Towards a Variety of Family Models: Economic Contributions of Spouses and Family Power

In Western societies the increase in female employment (especially among married women) is seen as having brought about the crisis of the traditional model of the family, reinforcing the position of the "modern" model - the egalitarian family with two working spouses and a "dual-career" family. In contrast, the transitional situation in the post-communist countries during the 1990s is producing a crisis of the family with two working spouses (the basic type of the communist period) and leading to new power relations within the family. While the growth of dual-earner households in this century has implied modification of family models towards greater symmetry of responsibility for breadwinning and homemaking, there is considerable evidence that women's increased employment does not necessarily lead to a more egalitarian approach to gender roles within the family. The group set out to investigate the economic situation of families and economic power within the fame as a crucial factor in the transformation of families with two working spouses in order to reveal the specific patterns of gender contracts and power relations within the family that are emerging in response to the current political and economic transformation. They opted for a comparative approach, selecting the Czech Republic as a country where the very similar tendencies of a few years ago (almost 100% of women employed and the family as a realm of considerable private freedom where both women's and men's gender identities and the traditional distribution of family responsibilities were largely preserved) are combined with a very different experience in terms of economic inequalities during the 1990s to that of Russia. In the first stage of the study they surveyed 300 married couples (150 in each country) on the question of breadwinning. They then carried out in-depth interviews with 10 couples from each country (selected from among the educated layers of the population), focusing on the process of the social construction of gender, using breadwinning and homemaking as gender boundaries which distinguish men from women. By analysing changes in social position and the type of interpersonal interaction of spouses they distinguished two main types of family contracts: the neo-traditional "communal sharing" (with male breadwinner, traditional distribution of family chores and negotiated family power) and the modern one based on negotiated agreement. The most important pre-conditions of husband-wife agreement about breadwinning seemed to imply their overall gender ideology rather than the economic and/or family circumstances. In general, wives were more likely to express egalitarian views, supporting the blurring or even elimination of many gender boundaries. Husbands, on the other hand, more often gave responses calling for the continued maintenance of gender boundaries. The analysis showed that breadwinning is still an important gender boundary in these cultures, one that is assumed unless it is explicitly questioned and that is seen as part of what makes a man a "real man". The majority of respondents seemed to be committed to egalitarian ideology on gender roles and the distribution of family tasks, including decision making, but this is contradicted by the persistent idea of the husband as the breadwinner. This contradiction is more characteristic of the Russian situation than of the Czech. The quantitative study showed a difference in prevailing family models between the two countries, with a clearer shift towards the traditional family contract in the Russian case. The Czechs were more likely to consider their partnerships as based on negotiated agreement, while the Russians saw theirs as based on egalitarian contract, in both cases seeing this as the norm. The majority of couples said they felt satisfied with their marriage, although in both countries wives seemed to be less satisfied. There was however a difference in the issues that aroused dissatisfaction, with Czech women being more sensitive to issues such as self-realisation, personal independence, understanding and recognition in the family, and Russians to issues of love, understanding and recognition. The most disputed area for the majority of families was chores in the home, presumably because in many families both husband and wife were working hard outside the home and because a number of partners had differing views as to the ideal distribution of chores within the family. The distribution of power in the family seems to be linked to the level of well being. The analysis showed that in the dominant democratic model there is still an inverse connection between family leadership and well being: the more prominent the wife's position as head of the family is, the lower the level of family income. This may reflect both the husband's refusal to play the leading role in the family and even his rejection of any involvement in family issues in such a family. The qualitative research revealed that both men and women see the breadwinning role to be an essential part of masculine identity, a role which the female partner would take on temporarily to assist the male but not permanently since this would threaten the gender boundaries and the man's identity. At the same time, few breadwinners expressed a sense of job satisfaction and all considered their choice as imposed on them by the circumstances (i.e. having a family in difficult times). The group feel that family orientation and some loss of personal involvement in their profession is partly reflected in the fact that many of the men felt more comfortable and self-confident at home than at work. Women's work, on the other hand, was largely seen as a source of personal and self-realisation and social life. Eight out of ten of the Russian women interviewed were employed, although only two on a full-time basis, but none saw their jobs as adding substantially to the family budget. Both partners see the most important factor as the wife's wish to work or stay at home, and do not think it wise for the wife to work at the expense of her part of the "family contract", although husbands from the "egalitarian" relationships expressed more willingness to compromise. The analysis showed clearly that wives and husbands did not construct gender boundaries in isolation, with the interviews providing clear evidence of negotiation. At the same time, husbands' interpretations of their wives' employment were less susceptible to the influence of negotiation than were their gender attitudes and norms about breadwinning. One of the most interesting aspects of the spouses' negotiations was the extent to which they disagreed about what they seemed to have agreed upon. Most disagreements about the breadwinning boundaries, however, were over norms and were settled by changes in norms rather than in behavioural interpretation. Changes in norms were often a form of peace offering or were in response in changes in circumstances. The study did show, however, that many of the efforts at cooperation and compensation were more symbolic than real and the group found the plasticity of expressed gender ideology to be one of the most striking findings of their work. They conclude that the shift towards more traditional gednder distributions of incomes and domestic chores does not automatically mean the reestablishment of a patriarchal model of family power. On the contrary, it seems to be a compromise formation, relatively unstable, temporary and containing self-defeating forces as the split between the personal and professional value of work and its social value expressed in a money equivalent cannot be maintained for generations.

