Immigrants in the Czech Republic (With Special Reference to Ukrainian Workers and "Western" Firms Operating in Prague)

International migration has increased rapidly in the Czech Republic, with more than 150,000 legally registered foreign residents at the end of 1996. A large proportion of these are in Prague - 35% of the total in December 1996. The aim of this project was to enrich the fund of information concerning the "environment", reasons and "mechanisms" behind immigration to the Czech Republic. Mr. Drbohlav looked first at the empirical situation and on this basis set out to test certain well-known migration theories. He focused on four main areas: 1) a detailed description and explanation of the stock of foreign citizens legally settled in Czech territory, concentrating particularly on "economic" migrants; 2) a questionnaire survey targeting a total of 192 Ukrainian workers (98 in the fall 1995 and 94 in the fall 1996) working in Prague or its vicinity; 3) a second questionnaire survey of 40 "western" firms (20 in 1996 and 20 in 1997) operating out of Prague; 4) an opinion poll on how the Czech population reacts to foreign workers in the CR. Over 80% of economic immigrants at the end of 1996 were from European countries, 16% from Asia and under 2% from North America. The largest single nationalities were Ukrainians, Slovaks, Vietnamese and Poles. There has been a huge increase in the Ukrainian immigrant community over both space (by region) and time (a ten-fold increase since 1993), and at 40,000 persons this represents one third of all legal immigrants. Indications are that many more live and work there illegally. Young males with low educational/skills levels predominate, in contrast with the more heterogeneous immigration from the "West". The primary reason for this migration is the higher wages in the Czech Republic. In 1994 the relative figures of GDP adjusted for parity of purchasing power were US$ 8,095 for the Czech Republic versus US$ 3,330 for the Ukraine as a whole and US$ 1,600 for the Zakarpatye region from which 49% of the respondents in the survey came. On an individual level, the average Czech wage is about US$ 330 per month, while 50% of the Ukrainian respondents put their last monthly wage before leaving for the Czech Republic at under US$ 27. The very low level of unemployment in the latter country (fluctuating around 4%) was also mentioned as an important factor. Migration was seen as a way of diversifying the family's source of income and 49% of the respondents had made their plans together with partners or close relatives, while 45% regularly send remittances to Ukraine (94% do so through friends or relatives). Looking at Ukrainian migration from the point of view of the dual market theory, these migrants' type and conditions of work, work load and earnings were all significantly worse than in the primary sector, which employs well educated people and offers them good earnings, job security and benefits. 53% of respondents were working and/or staying in the Czech Republic illegally at the time of the research, 73% worked as unqualified, unskilled workers or auxiliary workers, 62% worked more than 12 hours a day, and 40% evaluated their working conditions as hard. 51% had no days off, earnings were low in relation to the number of hours worked. and 85% said that their earnings did not increase over time. Nearly half the workers were recruited in Ukraine and only 4% expressed a desire to stay in the Czech Republic. Network theories were also borne out to some extent as 33% of immigrants came together with friends from the same village, town or region in Ukraine. The number who have relatives working in the Czech Republic is rising, and many wish to invite relatives or children to visit them. The presence of organisations which organised cross-border migration, including some which resort to organising illegal documents, also gives some support for the institutional theory. Mr. Drbohlav found that all the migration theories considered offered some insights on the situation, but that none was sufficient to explain it all. He also points out parallels with many other regions of the world, including Central America, South and North America, Melanesia, Indonesia, East Africa, India, the Middle East and Russia. For the survey of foreign and international firms, those chosen were largely from countries represented by more than one company and were mainly active in market services such as financial and trade services, marketing and consulting. While 48% of the firms had more than 10,000 employees spread through many countries, more than two thirds had fewer than 50 employees in the Czech Republic. Czechs formed 80% plus of general staff in these firms although not more than 50% of senior management, and very few other "easterners" were employed. All companies absolutely denied employing people illegally. The average monthly wage of Czech staff was US$ 850, with that of top managers from the firm's "mother country" being US$ 6,350 and that of other western managers US$ 3,410. The foreign staff were generally highly mobile and were rarely accompanied by their families. Most saw their time in the Czech Republic as positive for their careers but very few had any intention of remaining there. Factors in the local situation which were evaluated positively included market opportunities, the economic and political environment, the quality of technical and managerial staff, and cheap labour and low production costs. In contrast, the level of appropriate business ethics and conduct, the attitude of local and regional authorities, environmental production conditions, the legal environment and financial markets and fiscal policy were rated very low. In the final section of his work Mr. Drbohlav looked at the opinions expressed by the local Czech population in a poll carried out at the beginning of 1997. This confirmed that international labour migration has become visible in this country, with 43% of respondents knowing at least one foreigner employed by a Czech firm in this country. Perception differ according to the region from which the workers come and those from "the West" are preferred to those coming from further east. 49% saw their attitude towards the former as friendly but only 20% felt thus towards the latter. Overall, attitudes towards migrant workers is neutral, although 38% said that such workers should not have the same rights as Czech citizens. Sympathy towards foreign workers tends to increase with education and the standard of living, and the relatively positive attitudes towards foreigners in the South Bohemia region contradicted the frequent belief that a lack of experience of international migration lowers positive perceptions of it.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.