A Computational Model for Processing Lexical Information"

The group analysed some syntactic and phonological phenomena that presuppose the existence of interrelated components within the lexicon, which motivate the assumption that there are some sublexicons within the global lexicon of a speaker. This result is confirmed by experimental findings in neurolinguistics. Hungarian speaking agrammatic aphasics were tested in several ways, the results showing that the sublexicon of closed-class lexical items provides a highly automated complex device for processing surface sentence structure. Analysing Hungarian ellipsis data from a semantic-syntactic aspect, the group established that the lexicon is best conceived of being as split into at least two main sublexicons: the store of semantic-syntactic feature bundles and a separate store of sound forms. On this basis they proposed a format for representing open-class lexical items whose meanings are connected via certain semantic relations. They also proposed a new classification of verbs to account for the contribution of the aspectual reading of the sentence depending on the referential type of the argument, and a new account of the syntactic and semantic behaviour of aspectual prefixes. The partitioned sets of lexical items are sublexicons on phonological grounds. These sublexicons differ in terms of phonotactic grammaticality. The degrees of phonotactic grammaticality are tied up with the problem of psychological reality, of how many degrees of this native speakers are sensitive to. The group developed a hierarchical construction network as an extension of the original General Inheritance Network formalism and this framework was then used as a platform for the implementation of the grammar fragments.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.