The Charity and the Poverty

At the end of the middle Ages, financial savings institutions developed, largely in response to the increasingly usurious money-lending practices of the Jews and to the adaptation of church authorities to the by then well developed commercial and financial operations. It was the Franciscan Order that took the initiative to develop such institutions, first in Italy and later in other western European Mediterranean towns. These were the so-called Monte di Pieta, which lent money at low rates of interest taking objects in pawn as security. However, as they had to operate with circulating capital and on the principles of savings banks, they may be considered to be the predecessors of modern banks. Although charity was declared in the very names of these institutions, this was no longer in the sense of the medieval mercy towards the virtuous poor, but more a support for impoverished members of higher social strata, as loan applicants had to place valuable movable property in pawn, meaning that they first had to possess such property. In spite of this, the institutions had the character of the primeval accumulation of capital, although not so much for individuals as for a community or, in the latter's name, for a commune, i.e. the local authority, which at least in the cases of Koper and Piran was also the founder. However, the stagnation of trade with the hinterland and the decline in the economic power of the Venetian Republic, particularly in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, pushed pawnshops into a more miserable existence, with ups and downs linked with the irregularities of profit-making on behalf of the institution, particularly by its clerks.

Changes in Psychological Characteristics of Working Adults in Different Stages of Economic Transition in Lithuania

Global economic changes have psychological consequences and Mr. Lepeska set out to assess these changes in working adults in Lithuania between 1993 and 1997. He surveyed two groups of working adults, with a total of 200 people, randomly selected and representing different organisations and professions. In both groups around 30% of participants were managers, with the remainder working in non-managerial positions. The participants were surveyed twice, once in 1993 and the second time in 1997,using various psychodiagnostic tools to measure their psychological characteristics. The results showed that strategies for coping with stress have changed, with problem solving strategies being used more often, and avoidance behaviour or seeking social support less. Men tended to have rejected these strategy more radically than women. Attitudes towards work had become more positive, with managers' attitudes having changed more significantly than those of employees from lower levels of organisations. Younger people were more positive towards work-related changes, while situational anxiety tended to increase with age, although overall it remained low. Mr. Lepeska found that while there were some indications of an increasing individualist in relation to peers, the traditional collective orientation of Lithuanian adults had if anything increased. People have become more accepting of an unequal distribution of power, making it difficult to increase the participation of subordinates in decision making. He also noted a tendency for Lithuanians to see their organisations as traditional families, expecting them to take care of them physically and economically in return for loyalty. The strong feminine orientation with its stress on interpersonal relations and overall quality of life has also strengthened, but the ability of Lithuanians to take initiative and control their environment was relatively low. Mr. Lepeska concludes that organisations should seek to recruit people who are able to adjust more easily to changes and consider measuring dominance, individualism, and attitudes to work-related change and situational anxiety in the process of professional selection. There should also be more emphasis on team building and on training managers to maintain closer relationships with their subordinates so as to increase the latter's participation in decision making. Good interpersonal relations can be a strong work motivator, as may be special attention to the security needs of older employees.

Economic and Social Changes in Czech Society after 1989: an Alternative View

The group presents an analysis of the development of the Czech society and economy during the 1990s. They believe that the Czech neo-liberal strategy of transformation led to a partial and uneven modernisation and that this strategy is unable to provide a firm basis for a complex process of modernisation. The increasing developmental problems encountered during 1996-1999 can be seen as empirical evidence of the inadequacy of the neo-liberal transformation strategy. These problems are connected to institutional shortcomings due to the excessive speed of privatisation, its form with certain important Czech innovations (particularly the voucher method and an attempt to resuscitate the Czech national capital) and with the overlooking of the importance of the legal framework and its enforcement. The overly hasty privatisation has created a type of 'recombinant property' which lacks the economic order necessary to stimulate efficiency in an atmosphere of prevailing social justice. A second reason for the present difficulties is the long-term lag behind the civilisation and cultural standards typical of the advanced European countries. The first steps of the Czech transformation concentrated mainly on changes in the institutions important for the distribution of power and wealth and largely neglected the necessity of deep-reaching modernisation of Czech society and the economy. The neo-liberal strategy created conditions conducive to predatory and speculative behaviour at the expense of creative behaviour. Inherited principles of egalitarianism combined with undeserved economic privileges survived and were reinforced by important new developments in the same direction. This situation hinders the assertion of meritocratic motivations. The group advocates the development and implementation of a complex strategy of modernisation based on deliberate reforms, institutional changes and restructuring on the basis of strategic planning, and structural and regional policies which stress the role of cultivation of the institutional order and of the most important factors of economic growth and development.

The Hungarian Economic Elite After the Political Transition

Erzsebet Szalai (Hungary). The Hungarian Economic Elite after the Political Transition. Ms. Szalai is a research fellow in the Institute of Political Sciences in Budapest and worked on this project from July 1996 to June 1998. In the period following the political changes of 1989, the leading forces of the economic elite have gained increasing superiority over the political and cultural elites, with the clear ambition of putting the latter to their service. The power relations within the economic elite were characterised by "a war of all against all". The desire to gain precedence over others became an openly declared value. The formation of estates and the intensification of competition became embodied in a multitude of lobbies which cropped up to assert short-term interests. After the state socialist period, possession of at least two of the social, economic and cultural forms of capital is necessary to join one of the three segments of the elite: political, cultural or economic. What defines the ability of the members of the three elite groups to assert their interests is their ability to convert any of the three types of capital into another. That is to say, the basis on which they can retain and extend their position is "symbolic capital" as interpreted by Bourdieu. The concept of symbolic capital is useful for describing the power relations following the collapse of state socialist systems and societies. In the state-socialist system, the political, economic and cultural spheres are tightly interwoven, and this interpenetration slackens only slowly after the system's disintegration. A close institutional relationship between the three spheres continues to make it easier for power actors to convert social, economic and cultural capital from one type to another. Symbolic capital, or the easy transfer between the three spheres, in turn reproduces the institutional relationship, or more precisely, complicates the separation of the three spheres after the fall of state socialism.