Sciences, which formerly fostered such research. Some part of the output of this research can be used in the education system and its financial contribution does significantly affect the stability of the present staff, but Mr. Cermak sees it as generally unfavourable for the development of talent education. In addition, it has led to a certain resignation on the question of integration into international structures, due to the emphasis on short-term targets, commercial advantages and individualism rather than team work. At the same time, he admits that these developments reflect those in other areas of the transformation in the Czech Republic.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.